The Idolatry of Philosophy : Johann Georg Hamann's Critique of his Contemporaries as Driven by his Notion of Philosophical Superstition and Idolatry by Cierzan, Matthew
The Idolatry of Philosophy 
 
Johann Georg Hamann’s Critique of his Contemporaries as Driven by his 
Notion of Philosophical Superstition and Idolatry 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation  
zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde 
der 
Philosophischen Fakultät 
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
zu Bonn 
vorgelegt von  
Matthew Cierzan 
aus 
Iowa, die Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 
Bonn 2019 
 
2 
 
Gedruckt mit der Genehmigung der Philosophischen Fakultät  
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
 
 
 
Zusammensetzung der Prüfungskommission: 
Prof. Dr. Rainer Schäfer 
(Vorsitzender) 
Prof. Dr. Michael Schulz 
(Betreuer) 
Prof. Dr. Phil. Andreas Pangritz 
(Gutachter) 
PD Dr. Christian Rode 
(weiteres prüfungsberechtigtes Mitglied) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 13.7.2018 
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abbreviations and Translations .......................................................................................................................................... 6 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 
Course of Argumentation .................................................................................................................................................................. 7  
Superstition (Aberglaube) – Idolatry (Abgotterei, Idolatrie, Götzendienst) ....................................................................... 8 
Tracing the Thread .................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 
Contribution of this Study ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14 
Example: Socratic Memorabilia.................................................................................................................................................... 15 
Glimpsing the Issue............................................................................................................................................................................ 15  
CHAPTER I ................................................................................................................................................................................. 18  
Review of Scholarship ............................................................................................................................................................................. 18 
Faith, Superstition, and Idolatry .................................................................................................................................................. 22 
Critique Criticized ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 23 
Empiricism and the Blind Philosophers ........................................................................................................................................... 28 
Setting the Stage: Hamann’s Interlocutors ..................................................................................................................................... 30 
A Post-Cartesian Epoch .................................................................................................................................................................... 31 
The Rationalism of Christian Wolff ............................................................................................................................................ 32 
Encyclopedic Knowledge ................................................................................................................................................................ 34  
The Berlin Enlightenment .............................................................................................................................................................. 36 
Idolatry, Superstition, and Atheism ................................................................................................................................................... 40 
CHAPTER II ............................................................................................................................................................................... 45  
Turning Things on Their Head: The Superstition of His Century ........................................................................................... 45 
The Enlightenment Critique of Superstition .................................................................................................................................. 47 
Purging Religion of Superstition ......................................................................................................................................................... 49 
Foundation of Faith: the Foundation of Knowledge ................................................................................................................... 51 
The Empirical Starting Place of Faith .............................................................................................................................................. 53 
Empiricism, Language, Reason ........................................................................................................................................................... 56 
Language and Communication ........................................................................................................................................................... 57 
Religious Faith ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 59 
The Singularity of the Christian Faith ....................................................................................................................................... 60 
Faith and Historical Revelation .................................................................................................................................................... 61 
Christian Faith: a Framework for Philosophy........................................................................................................................ 64 
Condescension of God....................................................................................................................................................................... 67 
4 
 
Faith and Reason: Two Interdependent Faculties of Human Knowledge .......................................................................... 71 
Philosophical Superstition ..................................................................................................................................................................... 76 
Hamann's Critique of Superstition and Hans Blumenberg's Metaphorology ................................................................... 77 
Foundations of Philosophy beyond Reason: Blumenberg's Absolute Metaphors ................................................. 78 
Hamann’s Notion of History .......................................................................................................................................................... 85 
The Road to Superstition: Its Causes ................................................................................................................................................. 88 
Limitations of Abstract Reason .................................................................................................................................................... 88 
Reason, Knowledge, and Eschatology ....................................................................................................................................... 90 
Contingency of Reason and Faith ................................................................................................................................................ 91 
System as the Worst Form of Abstraction ............................................................................................................................... 94 
Abstraction Relativized .................................................................................................................................................................... 96 
Examples of Superstition ....................................................................................................................................................................... 98 
Superstition in Kant’s System of Pure Reason ....................................................................................................................... 98 
Superstitious Elements in the Thought of Moses Mendelssohn: “The State of Nature” .................................. 103 
Chapter III .............................................................................................................................................................................. 107 
From Superstition to Idolatry ........................................................................................................................................................... 107 
Philosophical Idols Specified ............................................................................................................................................................. 110 
The Idol of the Economics of Reason: Johann Christoph Berens ......................................................................................... 111 
The Idol of Orthography of Reason: The New Apology of the Letter h ............................................................................. 119 
Title Page and Introductory Remarks on Hamann’s New Apology of the Letter h .............................................. 120 
Main Body of the New Apology of the Letter h..................................................................................................................... 123 
The Letter h Defends Itself .......................................................................................................................................................... 128 
Summary and Final Thoughts on the Idol of the Orthography of Reason .............................................................. 133 
The Idol of the Public ............................................................................................................................................................................ 135 
Understanding the Public in Hamann through the Concept of the Individual in Kierkegaard ..................... 136 
The Public as Philosophical Idol ............................................................................................................................................... 138 
Herder's Servitude to the Idol of the Public ........................................................................................................................ 139 
Bon sens, gesunde Vernunft and the Idol of the Public ..................................................................................................... 144 
Early Reservations and Hamann’s Curious Translation ................................................................................................ 145 
Bon sens Weaponized in the Service of the Enlightenment .......................................................................................... 146 
Summary and Transition ............................................................................................................................................................. 150  
Evolution of the Idolatry of Reason ................................................................................................................................................ 150 
Reason in his Pre-published Works ........................................................................................................................................ 151 
Early Publications and Abstract Reason ............................................................................................................................... 154 
The Middle Years: the Critique of the Idolatry of Reason Coming to Fruition ..................................................... 157 
The Idol of Abstract Reason Fully Developed ..................................................................................................................... 160 
The Reoccurrence of the Importance of Faith and Sense Experience ...................................................................... 162 
The First Purification of Philosophy ....................................................................................................................................... 163 
The Second Purification of Philosophy .................................................................................................................................. 164 
The Third Purification of Philosophy ..................................................................................................................................... 166 
Foundational Disagreements and the Idol of Reason ...................................................................................................... 168 
Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 172 
5 
 
Chapter IV ............................................................................................................................................................................... 173 
Hermeneutics of Humility ................................................................................................................................................................... 174 
Hermeneutics of Humility: Interdependency ..................................................................................................................... 179 
Hermeneutics of Humility: Conviviality of Reason (Geselligkeit der Vernunft) ................................................... 181 
Hermeneutics of Humility: Contingency ............................................................................................................................... 186 
Hermeneutics of Humility Summarized ................................................................................................................................ 187 
Hamann's Christianity in Relation to the Critique of Superstition ..................................................................................... 188 
Hamann’s Final Attempt at a Philosophical Approach ........................................................................................................... 190 
Life over Knowledge .............................................................................................................................................................................. 194 
Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................. 197 
References: ............................................................................................................................................................................ 199  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Abbreviations and Translations 
 
The present work utilizes the standard abbreviations for Hamann’s collected works 
and correspondence of Johann Georg Hamann as indicated below: 
 
N Johann Georg Hamann: Sämtliche Werke, Vol. I-VI, ed. Josef Nadler, Wien: Thomas-
Morus Presse im Herder-Verlag, 1949-1957. 
ZH Johann Georg Hamann: Briefwechsel, Vol. I-VII, ed. Arthur Henkel and Walther 
Ziesemer (Vol. I-III), Wiesbaden: Insel, 1955-1957; ed. Arthor Henkel (Vol. IV-VII), 
Wiesbaden: Insel, 1959; Frankfurt a.M: Insel, 1965-1979. 
 
Any other primary sources consulted besides the standard works will be cited in 
accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style. The primary English translation used is 
Kenneth Haynes, Writings on Philosophy and Language, Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Philosophy. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. There have been 
disparate translations of varying quality through the years; however, many of them are 
either difficult to find (e.g. Gwen Griffith-Dickson)1 or lacking in academic precision (e.g. 
Ronald Gregor Smith).2 Quotes of Hamann not by Haynes or otherwise noted are the 
author’s own. Also of note, Hamann's orthography (spelling, punctuation, etc.) has been 
retained in the German texts provided in the footnotes.3  
                                                          
1 Gwen Griffith Dickson and Johann Georg Hamann, Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism 
Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Bd. 67 (Berlin ; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1995). 
2 Ronald Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence (London: Collins, 1960). Smith 
provides very readable translations. However, they are highly interpretive, reflecting Smith’s reading of 
Hamann as a Christian existentialist. At times this leads Smith to oversimplify Hamann’s complex and 
tumultuous style. 
3 The reader accustomed to modern German texts will notice significant changes, some due to the spelling at 
the time (e.g. sein = seyn), others due to Hamann's singular style (e.g. his excessive use of dashes). 
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Introduction 
 
 The present work argues that Johann Georg Hamann's (1730-1788) critique of his 
contemporaries was driven by his notion of superstition and the corresponding idolatry. 
This bases itself on his broad understanding of faith, and further, its misappropriation (i.e. 
superstition). It outlines the motivation behind his authorship and his loose philosophical 
approach as he challenged the thinkers of his era via rigid critique sprinkled with wit. This 
distinctive style of critique runs throughout the variety of his thought. Although his 
criticism is informed by theology, it will be established that it is fundamentally 
philosophical insofar as its approach retains its poignancy removed from its religious 
foundations. This is not to be confused as asserting that Hamann’s thought was not 
theological; indeed, it was immersed in the Christian idiom - e.g. his idea of the 
condescension of God and its relationship to human knowledge. Be that as it may, this work 
will elucidate that his critique of his contemporaries was of a philosophical nature. 
Moreover, he resolved the tendency to create philosophical idols with an approach that 
here is termed hermeneutics of humility, and is based on the interdependency of the 
faculties of knowledge, a convivial understanding of reason, and the contingency of 
thought. 
Course of Argumentation 
 
The current study consists of four chapters, commencing with the interpretation of 
Hamann as a critic of his century. The first chapter gives a survey of Hamann scholarship as 
well as discussing some of the broad markers of how the critique of superstition and 
idolatry was one of the primary motivations of his authorship. Additionally, some of the key 
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interlocutors who were decisive in making up Hamann’s view of his century will receive 
commentary. The second chapter deals with Hamann’s notion and condemnation of the 
philosophical superstition of his contemporaries. Initially, it addresses a few eighteenth 
century views and opinions regarding superstition (Aberglaube) and faith (Glaube) – 
explicating how these philosophies, in Hamann’s view, cannot achieve what they set out to 
accomplish. Furthermore, why Hamann’s idea of superstation should be considered a 
philosophical superstition rather than a religious one will be discussed. Chapter three deals 
specifically with Hamann’s notion of idolatry: tracking how one gets from superstition to 
idolatry. Subsequently, specifying the major idols identified by Hamann in his critique will 
be undertaken, examining how and where this thinking manifests itself, as well as the 
deficiencies with these various perspectives. This culminates in a detailed account of how 
the idol of abstract reason evolved over the course of Hamann’s authorship. The fourth and 
final chapter will attempt to give a Hamannian reply to the idolatrous thought of his 
century. This consists not in juxtaposing his own system whereby all things might be 
measured, but in what might be called an organic/communicative approach: emphasizing 
the multiplicity of human capacities that receive and impart knowledge. Put differently, he 
seeks a dialogical, organic approach that manifests itself in a Hamannian hermeneutics of 
humility. A brief note on the terminology of superstition and idolatry will be helpful before 
plunging in to the specifics. 
Superstition (Aberglaube) – Idolatry (Abgotterei, Idolatrie, Götzendienst) 
 
Hamann does not use the word Aberglaube exclusively when accusing his 
contemporaries of superstition, but it is the dominant term. With the present study written 
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in English, a short terminological clarification of the words most commonly used by 
Hamann for superstition will be provided. Concurrently, these insights will aid in carefully 
constructing Hamann’s understanding of the term itself, and are therefore useful for those 
familiar with German. 
Aberglaube (superstition) is a compound word comprised of the conjunction, aber 
(but), and the noun, Glaube (faith). In older forms of German, aber is used as a prefix 
denoting a negative form, i.e. false, bad:4 hence a bad-faith, or false-faith. There is then a 
direct etymological connection within the word superstition to faith; it is a misplaced faith. 
For Hamann, it also carries the notion of negation, being against faith.5 Observe, however, 
that faith was not merely a confessional faith, but encompassed all types of revelation: in 
experience and in history as revealed in language mediated through senses.   
Although the etymological similarities between faith and superstition are in fact 
present in the English word superstition, they are not as readily apparent, and thus lack 
some of Hamann’s nuance and word play when using Aberglaube. Since many Enlighteners 
were concerned with superstition, some of the inferences made to faith are not readily 
apparent in English. 6 Working with this language, Hamann is clearly interacting with the 
themes of Enlightenment thought. 
 
                                                          
4 “Duden | Aber-glau-be, Seltener Aber-glau-ben | Rechtschreibung, Bedeutung, Definition, Synonyme, 
Herkunft,” accessed April 11, 2017, http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Aberglaube. 
5 This is supported by other synonyms Hamann uses, at times interchangeably. E.g. "Unglaube" (literally, un-
faith). 
6 Cf. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft I, § 40). Also, H-G Fritzsche, “Aberglaube,” ed. Jenssen, Theologisches Lexikon 
(Berlin: Union-Verl., 1978). “In Hegels Phänomenologie bezieht sich ‘der Kampf der Aufklärung mit dem 
Aberglauben’ auf einen der Vernunft und Wahrheit entgegengesetzten Glauben, wie der ‘im Allgemeinen ein 
Gewebe von Aberglauben, Vorurteilen und Irrtümern ist’ (VI B II a).” 
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Tracing the Thread 
 
Do not marvel at the individual character (Eigene) of my letters; it would be 
unbelievably easier for me to write shorter and more properly. There is a 
common thread (Faden) in all the chaos of my thoughts that an insider 
(Kenner) can find, and which above all my friend would recognize.7 – Johann 
Georg Hamann 
The quote above demonstrates that Hamann perceived his thought containing a unity or 
common motive. The present study traces the notion of superstition and the idolatry which 
follows from it as a common thread woven throughout Hamann’s thought as a common 
thread and motive of his authorship. This terminology deserves some definition before 
proceeding. 
At first glance, the use of the words idolatry and supersition may appear peculiar 
terms to utilize when writing a philosophical critique of the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment – with its etymology and meaning being religious in nature.8 Hamann’s own 
religious convictions aside, it will be argued that in order to properly grasp how he 
understood his century as idolatrous is key to his philosophical critique. To fully 
understand this critique requires an understanding of Hamann’s notion of faith, 
specifically, his assertion that all thought is preconditioned by faith (Glaube). Hamann’s 
understanding of faith is very broad; encompassing everything from the skepticism of 
David Hume (1711-1776) – he needed belief (Glaube) to even eat an egg or drink a glass of 
                                                          
7 ZH I, 311:9-13. To Johann Gotthelf Lindner, March 31st, 1759. “Wundern Sie sich nicht über das Eigene 
meiner Briefe; es wäre mir ungl. leichter kürzere und ordentlichere zu schreiben. In allem dem Chaos meiner 
Gedanken ist ein Faden, den ein Kenner finden kann, und den mein Freund vor allen erkennen würde.” 
8 The language of the superstition in philosophy has found some recent attention. Markus Gabriel, in his book 
addressing philosophy of mind, argues that some modern philosophical positions (e.g. Richard Dawkins) are 
themselves susceptible being their own type of superstition. Markus Gabriel, Ich ist nicht Gehirn: Philosophie 
des Geistes für das 21. Jahrhundert, Ungekürzte Ausgabe, 1. Auflage (Berlin: Ullstein, 2017), 93.   
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water9 – to the faith in the historical revelation mediated through language. Therefore, 
Haman asserted that philosophical thought cannot remove itself from being subject to 
varying arbitrary faith-based presuppositions. Since all human experience and reasoning is 
preconditioned by faith, abstract thought (e.g. rationalism, French bon sens) – with its 
denial of the dependency on faith – or the misappropriation of faith – leads Hamann to 
accuse these philosophical approaches of superstition (Aberglaube). Often Hamann’s 
accusations were a response to the elevating of one human capacity of knowledge to the 
detriment of others. If all philosophy is engaged in faith-based commitments (e.g. the 
various postulates of a state of nature or reason that exists apart from history), then failing 
to acknowledge these commitments – and placing the object or results of these 
presuppositions as supreme – is indeed partaking in philosophical idolatry. Even positions 
that sought to establish themselves upon principles of sound reason, for example, to 
Hamann were engaging in faith as any type of first principles were based in faith according 
to him. In taking their respective faith commitments without acknowledging their 
contingency, they are indubitably “serving”, in Hamann’s mind, a philosophical idol. 
Generally this takes the form of a quest for totality, certainty, or systematic purity, 
expressed concretely in turning moral values into economics, the mathematical 
manipulation of nature, or epistemological certainty, to name a few examples.10 In addition 
                                                          
9 ZH I, 379:30-31. To Immanuel Kant, July 27th, 1759. “Der attische Philosoph, Hume, hat den Glauben nöthig, 
wenn er ein Ey eßen und ein Glas Waßer trinken soll.”  
10 Even the Roman Catholic Church comes under fire as Hamann sees it as a totalizing force. Despite the 
difference between the Enlightenment project and the Roman Catholic Church, in Hamann’s mind they have 
an analogous relationship in their tendency to abstract and systematize. He equated Enlightenment 
philosophy with Catholicism. Renate Knoll, Johann Georg Hamann und Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, vol. 7, 
Heidelberger Forschungen (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1963), 83. Haman was influenced by Martin Luther’s 
disparaging comments concerning the Roman Catholic Church. Luther’s comments on reason were also 
formative for Hamann, who had little exposure to Roman Catholicism in his daily life. However, in Hamann’s 
later days he showed much sympathy for Princess Gallitzin and there is uncertainty as to what his opinions 
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to this concept of the idolatrous nature of philosophy and abstract systems, his language is 
influenced by a Christian framework upon which his thought is based. As Hamann points to 
the subjective nature of all thought, he often juxtaposes religious terminology and language 
to the abstract, conceptual thought of his contemporaries. He does this to highlight what he 
believes to be the hidden, faith-based foundations of all thought. However, Hamann’s 
emphasis on faith should not be construed or confused with those who belief that he is 
suggesting a Christian ontology contrasting a secular one.11 
The answer or correction to the idolatry of his generation is expressed much more 
subtly, most of the time entrenched implicitly in the critiques themselves. This is not to say 
that there is no resolution, but only to point out that the solutions Hamann provides are 
cryptic in comparison to the specificity of his criticism. He does provide more clarity late in 
life in his correspondence with Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) and in Disrobing and 
Transfiguration. Insofar as he sees the idolatry of philosophy bound to its misappropriation 
of faith and the usurpation of one capacity of human knowledge over and above that of 
others, the correction is to restore, or at least recognize, the organic and communicative 
nature of human knowing. This consists in a focus on receptivity, response, and historical 
contingency. This focus was in opposition to the approaches of his contemporaries, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regarding Roman Catholicism would have been had he had more time to write before his death in Münster. 
Helene Stöcker, Palaestra: Zur Kunstanschauung des XVIII. Jahrunderts, vol. XXVI, Palaestra: Untersuchungen 
und Texte aus der Deutschen und Englischen Philologie (Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1904), 74. 
11 John Milbank attempts to fit Hamann into his overarching scheme of the “ontology of violence” advanced by 
secular reason and a Christian “ontology of peace”. The difficulty lies in the fact that these two categories are 
so encompassing, and despite Hamann’s arguable sympathies with any view that regards reason as grounded 
in metaphysical claims, Milbank merely places Hamann into a group of counter-secular thinkers. One must 
only look to Hamann’s own large differences between the other thinkers (e.g. Herder) to realize the problem 
with placing Hamann into such a scheme. Furthermore, Hamann’s issues with abstract reason do not stem 
from its “violence” but rather its presumption of being beyond the trappings of belief in first principles. See, 
John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed (Oxford, UK ; Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Pub, 2006), 4. 
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manifested most clearly in the rationalist use of abstract reason. In regards to the 
rationalist, one first comes to the world, imposes a view on the world through the intellect 
according to Hamann. In contrast, he looks first to experience before moving on to the 
manner in which the subject reasons. However, he should not be understood as an 
empiricist. One does not first look at the world (i.e. rationalism) but is addressed by it.12 For 
Hamann, one is first spoken to, i.e. in nature, through the senses, in tradition, by language. 
Thereafter one responds, and in this dialogical scheme consists the wealth of human 
knowing. Knowledge is always something to be further discussed, continuously developing 
in the relation of one to another; knowledge is always growing and developing.13 All this 
hails a return to concrete nature of thought and the lived experience of individuals, which 
had been pushed aside in favor of abstract reason. Additionally, Hamann focused on both 
the historical/transmissional and the eschatological/prophetic. Each of these aspects of 
human thought were intrinsically linked to his theme of language, the former in the 
meaning of words being dependent upon both transmission and usage, and the latter by the 
purposefulness in speaking which creates future – eschatology. This could be spoken of as 
organic, living, whereas abstractions are static, lifeless. 
                                                          
12 The often used idea of a Weltanschauung (worldview) would be problematic in Hamann’s opinion insofar 
as a worldview focuses on the attempt to grasp and order the world according to the individual’s application 
of abstract reason. As will be seen over the course of the present study, Hamann held to a highly subjective 
and interpretive idea of the world. However, this was far from a worldview in the Kantian sense. According to 
Hamann, one is always first addressed in experience, and from that starting point begins the process of 
interpretation. 
13 Knowledge about the world should be understood as living, organic; it is not like a machine that might be 
better ordered and constructed. Elisabeth Emter discusses the relationship between “new” scientific 
knowledge and the Hamannian h (as in the New Apology of the Letter h). Her insights help illuminate how one 
might interpret the statements made here regarding the developing nature of knowledge. She deals 
particularly in the thought of Ernst Jünger. New knowledge was seen as a type of perception (Empfindung) or 
imagining (Vorstellung) that related to a larger development, but not in a positivistic sense. See, Elisabeth 
Emter, Literatur und Quantentheorie: Die Rezeption der Modernen Physik in Schriften zur Literatur und 
Philosophie deutschsprachiger Autoren (1925-1970), Quellen und Forschungen zur Literatur- und 
Kulturgeschichte 2 (Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 1995), 138. 
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Contribution of this Study 
 
 That critique was one of the hallmarks of Hamann’s authorship would find little to 
no rebuttal within contemporary Hamann scholarship. It may, in fact, be one of the only 
issues which would be affirmed by all interpreters of Hamann. However, most research 
focuses on isolated elements within the critique itself, e.g. his philosophy of language, his 
existential emphasis, his aesthetics, his place in the history of thought (e.g. Sturm und 
Drang, Frühromantik), general summaries, or the appropriation of elements of his thought 
into systematic theology.14 Although this research has been very worthwhile, what is 
unique about the present study is that it approaches his corpus from a new vantage point. 
Namely, this study traces a notion explicitly used throughout his writings in order to 
expose a driving motivation of his critique. Proceeding in this manner provides a 
comprehensive reading of Hamann’s authorship. In doing so, the present study develops 
what might be called a notion of philosophical superstition and idolatry based on his idea of 
faith. This concurrently allots for the fragmentary, anti-systematic nature of his thought.15 
One can speak much more definitively about a motivation and disposition towards human 
knowledge in Hamann than specific ideas which can be further developed by a school of 
thought. This is because knowledge is always in dialogue, always underway, always 
informed by faith; and faith is always contingent. Hence there is justification in reading a 
unity in Hamann’s authorship as long as one does not develop philosophical concepts void 
                                                          
14 Sven-Aage Jørgensen, “Hamanns Streitkultur,” in Sturm und Drang: Geistiger Aufbruch 1770-1790 im Spiegel 
der Literatur, ed. Bodo Plachta and Winfried Woesler (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1997), 67–77. Also, Emerich 
Coreth, Harald Schöndorf, and Emerich Coreth, Philosophie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, 4. Aufl, Grundkurs 
Philosophie, Bd. 8 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008), 223. 
15 This is because Hamann never considers philosophy being able to attain any sense of totality regarding 
existence. Philosophical systems that either purport or imply a totality or definitiveness regarding knowledge 
must be superstitious according to Hamann. Consequently Hamann's thought can be not only classified as not 
only unsystematic, but anti-systematic. 
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of history, contingency, and subjectivity. This presents a challenge as well, delineating an 
approach without becoming merely conceptual and abstract. 
Example: Socratic Memorabilia 
 
To preface, it will be useful to make some preliminary observations and undertake a 
cursory explication of the first two pages of the Socratic Memorabilia – the first text of 
Hamann’s self-proclaimed authorship. It provides a concrete example of the philosophical 
critique of idolatry and will be beneficial in connecting the approach taken up by the 
present study. Although in its initially stages, these initial pages of the Socratic Memorabilia 
reveal how Hamann began to interpret his age as superstitious, indeed, idolatrous. The 
same impulse that motivated Hamann to write this first text would continue throughout his 
authorship. 
Glimpsing the Issue 
 
His critique of superstition would increasingly come to address abstract reason. 
Even in the first text of his self-proclaimed “authorship” the superstitious and idolatrous 
nature of his enlightened but “blind” contemporaries is front and center. Superstition and 
idolatry show up in tandem on the very first page of his published authorship. He 
addresses the Public, whom he accuses his friends Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and 
Christoph Berens (1729-1792) of serving. Hamann wishes to free them from their 
servitude through the writing of the Socratic Memorabilia. In addressing the Public he 
states, “I throw myself, like the philosopher, at the hearing feet of a tyrant. My gift is in 
nothing but the lumps by which a god, like you, once burst in sunder. So let them be given 
16 
 
to a pair of your worshipers, whom I wish to purge with these pills from devotion to your 
vanity.”16 What is of interest here is the nature of the “Public” described by Hamann, which 
has its origin in superstition (Aberglaube). “We know that there is no idol in the world. 
Neither are you human, yet you must be a human image which superstition has made a 
god.”17 Furthermore, the language describing the Public parallels the biblical story of Elijah 
and the prophets of Baal.18 “You must know everything, and you learn nothing, you must 
judge everything, and you understand nothing, ever learning and never able to come to a 
knowledge of the truth, you are talking, or you are pursuing, you are on a journey, or 
peradventure you sleep, while your priests lift up their voice, and you should answer them 
and their mockery with fire.”19 Hence the Public cannot be understood as anything but an 
idol. The attributes of this idol are quite insightful for the development of Hamann’s 
critique of superstition and idolatry. Firstly, the entire section points to the abstract nature 
of this thing called the “Public”, e.g. “You [the Public] must know all things but never 
coming to a knowledge of the truth”. Significantly, faith is a precondition, “you find faith 
and do no miracles to earn it.”20 Berens and the young Immanuel Kant place their faith in, 
and consequently serve, this idol in their own respective way. Berens is in service to the 
                                                          
16 Johann Georg Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, trans. Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge Texts in 
the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5. N II, 59:23-27: 
Socratic Memorabilia. “Ich werfe mich wie der Philosoph zu den erhörenden Füssen eines Tyrannen. Meine 
Gabe besteht in nichts als Küchlein, von denen ein Gott, wie Du, einst barst. Überlaß sie daher einem Paar 
Deiner Anbeter, die ich durch diese Pillen von dem Dienst Deiner  Eitelkeit zu reinigen wünsche.” (N II, 59:23-
27).   
17 Hamann, 4. N II, 59:9-11: Socratic Memorabilia. “Wir wissen, daß es keinen Götzen in der Welt giebt. Ein 
Mensch bist du auch nicht; doch must Du ein menschlich Bild seyn, das der Aberglaube vergöttert hat.” 
18 1 Kings 18. 
19 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 4–5. N II, 59:15-19: Socratic Memorabilia. “Du must alles 
wissen, und lernst nichts; Du must alles richten, und verstehst nicht, lernst immerdar, und kannst nimmer zur 
Erkenntnis der Wahrheit kommen; Du dichtest, hast zu schaffen, bist über Feld, oder schläfst vielleicht, wenn 
Deine Priester laut ruffen, und Du ihnen und ihrem Spötter mit Feuer antworten solltest.” 
20 Hamann, 4. N II, 59:7-8: Socratic Memorabilia. “Du findest Glauben, und thust keine Zeichen denselben zu 
verdienen.” 
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political system of the day; full of “bourgeois virtues” (bürgerliche Tugenden) searching for 
the clarity of a “philosopher's stone” (Stein der Weisen), the purpose thereof was to lead to 
greater wealth.21 Hamann accuses him of propagating a general system of economics that 
placed value on commerce and trade to the detriment of other virtues.22 In Hamann’s mind 
this is a useless and vain task, and therefore he chooses to address him in, “the mystical 
language of a sophist, because wisdom will always be the most hidden secret of political 
economy”.23 Kant, on the other hand, is accused of supporting this endeavor through his 
philosophical system, particularly its attempts at universal knowledge – and hence totality 
– derived through his philosophical system, according to Hamann.24   
Richard Bauckham (1946*) defines an aspect of idolatry as, “treating something 
relative as though it were absolute.”25 This is akin to Hamann’s view in that some aspects of 
philosophical idolatry are its absolute and definitive nature. Hence Hamann’s own 
apprehension of creating any sort of philosophical system as it may in turn become a 
similar type of philosophical “idol”. Thus, one can catch a glimpse of how Hamann accused 
his contemporaries of philosophical idolatry.  
 
                                                          
21 Hamann’s employing alchemic terminology for that which would turn base metals into precious metal (i.e. 
gold, silver). For more on the various aspects and alchemic terminology see, Jörg Völlnagel, Alchemie: Die 
Königliche Kunst (München: Hirmer Verlag, 2012). 
22 Letters to Linder beginning in March, 1759. See, ZH I, 304-312. 
23 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 5. N II, 59:2-4: Socratic Memorabilia. “Ich habe für ihn in der 
mystischen Sprache eines Sophisten geschrieben; weil Weisheit immer das verborgenste Geheimnis der 
Politick [sic] bleiben wird.”  
24 It is important to keep in mind that the Kant addressed in the Socratic Memorabilia is the pre-critical Kant. 
Hamann would later address the Critique of Pure Reason, but here Kant is representive of "standard" 
Enlightenment philosophy. 
25 Richard Bauckham, The Bible in the Contemporary World: Hermeneutical Ventures (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015), 40. Bauckham’s position does not follow Hamann’s own; 
indeed, Bauckham is engaged in theology for the modern reader and is specifically speaking of how 
consumerism can be idolatrous.  Yet this concise description accords with aspects of Hamann's own regarding 
the philosophical idolatry of his age.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Review of Scholarship 
 
 Here at the outset it will be helpful to place this study within the already existing 
Hamann scholarship. This will reveal the uniqueness of the contribution as well as 
exposing upon which impulses it is based. At the most basic level, despite the variety of 
interpretations, one can discern two streams in Hamann scholarship at odds with each 
other.26 These two opposing streams can be constructed as negative and positive; the 
present study falling loosely into the category of the latter. What is meant by negative are 
those who either (a) laud Hamann’s historical influence, yet assert that his thought 
contains too much contradiction to be considered seriously in its own right, or (b) see him 
as a conservative harkening back to pre-modern thought, not merely archaic but pernicious 
to modern liberal goals.27 Contrarily, what is meant by positive – or what might also be 
called “constructive” thought – are those who tend to either (a) interpret Hamann’s 
authorship as consistent in its own right, only being difficult insofar as he rejects the 
                                                          
26 It should be noted that the following analysis deals with Hamann interpretation in the academic sense. The 
present study locates this beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century. Of course, during Hamann’s 
lifetime his writings received reviews and the generation thereafter felt his influence (e.g. Herder, Goethe, 
Schleiermacher). Still, this influence was mostly in relation to each thinker’s respective philosophy or 
theology and therefore does not fall under the category of academic scholarship, but would instead fall under 
reception. For the early sources see, Karl Hermann Gildemeister, Johann Georg Hamanns des Magus in Norden 
Leben und Schriften, vol. 1–6 (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1857).; Rudolf Unger, Hamann und die Aufklärung: Studien 
zur Vorgeschichte des romantischen Geistes im 18. Jahrundert, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1911).; 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings, ed. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13–14, 
73. 
27 Here negative is meant to merely indicate those who are critical to the degree that they primarily see 
detrimental aspects in Hamann’s thought. This is not to be confused with an apophatic approach. Insofar as 
Hamann is critical of metaphysical propositions regarding God, an apophatic approach could be argued for 
based upon his ideas of the condescension of God. Hamann does not advocate a “God of the gaps” type of 
theology such as that criticized by Dietrich Bonheoffer. See, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from 
Prison (Princeton, N.J.: Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2006), 310–12. 
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systematic nature of his theological and philosophical counterparts, or (b) seek to utilize 
him in building contemporary philosophical and theological forms of thought. 
 The central figures on the negative side are Rudolf Unger (1876-1942) and Isaiah 
Berlin (1909-1997), as they were the primary advocates of reading Hamann as an 
irrationalist.28 Unger embodies the first tenant of negative thought as he understands 
Hamann purely as a historical phenomenon.29 For Unger, this does not mean that Hamann’s 
thought has no utility, but it does mean that it plays only an influential role rather than a 
constructive one. Although his intention is to provide a historical explication, Unger ties 
together the disparate strands of Hamann’s authorship in the uniqueness of his personality 
(seelische Eigenart).30 Hamann is thereby reduced to an eccentric personality, a historical 
curiosity worth reading yet lacking substance upon which to build. Berlin represents a 
much more radical interpretation. Hamann’s irrationalism is seen as something outside of 
what is to be considered Enlightenment, founding, as it were, a counter-Enlightenment.31 It 
is not only that Hamann’s thought is plagued by conflicting impulses but Berlin finds these 
                                                          
28 They are not the only ones. Other early twentieth century Hamann commentators were also prone to put 
Hamann in the camp of irrationalism. However, this form of irrationalism was held as something that still 
brought some benefit to philosophy. It was not as radical as that which would be later postulated by Isaiah 
Berlin. Therefore, the understanding of the present study would still reject categorizing Hamann as part of 
some form of irrationalism; these somewhat dated sources were not seeking to dismiss him in the same way 
Berlin was. One should keep in mind that those early sources who categorized him as an irrationalist were 
not necessarily dismissive of his philosophical insights, perhaps only misguided it their use of the word, 
particularly with the many positive references to reason often overlooked. Cf. Hans-Emil Weber, “Zwei 
Propheten des Irrationalismus. J. G. Hamann und S. Kierkegaard als Bahnbrecher der Theologie des 
Christusglaubens,” Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift 28, no. 1 (1917); Ewald Burger, J. G. Hamann: Schöpfung und 
Erlösung im Irrationalismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929).  
29 The title of his monumental work, Unger, Hamann und die Aufklärung: Studien zur Vorgeschichte des 
romantischen Geistes im 18. Jahrundert., clearly reveals his interpretation of Hamann as having mere historical 
importance. 
30 Unger, 1:115. 
31 There are also parallels with Berlin’s view and that of John Milbank insofar as they both hold Hamann as 
representing a conservative reaction to liberalism. Cf. Katie Terezakis, “J. G. Hamann and the Self-Refutation 
of Radical Orthodoxy,” in The Poverty of Radical Orthodoxy, ed. Marko Zlomislić and Lisa Isherwood (Eugene, 
Or.: Pickwick Publications, 2012), 43. 
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thoughts detrimental to philosophical and political liberalism that should consequently be 
read with discretion and even suspicion.32 
 It should be noted that the above figures are quite dated. Unger certainly still carries 
importance in the furthering of academic research on Hamann, however, his interpretation 
has received thorough treatment and is largely a point of departure for contemporary 
historical analysis. Despite few researchers holding critical views of Hamann, keeping these 
voices in mind can be helpful as the majority of research on Hamann, as pointed out by 
Robert Sparling, has an overly laudatory tone.33 The present study sees Hamann’s thought 
as far ahead of its time in many ways, yet does not wish to ignore aspects of his thought 
often times ignored by contemporary scholarship.34 
The other and much larger group of Hamann interpreters, nearly unanimously 
reject the claim of irrationalism in Hamann.35 The defining characteristic of this line of 
interpretation is upholding Hamann’s thought as constructive and coherent. Many of these 
                                                          
32 Dan Smith represents the tendency to read Hamann as a precursor to fascism, particularly due to his 
influence on Herder. Smith focuses on Hamann’s vehemence in arguing against those who did not hold his 
opinion. Hamann did, indeed, argue in this fashion. However, he consistently argued against compelling 
others to conform to his position. See, Dan Smith, in Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg (Washington, D.C: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2007), 264. 
33 Robert Alan Sparling, Johann Georg Hamann and the Enlightenment Project (Toronto ; Buffalo [N.Y.]: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011), xiv. 
34 Many aspects of Hamann’s thought might nowadays be considered problematic, they can often be explained 
as corresponding to the main thinking of his time and they should not be ignored. E.g. Hamann’s Lutheran 
influences drove his ideas of the condescension of God, his skepticism of reason, system, and emphasis on 
faith. However, it was also grounded on a nationalistic understanding of the Lutheran Bible and its 
juxtaposition to French and English philosophy. It was a grounding for the German people and its denigration 
meant the denigration of the German people.  
35 A sample of authors representing this line of interpretation can be found in Oswald Bayer, ed., Johann Georg 
Hamann: “Der hellste Kopf seiner Zeit” (Tübingen: Attempto, 1998). Irrationalism is not something isolated to 
the Enlightenment period, but has recieved significant philosophical commentary. Cf. Jürgen Mittelstraß, 
Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. 4: Sp - Z (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1996), 72–74. 
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approaches seek to explicate a specific aspect found in Hamann: existentialism (Smith),36 
linguistic philosophy (Terezakis), 37  the relationship between nature and history 
(Veldhuis),38 etc. Others attempt extrapolations and applications into contemporary issues. 
How this is done takes on a myriad of forms: the encounter with the author God in 
Hamann’s conversion (Bayer),39 the use of intuitive reason as a legitimate form of thinking 
unrepresented by his contemporaries (O’Flaherty)40, a profound critic of secularity, 
providing philosophical and theological ways of overcoming the nihilism of modernity 
(Milbank, Betz),41 to spotlight a few. 
This overview - albeit in very broad strokes – helps bring the particular contribution 
of the present study into greater clarity. As can be inferred from the introduction, there is 
loose agreement between those who assert that there are cohesive elements contained 
within the tempest that is Hamann's authorship. The ambition of the present study is to 
make sense of Hamann’s thought by dealing strictly with an explication of Hamann's work 
as a critique of the superstition and idolatry of his century. This furthers the understanding 
of this opaque and bewildering figure in relation to his historical period and the internal 
                                                          
36 Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence. 
37 Terezakis, “J. G. Hamann and the Self-Refutation of Radical Orthodoxy.” 
38 Henri Veldhuis, Ein versiegeltes Buch: der Naturbegriff in der Theologie J.G. Hamanns (1730-1788) (Berlin: 
W. de Gruyter, 1994). 
39 Oswald Bayer, Zeitgenosse im Widerspruch: Johann Georg Hamann als Radikaler Aufklärer, Originalausg, 
Serie Piper, Bd. 918 (München: Piper, 1988), 69. Bayer sees this encounter as the primary motive (Urmotiv) 
behind Hamann’s thought. He also seeks to incorporate his insights in building a contemporary, Lutheran 
theology. Oswald Bayer, Schöpfung als Anrede: Zu einer Hermeneutik der Schöpfung, 2.,  Aufl (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1990). 
40 James C. O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann, Twayne’s World Authors Series, TWAS 527 (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1979). O’Flaherty sees an “intuitive” reason being developed by Hamann – yet existing elsewhere, 
e.g. some Indian wisdom – and then attempts to advance this thought within contemporary philosophy. 
41 John Milbank, “Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi,” in Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward, and Milbank, John (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 1999). And John Betz, After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of J.G. Hamann, Illuminations--
Theory and Religion (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Pub, 2009). 
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logic of his writings. Prior to dealing with the specifics of his critique of his critical century, 
one scholar in particular who dealt with Hamann's use of idolatry in his critique should be 
recognized and his contribution addressed. 
Faith, Superstition, and Idolatry 
 
It is not uncommon to find an allusion or brief reference to Hamann’s consideration 
of some positions as superstitious or idolatrous, as Hamann frequently utilized these terms 
when describing whichever system he happened to be critiquing. However, these 
comments remain peripheral to most studies, with the exception of W. M. Alexander’s book 
(1966), Johann Georg Hamann: Philosophy and Faith.42 The present study is indebted to 
Alexander’s book in a couple of significant ways. Firstly, he calls attention to the prevalence 
of Hamann’s focus on idolatry, and secondly, for his in depth research in gathering 
Hamann’s specific references to the term. 
Despite Alexander’s essential contribution, the present study is both unique and 
well warranted for a number of reasons. Alexander’s book was written not long after the 
publication of Nadler’s edition of Hamann’s corpus,43 and Alexander even makes mention of 
its cursory nature. Alexander primarily sought to give people in the English speaking world 
an introduction to Hamann.44 It is not only the introductory nature of his study, but the 
content itself which differs from the present work. Alexander does not attempt an 
                                                          
42 W. M. Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann Philosophy and Faith (Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 
1966). 
43Nadler’s edition sparked a renewed interest in Hamann research. Until that time, within English language 
research there existed few in depth studies. Instead, what was available tended to be introductory and of a 
very cursory nature. 
44 Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann Philosophy and Faith, 1. “This study is intended to be only an 
introduction.” 
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explication of the notion of idolatry in Hamann, but seeks an interpretation of Hamann’s 
ideas of philosophy which Alexander separated into three categories: idololatria, agnosia, 
and philologia. His book focuses on explicating the content of these three “categories” of 
philosophy – idololatria being a “false” philosophy, agnosia a philosophy before faith, and 
philologia a philosophy from faith. No attempt is made by Alexander to trace or present a 
cohesive notion of superstition and idolatry in Hamann beyond some cursory remarks. 
The present study differentiates itself by taking the notion of superstition and 
idolatry as a means of understanding Hamann’s authorship – as a motivation for, and 
foundational to, his critique. Moreover, the idea of faith is taken to be a broader faculty of 
thought than is presented in Alexander’s work. In fact, on the empirical, experiential level it 
would be incorrect to speak of a philosophy before faith insofar as faith permeates all sense 
experience, covered in depth in Chapter II. Hence, an elucidation and presentation of the 
notion of superstition and idolatry is necessary.  
Critique Criticized 
 
 The explication of Hamann’s critique of superstition and idolatry helps clarify 
Hamann’s published authorship as its entirety is marked by critique.45 Amidst the varying 
emphases (language, faith, revelation, etc.) he nearly always writes in response to 
something he deemed detrimental. He does not intend to build on a specific line of thought, 
at least at first appearance. 
                                                          
45 This excludes his letters and early unpublished devotional texts, which he did not consider as part of his 
authorship, but belonging to the broader category of his thought. 
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 This tendency of critique has early foundations in his interaction with Kant and 
Berens that led to him taking up the figure of Socrates, “I have written about Socrates in a 
Socratic Way. Analogy was the soul of his reasoning (Schlüsse), and he gave it irony for a 
body.”46 Irony would permeate much of his authorship.47 His critique of the dominance of 
criticism demonstrates this irony. Consider the following, “Nothing could be more 
ridiculous than to conduct a proof that is the contrary of a truth that has been not only 
firmly proven but also crowned. Hence I find myself under the pleasant obligation of being 
able to burn the incense of doubt to the fashionable spirit of my age.”48 Elsewhere he writes, 
“I believe, like Socrates, everything that the other person does – and from this starting 
place disrupt others in their belief.”49 Therefore, irony was often his weapon of choice. He 
would use the language of his interlocutor to undo the conceptual development intended 
by whichever text was under scrutiny. Furthermore, his unwavering conviction in the 
inability of any abstract system to comprise experience gave him confidence in the pursuit 
of sowing doubt. 
 The means whereby Hamann seeks to sow the seeds of doubt, or disturb the belief 
of others, starts first by accepting the premises of the other’s system and proceeds with 
                                                          
46 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 7. N II, 61:10-13: Socratic Memorabilia. “Ich habe über den 
Sokrates auf eine sokratische Art geschieben. Die Analogie war die Seele seiner Schlüsse, und er gab ihnen die 
Ironie zu ihrem Leibe.” 
47 Timo G. Schmidt points out that Hamann’s use of irony was also a way to demonstrate the multiple 
meanings present in a text. Timo G. Schmidt, Theologie in Bewegung: Glaube und Skepsis in kritischer 
Aufnahme von Johann Georg Hamann, Theologie, Kultur, Hermeneutik, Band 16 (Leipzig: Evangelische 
Verlagsanstalt, 2015), 82. 
48 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 119. N III, 41:16-20: Philological Ideas and Doubts. “Es 
würde allerhöchst lächerlich seyn, wider eine nicht nur fest bewiesene [sic] sondern auch gekrönte Wahrheit 
einen Gegenbeweis zu führen. Ich befinde mich daher in der angenehmen Nothwendigkeit dem Modegeiste 
meines Jahrhunderts durch Zweifel räuchern zu können.”  
49 ZH I, 377:26-27. Letter to Kant, July 1759, “Ich glaube wie Socrates alles, was der andere glaubt – und geh 
nur darauf aus, andere in ihrem Glauben zu stöhren.” 
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showing the flaws from within. He presents this procedure very clearly in his critique of 
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem: On Religious Power and Judaism:50  
Since however a great gulf between our religious and philosophical 
principles has been firmly established, equity demands that the author be 
compared only with himself and to no standard other than the one which he 
himself professes. Herr Mendelssohn believes in a state of nature, which he 
partly presupposes and partly opposes to society (as dogmatists do with a 
state of grace). I grant him and every dogmatist his belief, even if I am myself 
incapable of making either a proper concept or use of this hypothesis so 
familiar to most of the men of letters of our century.51  
Hamann’s aversion to the mainstream of his century is here on display. He goes on to 
demonstrate how this State of Nature is inconsistent according to the terms set out by 
Mendelssohn. Hamann seeks to show how the entire premise is based upon certain 
presuppositions which, when not granted, disrupt the entire endeavor, thereby sowing the 
seeds of doubt regarding his first principles. 
This is not to suggest that Hamann thought critique the highest principle, but that 
his particular role was one of reproof. So that, like Socrates, his contemporaries would see 
the poverty of their thought. According to Hamann, to know Socrates required imitation of 
him: accepting one’s lack of knowledge. This involved knowing oneself and a recognition of 
the piecemeal nature of all knowledge.52 Although highly critical, the critique found in 
Hamann’s thought is distinct. He did not hold that critique or doubt – in a Cartesian sense – 
                                                          
50 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush (Hanover: 
Published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1983). 
51 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 165, 166. 
52 Cf. To Herder May 8th, 1985. Z V, 432, “Unser Wißen ist Stückwerk – diese große Wahrheit ist kein 
Dogmatiker recht im stande zu fühlen, wenn er seine Rolle, und noch dazu gut spielen soll.” Trans. “Our 
knowledge is piecemeal – no dogmatician is properly able to feel this, if he is to play his part, and in addition, 
to play it well.” 
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should be the starting place of thought. For him, starting with the cogito was just another 
presumption of possessing the truth in an absolute, comprehensive sense that concealed 
prejudices, and lead to the denial and overlooking of the faith commitments of the 
respective theorists. This adds another layer to the irony: demonstrating the prejudice of a 
philosophy presuming to be untainted by superstitious prejudices.53  
As indicated above, the critique that marked Hamann’s writings was qualitatively 
different from the notion of critique held by other Enlighteners. The qualitative difference 
lies in the nature of critique. For many Enlightenment thinkers, critique was the means 
whereby the validity of ideas could be secured. They sought to weed out contradiction and 
thus achieve accurate, true propositions about reality, specifically by employing abstract 
reason.54 One of the major flaws in Enlightenment thought was the idolization of critique. In 
regards to Hamann, critique marked his authorship insofar as his writings addressed and 
criticized the flaws he saw in his century. It was not used by Hamann to secure a specific 
philosophical system or absolute. In characteristic fashion, Hamann turns the 
Enlightenment notion on its head, launching a critique of critique.  55  
                                                          
53 Miguel de Unamuno has a similar critique of rationalism and the philosophy of the Enlightenment - and of 
Descartes in particular - employed by Hamann. Cf. Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, ed. J. E. Crawford 
Flitch, 2014, 79–115. 
54 Much of this stemmed from the influence of Descartes. Cf. Horst Möller, Vernunft und Kritik: Deutsche 
Aufklärung im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Erstausg., 1. Aufl., [Nachdr.], Edition Suhrkamp Neue historische 
Bibliothek, 1269 = N.F., Bd. 269 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 43–44. 
55 Understanding the historical specificity is important, namely, Hamann’s position in the Enlightenment. 
However, Garrett Green makes the astute observation that Hamann breaks fully with the foundational 
premises of many thinkers of his time. This is in opposition to those, Oswald Bayer included, who paint the 
picture of Hamann taking the Enlightenment to its logical conclusions. Once Hamann points out logical 
inconsistencies he does not try to fix or enhance them, but juxtaposes an entirely different way of reading the 
world. Although not an irrationalist, he does represent a sharp break with those he critiques, as opposed to a 
further development of the ideas critiqued. See, Garrett Green, “Modern Culture Comes of Age: Hamann 
versus Kant on the Root Metaphor of Enlightenment,” in What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers 
and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt, Philosophical Traditions 7 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 299–301.  
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In many instances Hamann speaks of the dangers lurking behind the faith contained 
in the veracity of critique to garner truth. Consider:  
Your lying murderous philosophy has cleared nature out of the way, and why 
do you demand that we are to imitate her? – So that you can renew the 
pleasure by becoming murderers of the pupils of nature, too – Yes you 
delicate critics of art!, you go on asking what is truth, and make for the door, 
because you cannot wait for an answer to this question –56  
The methodological critique of many Enlightenment thinkers presumed a position outside 
of history, itself unsusceptible to critique that was not grounded on abstract reason.57 It is 
the means and aim of the criticism of Hamann’s time that he saw as most problematic, 
leading to the superstition present in his age. 
The “critique of critique” shows up most clearly in the Metacritique of the Purism of 
Reason, where he declares his age a “critical century.”58 Herein he exposes the lack inherent 
in elevating critique above all else. The following quote demonstrates Hamann’s approach:  
Receptivity of language and spontaneity of concepts! – From this double 
source of ambiguity pure reason draws all the elements of its doctrinairism, 
doubt, and connoisseurship. Through an analysis just as arbitrary as the 
synthesis of the thrice old leaven, it brings forth new phenomena and 
meteors on the inconstant horizon, creates signs and wonders with the All-
creator and destroying mercurial caduceus of its mouth or with the forked 
goose quill between the three syllogistic writing fingers of its Herculean fist.59  
                                                          
56 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 77. Aesthetica in Nuce. 
57 Hamann speaks of skepticism becoming dogma. To Herder, May 8th 1985, Z V, 432. “...durch einen 
unvermeidl. Zirkel der reinen Vernunft wird die Σκεψις selbst zum dogma.” 
58 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 207. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
59 Hamann, 208–9. N III, 284:33-285:1-2: Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. “Rezeptivität der Sprache und 
Spontaneität der Begriffe! - Aus dieser (doppelten) (zwiefachen) doppelten Qvelle der Zweydeutigkeit schöpft 
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This is, of course, addressing something specific to the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason (i.e. 
receptivity of speech and spontaneity of concepts); yet the point remains the same for his 
age as a whole: critique alone is unable to bring one to a knowledge of the truth. Notice his 
language when addressing a philosophy attempting clarity and universality: ambiguity, 
doctrinairism, and especially arbitrary. The systems created by abstract reason were 
viewed as fabrications, idols upon which one must believe. At this point it is important to 
note the significance of critique in Hamann’s authorship. The critique of the Enlightenment 
was based on the application of abstract reason; consequently both the emphasis on 
critique and the idolatry of his century are intrinsically linked. 60 
Empiricism and the Blind Philosophers 
 
 Another element essential to Hamann’s criticism is his reliance on empiricism; how 
his empiricism contributed to marking critique by its relation to his notion of faith will here 
be pointed out. Hamann’s empiricism leans primarily upon David Hume, whom he 
considered “Saul among the prophets”.61 Hume’s influence bolstered Hamann’s skepticism 
towards the ability of philosophical systemization to attain certainty, not to mention its 
importance for his language philosophy: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
die reine Vernunft alle Elemente ihrer Rechthaberey, Zweifelsucht und Kunstrichterschaft, erzeugt durch eine 
ebenso willkührliche Analysin als Synthesin des dreymal alten Sauerteigs neue Phänomene und Meteore des 
wandelbaren Horizonts, schafft Zeichen und Wunder mit dem Allhervorbringen und zerstörenden 
mercurialischen Zauberstabe ihres Mundes oder dem gespaltenen Gänse(f)kiel zwischen den drey 
syllogistischen Schreibefinger(n) ihrer herkulischen Faust –.” 
60 Gwen Griffith Dickson, in Johann Georg Hamann: “der Hellste Kopf Seiner Zeit,” ed. Oswald Bayer (Tübingen: 
Attempto, 1998), 242. Although early on he did not describe his work as metacritique, he later referred to it 
as such. 
61 This phrase indicates how he utilized Hume as ultimately a friend and ally. Truth can come from the most 
unlikely of sources: King Saul or David Hume. One must be humble enough to not overlook that which is 
revealed through the unexpected and base. Z I 380:5-6, "Alle[r] seine[r] Fehler ungeachtet ist er wie Saul 
unter den Propheten." 
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Still I would ten times rather talk myself out of breath into the wind with a 
man born blind about the first and fourth days of the Mosaic history of 
creation, or with a man born deaf about the harmony of a tiny nightingale 
and a foreign gelding, than fall out any longer with an adversary who is not 
even capable of seeing that a universal, sound, practical human language, and 
human reason, and human religion, without arbitrary fundamental 
principles, are his own furnace of ice.62  
Hamann’s empiricism would lead him to affirm the faith-based foundation of knowledge, 
which establishes the very foundation of his approach. Furthermore, his empiricism aids in 
comprehending why he held no quarter for the confidence of his contemporaries, 
emphasizing instead, an approach based upon humility and receptivity. According to 
Hamann, leaning on abstract reason closes the eyes to the senses. Hence, philosophers who 
do this are blind in respect to their philosophical endeavors. In regards to philosophy, 
although one may have a perfectly consistent system, abstracted from the reality of that 
which is revealed in the senses leaves one without sight. Blindness is a reoccurring theme 
in his critique of abstract reason. Hamann sees abstract philosophical systems as having 
their own respective rules and grounds of reason, yet ostracized from the senses they are 
like having a conversation with a person blind from birth about light or the stars.  
The empirical elements in his thought, while contributing to its critical aspects, 
support understanding him within the framework of the Enlightenment. This applies, even 
if this only means that the categories and vocabulary were essentially Enlightenment ones. 
                                                          
62 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 154. N III, 97:31-40: New Apology of the Letter h. “Doch ich 
will zehnmal lieber mit einem Blindgebornen vom ersten und vierten Tagewerk der mosaischen 
Schöpfungsgeschichte, oder mit einem Taubgebornen von der Harmonie einer winzigen Nachtigall und eines 
welschen Verschnittenen mich aus dem Othem in den Wind reden als länger mit einem Gegner mich 
überwerfen, der nicht einmal fähig ist einzusehen, daß eine allgemeine, gesunde, practische 
Menschensprache, und Menschenvernunft und Menschenreligion ohne willkührliche Grundsätze sein eigener 
Backofen von Eis sind.“ 
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This is to say – however enigmatic that his thought appears – it remains closely connected 
to the topics and thought structures of that time.63   
Despite the profound impact of empiricism on Hamann, it would be a stretch to label 
his thought as such. Empiricism informs his thought, but only insofar as it supports other 
elements (faith, revelation, eschatology, etc.). In short, empiricism contributed to Hamann’s 
thought rather than the other way around. 
Setting the Stage: Hamann’s Interlocutors 
 
Prior to tackling the intricacies of how and why Hamann considered the thinkers of 
his day superstitious, and as such idolatrous, a brief look at whom he considered his 
interlocutors will take place. 64 In Hamann’s eyes the three general movements which 
helped constitute Enlightenment thought to be considered in this section are Rationalism, 
the French Encylopedists and the Berlin Enlightenment. And it is these three movements 
that encompassed the interlocutors with whom Hamann engaged.  
 
 
 
                                                          
63 See, Michael N. Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 283–323. One example Forster points to is the dualism shared by Hamann 
and his contemporaries. Additionally, Socrates was a figure utilized by the Enlightenment as a paradigm for 
their values and goals. For one example of Enlightenment use of Socrates see, Moses Mendelssohn, Phädon, 
oder, über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, ed. Anne Pollok, Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 595 (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 2013).  
64 The Enlightenment does contain a diversity at times overlooked. See, Dickson and Hamann, Johann Georg 
Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism, 1–6.  
31 
 
A Post-Cartesian Epoch 
 
After the middle of the seventeenth century the Cartesian spirit permeates all 
fields of knowledge until it dominates not only philosophy, but also 
literature, morals, political science, and sociology, asserting itself even in the 
realm of theology to which it imparted a new form.65 – Ernst Cassirer 
Hamann’s opinion is similar to the above quote (although negatively conceived, insofar as 
he interpreted the influence of Descartes as a move in the wrong direction). From his 
Biblical Observations to his final works, this remained unchanged.66 He viewed his age as 
indelibly shaped by René Descartes (1596-1650), even going so far as stating that 
Descartes had become an elementary book (Elementarbuch) for his age.67 Although he 
considered Descartes outdated for young philosophers, this did not mean that he thought 
Descartes’ influence to have waned.68 The monumental change brought about by Descartes 
is represented most vividly in the cogito of the famous formula – cogito ergo sum.69 This 
formula represented a shift in authority and a transition to the search to ascertain certainty 
of truths based upon his method.70 The cogito symbolized the ascendancy of human reason 
                                                          
65 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, ed. James P. Pettegrove, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln, 
Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Pr, 1995), 28. 
66For an example from his early works see, N 1, 12:12, and from his later works, N 3, 364:17. Worth noting, 
Newton and Leibniz were also seen as ushering in large changes to thought, however, not to the degree that 
Descartes did in philosophical thought. 
67 N III, 221:7. 
68 For his comments of Descartes being outdated see, N II, 162:20. For his continuing influence see, N IV, 
221:25.  “Er verdient die Ehre als ein Großvater der neueren Philosophien angesehen zu werden.” (Tran. He 
deserves the honor to be considered a grandfather to the new philosophers). 
69 See, René Descartes, Discourse on Method; and, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 4th 
ed (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1998). See also, Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, Grundriß der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften (Tübingen: Paul Siebeck, 1932), 1–7, 15–16. 
70 Stefan Majetschak, “Der Stil als Grenze der Methode. Über Hamanns Descartes-’Lektüre’,” in Johann Georg 
Hamann und die Krise der Aufklärung: Acta des fünften Internationalen Hamann-Kolloquiums in Münster i.W. 
(1988), ed. Bernhard Gajek and Albert Meier, Regensburger Beiträge zur Deutschen Sprach- und 
Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 46 (Frankfurt am Main ; New York: P. Lang, 1990), 227. 
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or, more precisely, the allocation of authority moving completely to abstract reason.71 This 
forms the bedrock upon which his age, and consequently his interlocutors, stands. This 
mentality manifests itself in a variety of ways. Hamann located the nearest appropriation of 
these seventeenth century developments in the rationalist philosophy of Christian Wolff. 
The Rationalism of Christian Wolff 
 
Hamann was appalled by the rampant rationalism of his day and its quest for 
mathematical certainty.72 Mathematical certainty was something that could never be 
attained with the purity hoped for when empirical sense perception was taken into 
account. Although the age itself was post-Cartesian, one of the specific figures looming over 
Hamann’s intellectual world and often referenced was Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Again, 
it was not Wolff himself as much as it was his impact on other thinkers, including some of 
Hamann’s university professors that caused Wolff to be considered a leading 
Enlightenment figure by Hamann.73 What Descartes was for the transition to the cogito as 
the place of authority, Wolff was to mathematical precision in metaphysics and 
philosophy.74 In Hamann’s mind, Wolff’s approach was taken to an unhealthy and 
                                                          
71 Historical developments aside, Hamann did not view Descartes as lacking in value, only that his 
contributions to thought were limited. See, Oswald Bayer, “Wahrheit oder Methode? Hamann und die 
neuzeitliche Wissenschaft,” in Johann Georg Hamann und die Krise der Aufklärung: Acta des fünften 
Internationalen Hamann-Kolloquiums in Münster i.W. (1988), ed. Bernhard Gajek and Albert Meier, 
Regensburger Beiträge yur Deutschen Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 46 (Frankfurt am Main ; New 
York: P. Lang, 1990).  
72 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 72. Aesthetica in Nuce. “Blame it on the foolishness of my 
way of writing, which accords so ill with the original mathematical sin of your writing.” 
73 Wollfian as well as Pietistic thought was advanced by some of Hamann’s university professors. See, 
Veldhuis, Ein versiegeltes Buch der Naturbegriff in der Theologie J.G. Hamanns (1730-1788), 34. 
74 For more on the implications of mathematical certainty see, Michael Schulz, Sein und Trinität: systematische 
Erörterungen zur Religionsphilosophie G.W.F. Hegels im ontologiegeschichtlichen Rückblick auf J. Duns Scotus 
und I. Kant und die Hegel-Rezeption in der Seinsauslegung und Trinitätstheologie bei W. Pannenberg, E. Jüngel, 
K. Rahner und H.U. v. Balthasar, Münchener Theologische Studien, 53. Bd (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1997), 92. 
For the Rationalism and the mathematization of the intellect see, Alberto Burgio, in Enzyklopädie Philosophie: 
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idolatrous level. Wolff emphasized precision and systematic cohesiveness. Wolff‘s starting 
place for metaphysics was the principle of non-contradiction, which he held as the “source 
of all certainty”.75 When Hamann brings up the principle of non-contradiction, he has 
Wolffian influence in mind. Since Hamann found the humbler approach of the British 
Empiricists more palatable, it is not difficult to see why that which Wolff embodied would 
be one of Hamann’s adversaries throughout his authorship. Wolff symbolized Hamann’s 
contention with those who belay the concrete and historical. “Nature works through the 
senses and the passions. But those who maim these instruments, how can they feel? Are 
crippled sinews fit for movement? – Your lying murderous philosophy has cleared nature 
out of the way.”76 This tendency pervaded his age, and Wolff happens to serve as the most 
thorough going of the bunch.77 In order to demonstrate the manner in which Hamann 
employs Wolff as a representative of the ideas and ambitions of his age, observe the 
following quote referring to a scholar arguing for orthographic reform based on modern 
rationalist ideas:  
O you ignorant despiser of divine providence and universal human reason!, 
do not regard as a blind game of chance the fact that the orthography of the 
extraordinary religious teacher [Wolff] is as closely related to the main 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in Drei Bänden Mit Einer CD-ROM, ed. Hans Jörg Sandkühler, 2., überarb. und erw. Aufl., vol. 3 (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2010), 2895. 
75  Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima siue Ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata : qua omnis cognitionis 
humanae principia continentior, 1736, 23. “Patet adeo principium contradictionis esse fontem omnis 
certitudinis, quo posito, ponitur certitudo in cognitione humana; quo sublato, tollitur omnis certitudo.”  
76 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 77. N II, 206:1-3: Aesthetica in Nuce. “Die Natur würkt durch 
Sinne und Leidenschaften. Wer ihre Werkzeuge verstümmelt, wie mag der empfinden? Sind auch gelähmte 
Sennadern zur Bewegung aufgelegt? – –. ” 
77 In Kant's words, "the illustrious Wolff, the greatest among all the dogmatic philosophers. He was first to 
provide the example (through which he became the originator of the - not yet extinct - spirit of thoroughness 
in Germany." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. James W. Ellington, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Unified 
ed (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co, 1996), 35. 
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subject as to the spirit of his illuminated century…merely because the hoary 
Wolffian [italics mine] in his time just wrote in ideas. - -78  
Mathematical certainty coincided with systematic purity, which was a misplaced goal. 
Wolff served as a symbol of the rationalist approach which had been favorably taken up by 
many of Hamann’s contemporaries. 
Thus, Hamann’s world consisted of a post-Cartesian environment wherein reason 
had been freed from the shackles of tradition and experience. Furthermore, abstract reason 
was employed to the extreme, seeking to achieve mathematical certainty and precision. 
The next major interlocutor of Hamann’s intellectual world was embodied by the French 
Encyclopedists. 
Encyclopedic Knowledge 
 
Hamann was well aware of the developments regarding the idea of the 
encyclopedia. To him, encyclopedic was in reference to Denis Diderot's (1713-1784), 
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, as well as the 
outlook it represented, of which Diderot was himself cognizant.79 
Josef Nadler gives a concise and precise definition of what the encyclopedia 
represented to Hamann, “[The Encyclopedia was] the major work of the European 
Enlightenment. The meaning of the word: comprehensive account (Darstellung) of 
everything worth knowing. Its purpose: beyond special knowledge unto a singular 
                                                          
78 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 157. N III, 101:1-5, 10: New Apology of the Letter h. “O du 
unwissender Schmäher göttlicher Vorsehung und allgemeiner Menschenvernunft! sieh es nicht für ein 
blindes Spiel des Zufalls an, daß die Orthographie des ausserordentlichen Religionslehrers sich eben so sehr 
zur Hauptsache paßt, als zum Geiste seines erleuchteten Jahrhunderts...weil der eisgraue Wolfianer damals 
eben in Gedanken schrieb. ” 
79 Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, 17. 
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knowledge. Hamann meant the work itself, its spirit, the people involved in furthering its 
ideas (Generalstab).”80 This opinion makes it an essential element of his understanding of 
his age and its goals. Important in this definition is the notion of achieving a unity of 
knowledge (Einheitswissen), which involved the continual accumulation of knowledge. Yet 
the goal of unity, insofar as unity implied a comprehensive knowledge, is where Hamann 
took issue.81 Encyclopedic unity was one of totality; contrarily, Hamann praised unity in 
thought, but not that which implied unity in the sense of universality. 
It was his friend Berens’ request that he translate some articles of the encyclopédie 
that served as the catalyst for the beginning of his authorship. In many ways his authorship 
was the antithesis of the ideas of his interlocutors, represented in titles such as, Fragments 
(Brocken), Crusades of the Philologian (Kreutzüge des Philologian), not to mention the 
writings designated by Nadler as “mystery writings”, two of which were composed with an 
esoteric pseudonym of the sibyl.82 These titles represented aspects adversarial to the goals 
of the encyclopedic spirit: clear, comprehensive, systematic knowledge. At times, Hamann 
utilized the expression “encyclopedic” to describe a comprehensive approach, not 
necessarily in reference to the specific philosophical approach of the Encyclopedists, but to 
the spirit of the age (similar to his use of Christian Wolff as representative of a specific 
tendency in philosophy).  
                                                          
80 N VI, 113: Der Schlüssel. “Das Hauptwerk der europäischen Aufklärung. Sinn des Wortes: umfassende 
Darstellung alles Wissenswerten. Ziel: über das Spezialwissen hinaus das Einheitswissen. H. [Hamann] meint 
bald das Werk selber, bald seinen Geist, bald seinen Generalstab.” 
81This should not be construed as a rejection of Hamann’s attempt at wholeness, as he was quick to see the 
inter-relatedness of existence. Instead, it was the absolute nature of this particular unity, one that sought to 
do away with mystery and contradiction, which was seen as detrimental. For more an Hamann’s holism see, 
Johannes von Lüpke, “Anthropologische Einfälle: Zum Verständnis der ‘ganzen Existenz’ bei Johann Georg 
Hamann,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 30, no. 1 (n.d.): 225–68. 
82 See, N III, 197. Vesuch einer Sibylle über die Ehe. Also, N III, 215. KONXOMPAX. Fragmente einer 
apokryphischen Sibylle über apokalyptische Mysterien. 
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In Hamann’s thought, there is a direct connection between the impetus to catalog 
the world and the moving away from traditional authority to that of abstract reason – both 
take place under the guidance of abstract reason and view knowledge as something to be 
compiled, something once and for all, static. That being said, the encyclopedic attitude is 
not the only expression of post-Cartesian thought, but one of the approaches utilized by his 
age.    
The Berlin Enlightenment 
 
“My hate towards Babel – this is the true key to my authorship.”83 –        
Johann Georg Hamann 
In the above quote, Hamann refers to Berlin as Babylon, indicating the arrogance 
associated with the tower of Babel. 84  The Berlin Enlightenment was the most 
comprehensive term for his epoch. It represented what Hamann saw as the tyrannical reign 
of abstract reason propagated by Frederick the Great (1712-1786): the Frenchification of 
German society and the dominance of abstract reason.85 Berlin was the location of the 
                                                          
83 To Jacobi, January 18th, 1786.  “Mein Haß gegen Babel – das ist der wahre Schlüssel meiner Autorschaft”. 
Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben 
und Schriften, ed. Karl Hermann Gildemeister, vol. 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi) 
(Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1868), 199. 
84 Genesis 11; The Book of Jubilees 10. 
85 Hans-Joachim Neumann, Friedrich der Grosse: Feldherr und Philosoph (Berlin: Edition q, 2000), 31–39, 98–
119. Here Voltaire’s influence on Frederick the Great is addressed. Additionally, statements from Frederick 
regarding religion reveal his nearness to the Enlightenment movement. “Humanity is the true religion” 
(Menschlichkeit ist die wahre Religion), and “One needs neither Luther nor Calvin to love God.” (Man braucht 
weder Luther noch Calvin Gott zu lieben). Neumann, 36. Frederick was indeed targeted for the above reasons; 
however, Hamann’s relationship to Frederick was nuanced. For a good summary of Hamann’s complex 
relationship to this figure see, James C. O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann: Einführung in sein Leben und Werk, 
Regensburger Beiträge zur deutschen Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft Reihe B, Untersuchungen 39 
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1989), 159–72. 
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Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek and it was this journal that often served as his 
representation for Berlin.86  
The terms “idolatry” and “superstition” profoundly inform Hamann’s interpretation 
of his age and the Enlightenment coming out of Berlin did not escape his critique. By using 
the imagery of the city of Babylon he evokes both Old and New Testament sentiments of a 
place of decadence. Babel – humanity’s attempt to reach heaven – symbolized human pride 
and ego seeking to put itself on the level of God. It was an idolizing of itself, and 
analogously, this was what the whole of Enlightenment philosophy was doing through 
abstract reason. 
The academy in Berlin served as a summary of the points above and hence received 
Hamann’s disdain. For instance, Frederick the Great favored the French language and 
equally advanced much of the thought purported by the French philosophers that Hamann 
vehemently opposed.87 
Alongside this, Frederick was praised by many Enlighteners for advocating 
tolerance and secularity to a greater degree than had been seen up to that time in German 
speaking lands.88 Although there was a greater openness, Hamann perceived a form of 
despotism couched in philosophical language – a support for what Hamann calls a “Sotadic 
                                                          
86 This was not entirely unique to Hamann. In fact, many who fall under the category of “Sturm und Drang” 
were opposed to the general impetus and philosophical outlook propagated by Nicolai.  Ute Schneider, 
Friedrich Nicolais Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek als Integrationsmedium der Gelehrtenrepublik, Mainzer 
Studien zur Buchwissenschaft, Bd. 1 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), 42. 
87  Wolfgang-Dieter Baur, Johann Georg Hamann als Publizist: zum Verhältnis von Verkündigung und 
Öffentlichkeit, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, 49. Bd (Berlin ; New York: W. de Gruyter, 1991), 69. 
88 Kant’s, What is Enlightenment, references the great strides that had been made (and needed to be 
furthered). See, Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (London: Penguin, 2009), 6–9. 
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tolerance”.89 Suffice it to say that Hamann, perhaps more intuitively than analytically, 
picked up on the philosophical difficulties of grounding a pluralistic state and society.90 
What some saw as the triumph of reason and tolerance, Hamann saw as the silencing of 
disparate voices and the propagation, not of reason, but of a cult that used reason as a 
euphemism for their god (i.e. their idol).  
A good example of his view of the Berlin academy appears in his critique of Johann 
Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Hamann accuses him of conforming to the philosophical 
biases of Berlin:   
Ought not my friend Herder, in order to chase after the mark, the jewel of the 
announced prize, within the limits of the academy [referencing the Berlin 
Academy], ought he not to have run as uncertainly, fought as one that beats 
the air? Indeed he suffered as a fine soldier and was legally crowned because 
he strove lawfully. As a clever steward of the mammon of unrighteousness he 
could take nothing but the revelations and traditions of his age as the basis of 
his treatise and he could only build his proof on sand, piecework, wood, hay, 
                                                          
89 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 104. N II, 30:12. In the corresponding footnote Haynes 
points out that this is a reference to the Greek poet, Sotades, and refers to the obscene. Sotades’ poetry was 
unconventional and the subjects obscene, leading him to be referred to as “Sotades the Obscene” by some. 
This historical data may have larger implications for the interpretation of Hamann in the present study. With 
“Sotadic tolerance” Hamann is implying that the Enlightenment thinkers are also developing systems – 
similar to that of Sotades developing his own type of verse – to fit into their own goals (for Sotades his own 
“obscene” subject matter). Albeit a cryptic reference today, but with this analogy Hamann is clearly 
insinuating that they only are willing to tolerate that which fits into the parameters of what they deemed 
acceptable. Cf. Justin Pollard and Howard Reid, The Rise and Fall of Alexandria: Birthplace of the Modern Mind 
(New York: Viking, 2006), 87–88. 
90This insight remains pertinent in contemporary philosophy and politics. One need only consider the work of 
Jürgen Habermas and those engaged in similar projects (e.g. Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, John Rawls) to see 
how this is a continually relevant concern in philosophy. In terms of politics one might look to the recent 
attempt at drafting a European Constitution and the issue of whether the Christian Tradition should be given 
reference. Cf. Jan Schmidt, Religion, Gott, Verfassung: Der Religions- und Gottesbezug in der Verfassung 
pluralistischer Gesellschaften, Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe XXIII, Theologie = Publications 
Universitaires Européennes. Série XXIII, Théologie = European University Studies. Series XXIII, Theology, 
Bd./Vol. 905 (Frankfurt am Main ; New York: Peter Lang, 2010). 
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stubble - - but of course: everything in accordance with the latest model of 
his age.91  
The Berlin Academy held the keys to knowledge and in order to gain recognition, one had 
to play according to the rules established by the Enlightenment thinkers in Berlin. Any 
perceived monopoly on knowledge was viewed as a superstitious allegiance to whichever 
form of knowledge was given credence above others. 
At times, Frederick symbolized the Berlin Enlightenment.92 Strewn throughout 
Hamann’s corpus are slights and satirical references to Frederick represented by the 
following:  
All the inhabitants of the New Prussia will seek to Solomon (Friedrich), to 
hear his wisdom, which God has put in his heart. Each one will bring his 
present, and all hearts, Sire, will burn with love for the immortality of your 
name, the glory of your kingdom, and the fulfillment of your will, with a love 
stronger than death and more envious than the grave is for treasure”.93  
Frederick was not Hamann’s only target when he spoke of Berlin; others such as the 
Publicist Nicolai represented Enlightenment factions that did not relate directly to 
                                                          
91 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 132. N III, 50:9-18: Philological Ideas and Doubts. “Muste 
[sic] nicht mein Freund Herder um in den akademischen Schranken dem vorgestreckten Ziel, dem Kleinode 
des verkündigten Preises nachzujagen, muste [sic] er nicht laufen als aufs Ungewiße, fechten als der in der 
[sic] Luft streicht? Ja er hat als ein schöner Streiter gelitten und ist von Rechtswegen gekrönt worden, weil er 
gesetzmäßig gekämpft hat. Als ein kluger Haushalter eines ungerechten Mammons hat er nicht anders als die 
Offenbarungen und Ueberlieferungen seines Jahrhunderts zum Grunde seiner Abhandlung legen und seinen 
Beweis auf Sand, Stückwerk, Holz, Heu, Stoppeln bauen können - - aber freylich: alles nach der neuesten 
Bauart seines Zeitalters.” 
92 Frederick the Great was himself clearly a prominent member of the Enlightenment. This was by no means 
an invention by Hamann. One must only look to Frederick’s support and friendship with Voltaire. See, 
Christian von Krockow, Friedrich der Große: ein Lebensbild, Orig.-Ausg (Köln: Lübbe Ehrenwirth, 2012), 141–
42. 
93 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 144. N III, 59:28-60:1-3: To the Solomon of Prussia. “Tous les 
habitans de la Nouvelle Prusse rechercheront de voir la face de Salomon pour entendre sa Sagesse, que Dieu a 
mise dan son coeur. Chacun lui apportera son present et tous les coeurs Sire, bruleront d’amour pour 
l’immortalité de votre nom, la gloire de votre regne et l’accomplissement de votre volonté, d’un amour plus fort 
que la mort et plus jaloux que le sepulcre d’un Tresor.” 
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Frederick’s politics, yet were complicit in advocating abstract reason.94 The reign of 
Frederick the Great and the academy in Berlin were a converging of forces of that which 
Hamann found superstitious and idolatrous. 
The aforementioned influences provide a good overview of the major intellectual 
movements that consistently informed Hamann’s view of the intellectual landscape of his 
day. The figures involved in these movements are intermittently referenced when dealing 
with the specifics of his notion of superstition and idolatry.  
Idolatry, Superstition, and Atheism 
 
In Hamann’s thought there are good grounds for interpreting atheism as one of the 
variant forms of superstition and idolatry. In the prelude to the Biblical Observations, he 
makes a direct connection between atheism and the occult. “The height of atheism and the 
great magic of unbelief is, therefore, the blindness to recognize God in revelation, and the 
sacrilege of distaining this means of grace.”95 One sees Hamann draw attention to 
revelation, which always has faith-based elements. Hamann pays close attention to 
etymological details. As noted by Nadler, Hamann’s notion of atheism stems from the 
Greek, “gr. átheos = gottlos”.96 Despite it being “godless”, one must keep in mind that for 
Hamann, knowledge cannot be attained outside of faith. “Because faith belongs to the 
natural conditions of our capacity for knowledge and basic instincts of our soul; every 
                                                          
94 “Berliner Aufklärung - Die Geschichte Berlins - Verein für die Geschichte Berlins e.V. - Gegr. 1865,” accessed 
April 11, 2017, http://www.diegeschichteberlins.de/geschichteberlins/berlinabc/stichworteag/545-
berliner-aufklaerung.html.  
95 Johann Georg Hamann, Londoner Schriften, ed. Oswald Bayer (München: Beck, 1993), 59:15-18. “Der Gipfel 
der Atheisterei und die größte Zauberey des Unglaubens ist daher [die] Blindheit, Gott in der Offenbarung zu 
erkennen, und der Frevel, dies Gnadenmittel zu verschmähen.” When Hamann speaks of disdaining revelation 
he reveals again the influence of empiricism on his thought. By focusing on the cogito, the rationalists are 
shunning an important aspect of what Hamann considers revelation. 
96 N VI, 37: Der Schlüssel. 
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general proposition rests upon good faith, and all abstractions are, and must be, 
arbitrary.”97 It is in this connection between faith and knowledge that Hamann views 
atheism as idolatry, being based on arbitrary faith. He would not contend the fact that 
atheism rejects the idea of a metaphysical deity. Nevertheless, he concludes that atheism, in 
its rejection of a god, is still caught up in making absolute claims based on arbitrary 
principles.  
Hamann connected atheism or godlessness to Attic philosophy: sophistry. Hamann 
makes this abundantly clear in Golgotha and Sheblimini!:  
An Egyptian priest chided the Greeks for being children. One of their games – 
they made a name for themselves in inventing and practicing it – is the global 
aspirant of philosophy. Although the ignorance of their epoch is neither 
suitable nor appropriate to our century, the little foxes and masters of Greek 
wisdom still affect the sheer nakedness and amateurism of pagan ignorance 
with such naiveté of taste that as the prophet says they ‘know neither their 
own nor the crib of their master.’ Systematic atheism thus is an Atticism par 
excellence, the means by which the common sense of some of the 
spermologues distanced itself from the universal and unavoidable 
superstition of popular idolatry, without however being able to supply the 
phenomena of indefinite objects with anything better than some 
transcendental whims, which more often than not have no other credentials 
[Creditiv] or sufficient reason than the relationes curiosae of oriental legends 
                                                          
97 N III, 190:16: Zweifel und Einfälle über eine vermischte Nachricht der allgemeinen deutschen Bibliothek. “Da 
der Glaube zu den natürlichen Bedingungen unserer Erkenntniskräfte und den Grundtrieben unserer Seele 
gehört; jeder allgemeine Satz auf guten Glauben beruht, und alle Abstractionen willkührlich sind und seyn 
müßen [sic].”   
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and rumors, homegrown folktales, premonitions, dreams, puzzles, and more 
childishness of that sort.98 
On one hand, Hamann compliments atheism for being more sophisticated than other vulgar 
forms of superstition. On the other hand, he criticizes atheism for falling prey to the very 
same traps as other forms of superstition. Only the object thereof is different. Although 
atheistic claims reach a different conclusion than their deistic counterparts, the deity is 
substituted for faith in an absolute non-deity. 
Furthering the idea of atheism’s connection to sophistry in Golgotha and Sheblimini!, 
he elucidates the deception involved in sophistic thought:  
Every sophist is therefore not only a liar but also a hypocrite, and makes use 
of language as mere puppetry, in order to pass off his idol, the vain 
fabrication of human art, as the overflow of divine reason and the daughter 
incarnate of its voice, to deceive superstitious readers by the snare of a 
golden hip or golden calf, and to insinuate himself like a thief and a killer into 
their confidence at the cost and risk of unrecognized living truths.99  
                                                          
98 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 190. N III, 309:27-310:6. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. “Ein 
ägyptischer Priester schalt die Griechen für Kinder. Zu ihren Spielen, durch deren Erfindung und Übungen sie 
sich einen Namen gemacht, gehört auch der Globe aspirant der Philosophie.  Obschon die Unwissenheit ihres 
Aeons unserm Jahrhunderte weder anpassend noch anständig ist: so affectiren doch die kleinen Füchse und 
Meister griechischer Weisheit die reine Blöße und Liebhaberey heidnischer Unwissenheit mit solcher 
Naivetät des Geschmacks, daß sie, wie der Prophet sagt, ‘weder ihren HERR noch die Krippe ihres HERRN 
kennen’. Der systematische Atheismus gehört also verzüglich zu den Atticismis, wodurch sich die gesunde 
Vernunft einiger ihrer Spermologen von dem so allgemeinen als unvermeidlichen Aberglauben des populairen 
[sic] Götzendienstes unterschied, ohne daß sie im stande [sic] waren die Erscheinungen der unbestimmten 
Gegenstände durch etwas besseres als einige transcendentale Grillen zu ergänzen, welche öfters kein anderes 
Creditiv noch zureichenden Grund hatten, als relationes curiosas morgenländischer Sagen und Gerüchte, 
einheimische Volksmährchen, Ahndungen, Träume, Rätzel und dergleichen Kindereyen mehr.” 
99 Hamann, 176. Golgotha and Sheblimini! N III, 301:3-10. “Jeder Sophist ist also nicht nur ein Lügner, sondern 
auch ein Heuchler, und bedient sich der Sprache, als eines leeren Puppenspiels, sein Idol, das eitele Gemächte 
menschlicher Kunst, für einen Ausfluß göttlicher Vernunft und eine leibhafte Tochter ihrer Stimme 
auszugeben, abergläubige Leser durch das Blendwerk einer güldenen Hüfte oder güldenen Kalbes hinters 
Licht zu führen, und ich ihre Überzeugung auf Kosten und Gefahr unerkannter lebendiger Wahrheiten, als ein 
Dieb und Mörder, zu erschleichen.” 
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The primitive forms of idolatry take on a more simplistic and readily apparent form, 
whereas serving the “vain fabrication of human art” is more deceptive. From Hamann’s 
perspective it might well be said that it is indeed more sophist-icated, that is, more 
deceptive: a sophistic, rather than a vulgar form of superstition.  
Even Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) was accused of atheism by Hamann. This 
further bolsters the point that Hamann does not work within traditional metaphysical 
philosophical paradigms – e.g. Mendelssohn wrote a book attempting to prove the 
existence of God.100 Because of the affinities shared by vulgar superstition and atheism, the 
terms are at times used interchangeably. In the case at hand, Hamann viewed 
Mendelssohn’s philosophy of the state as atheistic, and therefore this assertion did not 
directly pertain to Mendelssohn’s personal assent to particular theological or religious 
concepts and propositions. The connection between idolatry and the fabrication of human 
art is significant. The systems of abstract reason were interpreted as creations of 
whichever philosopher thought them up and were, in Hamann’s eyes, comparable to 
artistic fabrication, for they were not accessing absolute truth. Based on the above 
evidence, Hamann’s concept and critique of atheism falls under the umbrella of his critique 
of idolatry. For Hamann, all systems of thought are engaged in some form of faith and 
therefore one cannot sharply distinguish between abstract viewpoints about the potential 
of a deity.  
                                                          
100 Moses Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes Erster Theil (Berlin: 
Contumax GmbH & Co. KG, 2011), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201109028274. 
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Having covered the major elements making up Hamann’s intellectual world 
alongside the necessary linguistic and conceptual background, the stage is now set for 
moving on to the specifics of the notions of faith, superstition, and idolatry. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Turning Things on Their Head: The Superstition of His Century 
 
In both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology, idolatry and superstition are 
closely related. Idolatry is the worship of an idol;101 superstition is the corresponding faith 
or belief in the idol. Broadly speaking, for Hamann superstition is the prerequisite for 
idolatry; it lays the groundwork for the idolatry which follows. Due to this, the concept of 
superstition should be understood before dealing specifically with idolatry. However, in 
order to understand Hamann’s notion of superstition, the attitude towards it from the side 
of the “mainstream” Enlightenment will first be taken under consideration. As Hamann 
entrenches himself in the language and categories of those he criticizes in attempting to 
expose the often hidden motivations and inconsistent suppositions, understanding to what 
Hamann is responding is essential.  
As referenced in the first chapter of the present work, Hamann’s thought did not 
take place in a vacuum. In fact, once a grasp of the Enlightenment’s views of superstition 
come into greater light, the subversive nature of Hamann’s critique of his century as 
superstitious will be undeniable. Furthermore, he was not merely reacting to his 
contemporaries, but effectively turning their thought on its head in his attempt to expose 
its superstitious elements – revealing how those who’s thought purported the removal of 
                                                          
101 Walter A. Elwell, ed., Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed, Baker Reference Library (Grand Rapids, 
Mich. : Carlisle, Cumbria, U.K: Baker Academic ; Paternoster Press, 2001), 588. 
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prejudice through the use of abstract reason were engaging in their own faith 
commitments and presuppositions, i.e. superstition.102 
Without building on the foundation of the concept of superstition, the very notion of 
philosophical idolatry is nonsensical, because the concept of idolatry lies within the 
broader concept of the superstitious. This chapter explicates the notion of the superstition 
of the Enlightenment as found in Hamann. This lays the foundation for the assertion that 
the Enlightenment’s application of abstract reason was idolatrous. The chapter proceeds in 
the following manner. First, attention will be given to Enlightenment conceptions of 
superstition and the attempts to rid society of it. Thereafter, the understanding of 
Hamann’s notion of faith will be discussed: particularly its foundation in Empiricism, his 
notion of history, contingency, and subjective experience. The difference between the 
general philosophical idea of faith and religious faith will receive adequate attention before 
moving on to the specificity of the Christian faith. The framework of the condescension of 
God – which was the foundational aspect of Hamann’s theology – will also receive 
                                                          
102 Although to be treated in greater detail elsewhere, it is here worth mentioning a few insights that should 
be kept in mind regarding Hamann’s at times harsh comments when attempting to turn the arguments of his 
interlocutors in on themselves. Rarely, if ever, is Hamann advocating a regression to antiquated modes of 
society or thought. For instance, Hamann’s condemnation of Mendelssohn’s advocating for political and 
religious tolerance has led to some false conjectures as to the nature of his thought. Isaiah Berlin is one such 
interpreter who has a tendency of reading Hamann’s authorship as one long diatribe lamenting modern 
development, while providing scattered insights relevant for the history of philosophy. It is the understanding 
of the present study, and hence will be conveyed within the argumentation, that in most cases Hamann was 
not advocating a regression, but rather an even more diverse and open future, both in thought and society. 
Additionally, there are some issues of which Hamann was either ambivalent or conflicted. Hamann’s disdain 
for the reign of Frederick the Great was not always straightforward. There are other passages which 
demonstrate Hamann’s conflicted opinion regarding Frederick. This is only to say that some of Hamann’s 
reactions should be regarded as confined to a specific issue and not broadly applied. Again, at times Hamann 
was not entirely opposed to the societal changes, but the spirit driving the changes, which fell into many of 
the tropes and problems of the past that were considered to be primitive by the intellectuals of his time. 
These statements are necessary so that one does not jump to conclusions regarding the nature of Hamann’s 
critique. Regarding Berlin's stance referenced above see, Isaiah Berlin, The Magus of the North: J.G. Hamann 
and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism, ed. Henry Hardy, 1st American ed (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 1994), 119–20. 
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comment. This framework is significant as these ideas informed his linguistic insights. 
From here, the chapter will move more directly to the notion of philosophical superstition. 
Addressing why this is essential to be understood as a philosophical critique, Hans 
Blumenberg’s Metaphorology will be utilized and briefly juxtaposed to Hamann’s thought. 
Abstractions and the systems derived from them will be explicated in light of Hamann’s 
notion of superstition. Finally, an example of superstition from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason and Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism will 
each be given attention. 
The Enlightenment Critique of Superstition 
 
 “Liberation from superstition is what Enlightenment means.”                             
– Immanuel Kant103 
For all of the Enlightenment’s championing of the freedom of thought, the careful 
application of reason to socio-political problems and the natural sciences, there was an 
implicit, and at times explicit, polemic. This was directed at earlier forms of thought which 
was seen as succumbing to prejudice and emotion as well as being based upon superstition. 
In fact, anything not grounded in abstract reason was liable to be accused of superstition. 
Martin Pott summarizes this well in Enlightenment and Superstition (Aufklärung und 
Aberglaube) – to which this section is heavily indebted: 
Still before the important program ideas were formulated and the 
movements  general good was claimed, without question the legitimacy of 
the combat of ideas  came to be. In the process of Enlightenment the 
                                                          
103 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Nachdr., Reclams Universal-Bibliothek 1026 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 2011), 215. “Befreiung vom Aberglauben heißt Aufklärung.” 
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programmatic topoi of 'betterment of the understanding', 'maturity', 
'thinking for oneself' and 'perfecting the human being' were closely linked to 
the prior historical orientation on 'the idea of enemy' (Feindbildern) - the 
images of the enemy as prejudices, enthusiasm and fanaticism, melancholia, 
political arbitrariness (etc.) and even superstition. Stronger than other 
movements in cultural history, the Enlightenment was at the same time a 
combative community, which garnered its coherence through particular the 
idea of an enemy.104 
Despite the great strides in thought throughout intellectual history, the Enlightenment 
embraced a more decisive break with the past. Even the language used by this epoch of 
itself reveals this break: compare Renaissance (a re-birth) and Enlightenment (to give 
light). Renaissance implies huge developments, yet retaining and drawing from the past. 
Enlightenment carries the connotation of bringing light to darkness. As referenced earlier, 
Hamann employs the polemic of blindness against his contemporaries. One sees how 
Hamann’s accusing his contemporaries of blindness in thought was not something 
randomly employed to make a point, but directly connected to the Enlightenment’s 
understanding of itself as bringing light to a world darkened by religion, tradition, and 
superstition. 
                                                          
104 Martin Pott, Aufklärung und Aberglaube: die deutsche Frühaufklärung im Spiegel ihrer Aberglaubenskritik, 
Studien zur deutschen Literatur, Bd. 119 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1992), 2. "Noch bevor die wichtigsten 
Programmideen formuliert und Allgemeingut der Bewegung geworden sind, steht bereits die Gültigkeit der 
Kampfideen außer Frage. ‚Verbesserung des Verstandes‘, ‚Mündigkeit‘, ‚Selbstdenken‘ und ‚Vervollkommnung 
des Menschen‘ als programmatische Topoi sind im Prozeß der Aufklärung eng verklammert mit der 
historisch vorgängigen Orientierung an ‚Feindbildern‘, - den Feindbildern der Vorurteile, der Schwärmerei 
(Fanatismus und Enthusiasmus), der Melancholie, der politischen Willkür (usw.) und eben des Aberglaubens. 
Stärker als andere Bewegungen der Kulturgeschichte ist die Aufklärung zugleich auch eine 
Kampfgemeinschaft, die ihre Geschlossenheit nicht zuletzt durch bestimmte Feindbilder gewinnt." Although 
Pott describes this quite drastically, it is not without support elsewhere. Not only was this taking place on the 
intellectual level, but as the Enlightenment matured, and its cultural influence spread into Eastern Europe, it 
was employed in utilitarian fashion by leaders who were less interested in philosophical ideas but attacking 
their own enemies by employing these ideas. Robin Okey, Eastern Europe, 1740-1985: Feudalism to 
Communism, 2nd ed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 35–36. 
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Purging Religion of Superstition 
 
The employment of abstract reason by the Enlightenment was not anti-religion but 
a movement away from the concrete, historical, and revelatory. Apart from an assortment 
of dissenting voices,105 the varieties of deism as well as atheism shared the tendency of 
moving away from the historical and concrete. Philosophers such as Voltaire and Spinoza 
were unabashedly critical of revealed religion for its neglect of reason, as religion pulled 
from sources such as miracles, divine interaction, and other such dubious (i.e. 
superstitious) things. Consequently, the traditional Christian faith did not fare well in their 
eyes. The majority of thinkers were not anti-Christian, in fact, many sought to bring 
Christianity into accordance with the natural religion of the Enlightenment.106 Because 
these tendencies permeated the thought at that time, two examples will be given in order 
to illustrate both the widespread shifts in thought and the rejection of superstition present 
in society and its institutions. 
Voltaire (1694-1778) looms over the Enlightenment period as a philosophical 
example of the developments of that time. He had brought back ideas from his time in 
England that would not only indelibly affect the intellectuals of his day, but the entirety of 
French society.107 His skepticism had widespread influence, not only in France but 
                                                          
105 Hans Joas provided a superb analysis of the German appropriation of David Hume, particularly, how Hume 
provided concrete Christianity a new foundation. Specifically Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi are referenced. 
Hans Joas, “Naturgeschichte der Religion als Religionskritik? David Hume und die Folgen,” in Religion und 
Aufklärung: Studien zur neuzeitlichen “Umformung des Christlichen,” ed. Albrecht Beutel and Volker Leppin, 
Arbeiten zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte, Bd. 14 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2004), 14–16.  
106 Albrecht Beutel, Kirchengeschichte im Zeitalter der Aufklärung: ein Kompendium, UTB Theologie, Religion 
3180 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 89–111. 
107 Manfred Geier, Aufklärung: Das europäische Projekt, 1. Aufl (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2012), 103–
17. 
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throughout Europe.108 He advanced critical ideas regarding revealed religion – one might 
say condemning it to the realm of superstition. Alternate political inclinations were 
contained therein – this would culminate, albeit shortly after Hamann’s death, in the 
French Revolution, and deism would briefly become the state religion manifest in the Culte 
de l'Être suprême.109 This example demonstrates a mood in the late eighteenth century to 
break free from the shackles of the past: shackles of superstition which might be loosened 
by the proper application of abstract reason. Accompanying this, and synonymous to many, 
was a move away from confessionalism in the church.110   
The German scholar Johann August von Stark (1741-1816) is a theological example 
of the changes in thought in Hamann’s time. Stark argued that some early pagan cults 
exemplified the “natural religion” of the Enlightenment. He attempted to demonstrate that 
the same elements of natural religion were also present in the Christian religion. Stark’s 
interpretation of the origin of Christianity served as the catalyst for Hamann’s defense of 
revealed religion.111 For Hamann, the application of Enlightenment methodology upon 
Christianity in order to uncover the “truth” behind the shell of history and revelation (read: 
superstition) was an abomination. Hamann never advocated the blind acceptance of dogma 
out of pure obedience to tradition. Yet, tearing away the historical in order to get to the 
                                                          
108 Norman L. Torrey, “Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet de,” The Encylopedia of Philosophy (U.S.A.: Crowell 
Collier and MacMillan, 1972), 262. 
109 The Culte de l'Être suprême was implemented by Maximilien Robespierre, and certainly is to be 
differentiated from Voltaire’s philosophy, but at the same time, it is difficult to imagine these developments 
apart from Voltaire’s influence. 
110 Eduard Winter, Frühaufklärung: der Kampf gegen den Konfessionalismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa und die 
deutsch-slawische Begegnung, Beiträge zur Geschichte des religiösen und wissenschaftlichen Denkens 6 
(Berlin: Berlin Akademie Verlag, 1966), 20–32. 
111 Betz, After Enlightenment, 200. 
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true “reasonable” parts of Christianity – the parts which accord with abstract reason – was 
just as superstitious as the doctrines critiqued. 
Foundation of Faith: the Foundation of Knowledge 
 
Since Hamann's understanding of faith serves as the basis of his claims regarding 
superstition, some crucial points regarding his ideas of faith will be elaborated. In so doing, 
it will become increasingly clear of how he was able to criticize thinkers who were 
explicitly against superstition as being engaged in their own type superstition. 
Furthermore, understanding his idea of faith is critical for the argument of the current 
study’s reading of the critique of superstition and idolatry being the guiding line of thought 
in Hamann’s authorship. 
 Hamann’s assertion that his contemporaries were indeed engaging in a form of 
superstition is held up by his notion of faith. As supported by a statement from the Socratic 
Memorabilia; “Our being (Dasein) and the existence (Existenz) of all things outside of 
ourselves must be believed and cannot by any other means be accounted for.”112 Faith was 
intrinsic to knowledge for Hamann. Whatever role that reason and the intellect might play, 
there was no denying that they were tied to foundations resting upon faith.  
The quote above, stating that existence must be believed, is certainly thought 
provoking, yet shy on details. One thing is clear: faith is not solely the property of religion. 
In part, the reason for this was Hamann’s appropriation of Hume’s concept of belief into his 
own notion of faith. As Hamann mentions on various occasions, Hume needed faith to even 
                                                          
112 N II, 73:21-22, Socratic Memorabila. “Unser eigen Daseyn und die Existenz aller Dinge ausser uns muß 
geglaubt und kann auf keine andere Art ausgemacht werden.” 
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eat an egg or drink water. Yet perhaps because Hamann blurred the lines between Hume’s 
concept of belief and the faith requisite of religion, he was able to approach the thought of 
his day with a unique critique.113 Despite seeing the connection in what others sought to 
divide, he struggled nonetheless in tying together the immense category of “faith”. 
Hamann’s notion of faith embraced a very broad definition containing multiple layers. In 
his latter days, in a letter to Jacobi he said, “I still know neither what Hume nor what both 
of us understand by faith – and the more we would speak or write about it, the less we 
would manage to hold on to this quicksilver.”114 In the context of the letter he is not only 
unsure of faith, but was wrestling with the idea that all concepts are contained in words 
(reason, faith, being, etc.). These words were seen as constructs used to further knowledge, 
but only had reality in relation to one another, i.e. they were not the things in themselves. It 
is clear that despite the ambiguity he felt, faith was intrinsic to all knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113 Erwin Metzke gives a good analysis of Hamann’s appropriation of Hume’s empiricism, particularly his 
principle of belief. Metzke points out how Hamann uses Hume opposite to how Hume himself employed his 
own ideas. Erwin Metzke, J. G. Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1967), 195–98. 
114 ZH VII,  176. To Jacobi, April 30, 1787. “Noch weiß ich weder was Hume noch was wir beide unter Glauben 
verstehen – und je mehr wir darüber reden oder schreiben würden, je weniger wird uns gelingen diesen 
Quecksilber fest zu halten.” 
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The Empirical Starting Place of Faith 
 
“The senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images. All the 
wealth of human knowledge and bliss consists in images.”115 - Aesthetica in 
Nuce 
In the introductory remarks regarding empiricism it was mentioned that Hamann’s 
thought was influenced by empiricism but itself remaining something other. His notion of 
faith is one of the reasons why his thought does not fall under the rubric of empiricism. The 
influence of empiricism on Hamann is twofold. As can be seen in the above quote, 
everything starts in the senses. He takes this to a very radical extreme, even tying 
mathematics to an empirical starting point. “Without mathematical figures there is no 
mathematical method; and this is to me a mathematical truth, the same as that each 
quantity is equal to itself.”116 Since numbers are symbols that must be perceived they are 
dependent upon perception. As such, even mathematical generalities have an empirical 
foundation. For Hamann, everything is based in the concrete; nothing can be entirely 
abstract because the abstract always relies on some form of empirical sensation.  Even the 
concepts of philosophical schools of thought are dependent on language.117  
                                                          
115 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 63. Aesthetica in Nuce. N II, 197:22-24. “Sinne und 
Leidenschaften reden und verstehen nichts als Bilder. In Bildern besteht der ganze Schatz menschlicher 
Erkenntniß und Glücklichkeit.” 
116 Letter to Scheffner 11 Feb. 1785. ZH V, 359-360. “Ohne mathematische Figuren findt keine mathematische 
Methode statt; und es ist für mich eine mathematische Wahrheit, gleich der, daß jede Größe sich selber gleich 
ist: Aus Wörtern u[nd]] Erklärungen läst sich weder mehr noch weniger herausbringen, als jeder darinn [sic] 
legen will, oder gelegt hat. Die ganze Gewißheit der Mathematik hängt von der Natur ihrer Sprache ab, und 
ihrer Schreiberey. Die nothwendigkeit aller Beweise aber, von der poetischen Licenz metaphysiche Puncte, 
Linien und Flächen zu denken, die physich unmöglich sind. Was Demosthenes Actio – Engel Mimik – Batteux 
nachahmung der schönen Natur nennt, ist für mich Sprache – das Organon und Criterion der Vernunft, wie 
Young sagt. Hier liegt reine Vernunft und zugl. Ihre Kritik – und die weigen Gränzstreitigkeiten werden so 
lange währen, bis die Sprachen aufhören mit Weißsagungen und Erkenntnis.” 
117 ZH VII, 173. To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. 
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When speaking of nature there is usually an implicit reference to empiricism in 
Hamann’s writings. Nature has a linguistic quality for Hamann. It is a type of speech which 
addresses the subject and must be “read” or interpreted. This reinforces and upholds his 
idea of nature being a form of revelation. For example, in one of his many criticisms of 
rationalism, he states:  
Behold! the large and small Masorah of philosophy has overwhelmed the text 
of nature, like the Great Flood…You make nature blind, that she might be 
your guide! or rather, with your Epicureanism you have put out the light of 
your own eyes, that you might be taken for prophets who conjure inspiration 
and expositions out of the empty air.118  
Here, one can gain a better grasp of Hamann’s assertion that the existence of things (in 
nature) and one’s own existence (expressed in the passions) must be believed. His 
empiricism is an epistemological disposition insofar as it leads to skepticism, thereby 
necessitating faith. Instead of pessimistic doubt, Hamann responds with a hopeful 
dependency, rooted in faith.  
Of significance for the condemnation of superstition is the dependent nature of 
human knowledge on faith. One does not decipher atemporal laws of nature, but reads 
nature; therefore there is less certainty than can be provided by rationalism. Faith and 
skepticism, then, share a very close relationship. Faith permeates throughout the human 
faculties of knowledge; even sense perception is grounded in faith. 
                                                          
118 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 80. N II, 207:19-20-208:3-7, Aesthetica in Nuce. “Seht! die 
große und kleine Masore der Weltweisheit hat den Text der Natur, gleich einer Sündfluth, 
überschwemmt...Ihr macht die Natur blind, damit sie nämlich eure Wegweiserin seyn soll! oder ihr habt euch 
selbst vielmehr durch den Epikurismum die Augen ausgestochen, damit man euch ja für Propheten halten 
möge, welche Eingebung und Auslegung aus ihren fünf Fingern saugen.” 
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Essentially, all that is perceived and felt, that is, experienced, is revealed. A decisive 
difference between Hamann and Hume (Hamann’s primary source for the philosophy of 
empiricism) is in their notions of revelation. In a later passage in the Socratic Memorabilia 
Hamann reveals how his interpretation of the origin of perceptions from that of Hume is 
made clear. “The first outburst of creation, and the first impression of its chronicler; - - the 
first manifestation and the first enjoyment of nature are united in the words. ‘Let there be 
light!’ Here begins the perception of the presence of things.”119 Although everything begins 
in the senses, that which is perceived is understood as revelation. And revelation must be 
taken on faith. 
What led Hume to a radical skepticism helped lead Hamann to his understanding of 
faith. In a letter to Jacobi, Hamann wrote, “Experience and revelation are the same, and 
indispensible wings or crutches of our reason, if it is not to remain paralyzed. The senses 
(Sinn) and history are the foundation and ground (Boden), - that one might yet deceive, and 
that the other might be so simple, I favor them before all castles in the air.”120 Since it has 
already been established that experience and sense perception are grounded by faith, faith 
is then the foundation of Hamann’s thought. Whenever he approaches the notions of 
reason, language, or any subject for that matter, he takes faith into account. His notion of 
faith is broad and far reaching, going on to comprise both language and history, which will 
be discussed next.  
                                                          
119 Hamann, 63–64. N II, 197:24-27, Aesthetica in Nuce. “Der erste Ausbruch der Schöpfung, und der erste 
Eindruck ihres Geschichtschreibers; -- die erste Erscheinung und der erste Genuß der Natur vereinigen sich 
in dem Worte: Es werde Licht! Hiemit fängt sich die Empfindung von der Gegenwart der Dinge an.” 
120 To Jacobi 1784,November 14, 1784. "Erfahrung und Offenbarung sind einerlei, und unentbehrliche Flügel 
oder Krücken unserer Vernunft, wenn sie nicht lahm bleiben und kriechen soll. Sinn und Geschichte ist das 
Fundament, und der Boden, - jene mögen noch so trügen, und diese noch so einfältig sein: so zieh ich sie allen 
Luftschlössern vor." Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 
(Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):16. 
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Empiricism, Language, Reason 
 
Hamann greatly expands Hume’s concept of belief (which, lacking a superior 
cognate in German, was translated as “faith”).121 This is owed to Hamann’s view of language. 
Words contain meaning and are tools to express meaning – yet remain tied to experience:  
Words, therefore, have an aesthetic and logical faculty. As visible and audible 
objects they belong with their elements to the sensibility and intuition; 
however, by the spirit of their institution and meaning, they belong to the 
understanding and concepts. Consequently, words are pure and empirical 
intuitions as much as pure and empirical concepts. Empirical, because the 
sensation of vision or hearing is effected through them; pure, inasmuch as 
their meaning is determined by nothing that belongs to those sensations.122  
Once one begins to speak of the meaning of the words themselves, the empirical level is left 
behind. Language is the means of transmitting history and human intention (not to 
mention its relation to reason), both of which require faith. Words are not only empirical 
elements, but are in fact a priori. “Sounds and letters are therefore pure forms a priori, in 
which nothing belonging to the sensation or concept of an object is found; they are the true, 
                                                          
121 In his biography of Kant, Manfred Kuehn points out that the ambiguity of faith and belief in German 
allowed Hamann, as well as a few other thinkers, to interpret the skepticism of Hume as both the undoing of 
Enlightenment thought and a defense of Christian faith. See, Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 119–20. 
122 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 215. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. N III, 88:1-22. 
“Wörter haben also ein ästhetisches und logisches Vermögen. Als sichtliche und lautbare Gegenstände 
gehören sie mit ihren Elementen zur Sinnlichkeit und Anschauung, aber nach dem Geist ihrer Einsetzung und 
Bedeutung zum Verstand und Begriffen. Folglich sind Wörter so wol reine und empirische Anschauungen, als 
auch reine und empirische Begriffe; empirisch, weil Empfindung des Gesichts oder Gehörs durch sie bewirkt; 
rein, in so fern (in) ihre(r) Bedeutung durch nichts, was zu jenen Empfindungen gehört, (angetroffen) 
bestimmt wird.” 
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aesthetic elements of all human knowledge and reason.”123 The content of this a priori 
meaning derives from history and its transmission through language. One is able to accept 
meaning in language only through faith. The intellect can innovate and create; yet the 
intellect alone cannot come to meaning on its own. These views have far reaching 
repercussions. Having faith that language is capable of communicating the inner-
convictions of another person is linked to that which is communicated in history, revealed 
by language in sense experience. Things such as religious truth claims may not make sense 
from the point of sense experience alone, but are conveyed in history through language.  
Language and Communication 
 
Language contains both the repository of the past as well as the means whereby 
people might express their thoughts and intentions. The ability of language to convey inner 
intentions and convictions was very important to Hamann. Language (Sprache) means 
much more than the alphabet and the words created by it. To Hamann it contains the 
revelations of nature, written documents, and the speech of one to another. It is the 
foundation of all social life, showing up very clearly in a poignant passage of Golgotha and 
Sheblimini! Language is that which comes through the senses and the reception of it 
contains a faith-based element. From the starting place of language, all actions and reasons 
in social interactions base themselves in one way or another:  
“All social contracts derive, according to the law of nature, from the moral 
capacity to say Yes! Or No!, and from the moral necessity to make good the 
word that had been given. The moral capacity to say Yes! Or No! is based on 
                                                          
123 Hamann, 211. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. N III, 286:14-17. “Laute und Buchstaben sind also 
reine Formen a priori, in denen nichts, was zur Empfindung oder zum Begriff eines Gegenstandes gehört, 
angetroffen wird und die wahren, ästhetischen Elemente aller menschlichen Erkenntnis und Vernunft.” 
58 
 
the natural use of human reason and speech; the moral necessity to fulfill the 
word that has been given is based on the fact that our inward declaration of 
will can be expressed, revealed, or known only in speech or writing or action, 
and that our words like our deeds must be regarded as the natural signs of 
our convictions. Reason and language are therefore the inner and outer band 
of all social life.”124 
Notice that reason and language are tied together in this passage concerning the ability of 
the individual to utilize and receive speech. All social interactions are therefore based on a 
good faith in the ability of language to communicate the inner intentions, convictions, and 
reasonings of another human being. To highlight the essential role of faith in 
communication, in the same passage, he addresses the problems which arise when 
language is not respected. “If that which nature, through having been established, has 
joined together is divorced or divided, then faith and fidelity are annulled.”125 He goes on to 
quote Cicero’s De officiis where Cicero speaks of justice being grounded in iustitiae FIDES 
(good faith), which concerns our truth and fidelity to promises. Hence, faith upholds all 
social life insofar as reason and language are dependent upon it. 
 Up to this point, the focus of Hamann’s notion of faith has remained in areas more 
philosophical than religious. It is clear how the notion of faith underlies an array of 
philosophical points of inquiry; in fact, it underlies virtually all points of philosophical 
                                                          
124 Hamann, 175. Golgotha und Scheblimini!. N III, 300:22- 32. “alle gesellschaftliche Verträge beruhen, nach 
dem Rechte der Natur, auf dem sittlichen Vermögen Ja! Oder Nein! zu sagen, und auf der sittlichen 
Nothwendigkeit, das gesagte Wort wahr zu machen. Das sittliche Vermögen Ja! oder Nein! zu sagen gründet 
sich auf den natürlichen Gebrauch der menschlichen Vernunft und Sprache; die sittliche Nothwendigkeit, sein 
gegebenes Wort zu erfüllen, darauf, daß unsere innere Willenserklärung nicht anders als mündlich oder 
schriftlich oder thätlich geäußert, geoffenbart und erkannt werden kann, und unsere Worte, als die 
natürlichen Zeichen unserer Gesinnungen, gleich Thaten, gelten müssen. Vernunft und Sprache sind allso [sic] 
das innere und äußere Band aller Geselligkeit.” 
125 Hamann, 175. N III, 300:33-35. Golgotha und Scheblimini!. “durch eine Scheidung oder Trennung 
desjenigen, was die Natur durch ihre Einsetzung zusammengefügt hat, wird Glaube und Treue aufgehoben.” 
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inquiry in Hamann’s thought. This notion of faith is the basis from which he launches his 
critique of superstition. That being said, there is a religious, Christian conception of faith 
that should not be overlooked. 
Religious Faith 
 
 Although for Hamann one is always already engaging in faith commitments of one 
sort or another, religious faith can be differentiated from the faith present in perception or 
social interaction: “All religions [must] have a relationship to a faith in one, independent 
and living truth, which, the same as our existence, must be older than our reason.”126 
Because religious faith is not concerned with the outward relationship of things but our 
whole existence, all religions have a “mythical and poetic strand” from the perspective of 
reason.127 Religion contains more than just the intellectual analysis of sense perception, and 
therefore the faith contained therein is of a different quality: a mythical one. 
Notwithstanding, this does not imply that religion is a mere human creation, but that it is 
connected to existence which precedes our reason.128 
 The previous paragraph contains a working definition of religious faith, but it lacks a 
connection to the Christian faith, which was a defining characteristic of Hamann’s 
authorship and biography.129 He differentiates the Christian faith from other faiths in at 
least two aspects. One of these aspects is the accepting of historical truths particular to the 
                                                          
126 N III, 291:22-25, Zweifel und Einfälle. “so müßen alle Religionen eine Beziehung auf den Glauben einer 
einzigen, selbständigen und lebendingen Wahrheit haben, die, gleich unserer Existenz, älter als unsere 
Vernunft seyn muß.” 
127 N III, 291:34, Zweifel und Einfälle. “mythische und poetische Ader aller Religionen.” 
128 N III, 291, Zweifel und Einfälle. 
129 The biographical significance can be seen most prevalently in his Gedanken über meinen Lebenslauf, 
Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 313–49.  
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Christian faith, transmitted through the Scriptures and its interpretation. The other aspect 
is the Christological, theological structure of his entire thought, finding clear expression on 
numerous occasions but lucidly given at the start of his Biblical Observations.130 
The Singularity of the Christian Faith 
 
Golgotha and Sheblimini! contains some of the most explicit defense of and 
differentiation of the Christian faith from that of the faith present in all human existence 
and other religions, as presented in the last subsection. The faith present in all religions is 
insufficient for understanding why Hamann argued from the perspective of Christianity. In 
keeping with Hamann’s tendency, his view of religion was in stark contrast to those of his 
contemporaries, particularly with the deists and those who sought truths of reason apart 
from historical revelation. His argument is found in a work criticizing the thought of Moses 
Mendelssohn – who was harshly criticized by Hamann. Since Mendelssohn’s book, On 
Religious Power and Judaism, dealt with the relationship of church and state and at the 
same time established Judaism on Enlightenment foundations, Hamann was compelled to 
counter Mendelssohn’s ideas. Consequently, this text provided one of the clearest accounts 
of Hamann’ understanding of Christianity and that of revealed religion. 
 
                                                          
130 Karlfried Gründer provides a good analysis of the theological underpinnings in the Biblical Observations in 
his book, Figur und Geschichte: Johann Georg Hamanns “Biblische Betrachtungen” als Ansatz einer 
Geschichtsphilosophie. However, despite his good analysis of the Biblical Observations, its weakness is in only 
looking to this early work for a philosophical approach in Hamann. The considerations are interesting, but 
seem limited in scope insofar as providing a more comprehensive interpretation of Hamann’s approach. Due 
to the content matter, Hamann is generally treated as a theologian by Gründer. By broadening the scope of 
looking at Hamann’s authorship, one quickly discerns a more concrete philosophical approach that is not 
present in Gründer’s interpetation. For instance, in Gründer’s attempt to find the philosophical problems 
presented by condescension (p. 92), he still concludes with the idea of Hamann as theologian engaged with 
philosophy (p. 192). Karlfried Gründer, Figur und Geschichte: Johann Georg Hamanns “Biblische 
Betrachtungen” als Ansatz einer Geschichtsphilosophie (Freiburg: Alber, 1958). 
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Faith and Historical Revelation 
 
 In Golgotha and Sheblimini!, Hamann defends revealed religion, be it Judaism or 
Christianity, against the subsumption by abstract reason. Hamann affirms with 
Mendelssohn to knowing of, “no eternal truths save as incessant temporality.”131 One 
receives both “direct revelation through word and script” and “indirect revelation through 
things (nature) and concepts.”132 He is clear that it is not the nature of revelation which 
differentiates them (i.e. religions), but the content therein – the uniqueness of direct (read: 
historical) revelation. In his own terms what differentiates Judaism and Christianity is: 
…solely a matter of temporal truths of history, which occurred once and 
never come again – of facts which have become true at one point in time and 
place through a coherence of causes and effects, and which, therefore, can 
only be conceived as true in respect to that point in time and space, and must 
be confirmed by authority.133  
The point regarding authority is not to condone an authoritarian ecclesiology or 
institutions, but to recognize dependence of history being handed down by authority lest it 
cease to exist.134 The idea of transmission is connected to authority. Authority (which can 
be derived in a number of ways) is the means whereby specific things are deemed worthy 
of transmission.135 
                                                          
131 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 180. Golgotha and Scheblimini!  
132 Hamann, 180,181. Golgotha and Scheblimini!. 
133 Hamann, 182. Golgotha and Scheblimini!. 
134 Hamann, 182. Golgotha and Scheblimini!. 
135This applies to the case of the meaning of words. For one reason or another, words derive a meaning which 
can be located in an authority. In cases where the meaning of a word gained more prominence just due to its 
prevalence might at first seem to indicate that meaning it not derived by an authority. However, one could 
interpret this as a democratic authority that is imparting the meaning. Meaning can also be imparted by the 
aristocracy or priests who serve in the role of defining specific terms. What all have in common is that it is by 
authority which meaning is transmitted. 
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Interestingly, historical truths pertain not only to the past but to the future as well. 
“This characteristic difference between Judaism and Christianity is a matter of historical 
truths, not only those of past times but also of times to come, which are proclaimed in 
advance and prophesied through the spirit of providence as universal as it is particular, and 
which can, according to their nature, not be accepted in any other manner than on faith.”136 
Therefore the concrete religions have both an historical and eschatological element. It is 
the religious aspect of faith, the mythical, which orients one in the world. However, the 
specifics are based upon definite revelations in history, which cannot be derived outside of 
revelation in language – outside of the experience of natural phenomena. This is beyond the 
confines of reason. Hamann utilizes Hume in his own defense when writing to Kant: 
Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its [Christianity] veracity. And 
whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle 
in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and 
gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and 
experience.137  
If taken in isolation, statements like this can be read as a rejection of reason in matters of 
religion. Hence, his other statements regarding the role of reason in keeping faith in check 
must constantly be kept in mind to fully grasp the entirety of Hamann’s view of faith. He 
does not look to abstract reason to ground the Christian faith – not because he is against 
reason – but because of his understanding of its limitations in matters of faith.  
                                                          
136 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 182. Golgotha and Scheblimini!. 
137 ZH I, 380. To Immanuel Kant, July 27, 1759. Arnulf Zweig’s translation of this letter will be used. Immanuel 
Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 
42. 
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This discussion has demonstrated the manner in which Hamann regarded the specificity of 
Christian revelation. Namely, that the temporal revelations in history were not something 
that were accessible to abstract reason, and as such, were not something that might be 
encompassed in a general, objective philosophical approach. This applied to all concrete 
religions, as well. (e.g. Hamann defended the historical nature of Judaism in the face of 
Mendelssohn’s attempt to bring it under the rule of Enlightenment reason.) 
Notwithstanding, Hamann did not hold that all religions were equal, but only that their 
foundations were not something to be tried before the court of abstract reason.  
His approach to persuading others to Christian faith was of an aesthetic nature. 
Hamann does not defend his Christian faith in an argumentative manner, but perhaps the 
word assertive might better describe his stance. Due to the abutting relationship between 
faith and skepticism, he relies more on aesthetics than creating his own philosophical 
system. It is not hard to see why his insights were examined by Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(1905-1988) in his theological aesthetics, where beauty comes through revelation and can 
only be responded to by the individual.138 This circumvents the dependency of faith on 
abstract reason.139 For Hamann, Christian faith, indeed, any religious faith for that matter 
must be based on revelation. Hence, Hamann’s approach is assertive insofar as religion 
transcends the scope of abstract reason and offers something which must be accepted; it is 
                                                          
138 Michael Schulz – in his article on Balthasar’s theology within the framework of religious pluralism – 
highlights elements in Balthasar’s thought that parallel some of Hamann’s insights. Some of these are the 
specificity of the Christian revelation in Jesus Christ, as well as the condescension of God playing a significant 
role in considerations of religious plurality. See, Michael Schulz, “Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen im 
Gespräch Mit Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in Weltentfremdung, Weltoffenheit, Alternativen der Moderne: 
Perspektiven aus Wissenschaft, Religion, Kunst, ed. Hartmut Böhme and Hartmut Schröter, Zeitansage, Bd. 3 
(Berlin: Lit, 2008).  
139 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Studies in Theological Style, ed. John Kenneth Riches, vol. 3, Glory of the Lord / 
Hans Urs Balthasar, v. 2-3 (San Francisco: New York: Ignatius Press; Crossroad, 1984), 239–78. 
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not merely something to which one must assent. As the particularities of his Christian faith 
provided a framework for his philosophical approach, the essential particularities will 
receive attention below. 
Christian Faith: a Framework for Philosophy 
  
  Hamann’s idea of faith might at first glance be compared to that of Jacobi or 
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855).140 Despite some of the similarities and parallels,141 one 
must keep in mind that Hamann grounded his thought in the concrete, historical, and 
linguistic. He remained ever at the crossroads of faith and skepticism, allowing for a greater 
tension in knowledge than either Jacobi or Kierkegaard. This tension was part of the very 
fabric of faith to Hamann. R. G. Smith (1913-1968) put it well when he stated that 
Kierkegaard, “reaches a point beyond the world, the point of religious passion, in which the 
individual faces God, God alone, in the decision of inwardness, of pure subjectivity…For 
Hamann there is no stage beyond the indirectness of faith, which is grounded in the whole 
life of the world and history.”142 Christian faith is mediated (Smith’s “indirect”) in 
accordance with the nature of revelation. Hence, faith always mediates revelation; words, 
being part of revelation, are always mediated by faith. In reference to the quotes from 
Golgotha and Sheblimini!, one must believe that the words spoken reflect the inner 
conviction of the speaker (be it God or one’s fellow person). 
                                                          
140 For a good comparison of Jacobi and Kierkegaard see, Jon Stewart, ed., “Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Two 
Theories of the Leap,” in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions, Kierkegaard Research, v. 5 
(Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Ltd, 2009), 33–50. Additionally, there are instances 
where Hamann is casually lumped in with Jacobi’s fideistic ideas of faith and misrepresents Hamann’s 
thought. E.g. Samuel Fleischacker, What Is Enlightenment?, Kant’s Questions (London; New York: Routledge, 
2013), 43.  
141 They all had an emphasis on the limitations of reason and a focus on faith. 
142 Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence, 19. 
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 Still, Hamann recognized that for one to come to his position required an abrupt and 
entire change. To come to a specific faith of a particular religion, in this case Christianity, 
one has to accept and experience these particular truths revealed in history. His conversion 
serves as one example which indelibly affected his life and thought.143 While reading 
through the Scriptures, Hamann embraced a Christian framework for his thought.144 John 
Betz distinguishes between the natural faith required by all and a “supernatural faith” in 
Hamann’s thought.145 Hamann does not use this distinction himself. However, it helps make 
sense of instances where Hamann seems to clearly speak of Christian faith and not in the 
broad sense to which he frequently refers. One instance of this is in a letter to Jacobi, where 
he states that, “Faith is not everyone’s thing, and is not communicable like goods.”146 In 
another instance, in the Socratic Memorabilia, he speaks of his offerings needing to be 
swallowed not chewed, thereby insinuating that what was presented was an entirely 
alternate view incompatible with current modes of thinking.147 Presumably the faith 
required to make this complete change in rationality is qualitatively different, warranting 
the differentiation made by Betz. From the perspective of the present study, the term 
supernatural might lead to an incorrect understanding of Hamann’s authorship, as he tends 
                                                          
143 Although it is nearly a requirement to at least discuss Hamann’s conversion as it proved such a decisive 
turning point for his thought, Fritz Blanke provides a good analysis. See, Fritz Blanke, Hamann-Studien, 
Studien Zur Dogmengeschichte und Systematischen Theologie 10 (Zürich: Zwingli Verlag, 1956), 99–104. 
144 There has been some disagreement over the nature of his conversion; whether it was predominately 
Reformed or Pietistic. However, there is no question as to its influence on Hamann’s life and thought. For a 
discussion of these differences see, Harry Sievers, Johann Georg Hamanns Bekehrung. - Ein Versuch, sie zu 
verstehen, Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und systematischen Theologie 24 (Verlag Zwingli, 1969), 9–26.  
145 Betz, After Enlightenment, 64. 
146 ZH VII, 176. To Jacobi, April 30, 1787. “Glaube ist nicht Jedermanns Ding, und auch nicht communicable, 
wie eine Waare, sondern das Himmelreich und die Hölle in uns.” 
147 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 6. N II, 61, Socratic Memorabilia. 
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to veer away from the abstract, be it metaphysical or supernatural.148 Although at times 
Hamann uses this type of language, it is normally used analogously. Consequently, a better 
term for supernatural faith would be simply “Christian faith”, insofar as it reflects the 
concrete and historical. This provides for the potential of the supernatural, while 
containing a sense of epistemological reserve. 
Hamann’s notion of faith was very broad. Faith was understood as being intrinsic to 
any step beyond the apprehension of revelation which comes through the senses. To what 
degree this related to a universal, Christian truth warrants discussion. When Hamann 
makes statements concerning the faith involved in receiving sense experience there is an 
underlying theological referent. Hamann believes that revelation of the senses corresponds 
to the creator God of the Bible for him personally. Yet his assertions boast a clearly 
philosophical element which does not require a specifically Christian correlate. This 
perspective is at variance with other Hamann scholars who interpret his authorship as 
primarily a theological critique of secularity or philosophy.149 One should not infer 
conjectures of his personal faith into his philosophical assertions. This is not to say that 
Hamann can be read without taking Christianity into account, indeed, it is not the sole 
referent but the primary one. However, it is difficult to retain the Hamann-as-a-theologian 
                                                          
148 Hamann's turn to language is itself a rejection of the "castles in the air" of supernatural and metaphysical 
speculation. Additionally, on the difference between Christianity and other religions Hamann only goes back 
to historical truths revealed in history. Cf. Hamann, 182. Golgotha and Sheblimini!.   
149 One example – but far from the sole example – of this tendency is represented in Fritz Lieb’s interpretation 
of Hamann’s idea of faith. Lieb resists placing Hamann in a similar category as Herder, namely, a secularizing 
of the notion of revelation. In stark contrast to this, Lieb argues that Hamann’s idea of revelation is solely for 
those who believe in God’s word and divine plan. The problem with this interpretation is that it takes 
exegetical liberties with Hamann’s broad comments regarding revelation. Furthermore, insofar as Hamann’s 
critique could be employed without reverting to its theological underpinnings, conversion of his 
contemporaries cannot be seen as the only application of his thought. Fritz Lieb, “Glaube und Offenbarung bei 
J. G. Hamann,” in Johann Georg Hamann, ed. Reiner Wild, Wege Der Forschung; Bd. 511 (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978), 141.                                  
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opinion, particularly when looking at his published authorship. Certainly the breadth of his 
writing should be taken into account when attempting an interpretation of it. Yet, 
specifically how he engaged publicly with the prominent ideas of his time supports a 
philosophical interpretation of his critique. It cannot be denied that his Christianity 
informed his thinking but his utilization of Christian terminology had specific philosophical 
purposes when critiquing his philosophical interlocutors. These philosophical insights can 
be applied without proffering some version of Protestant Christianity as his solution to all 
philosophical problems.150 This is not to berate studies concerning his Lutheranism, as they 
are important to better understand him. To treat Hamann as a theological response to 
modernity is too narrow a view and is even misleading as this view overlooks his 
philosophical insights. 
Condescension of God 
 
 From statements made by Hamann, one might be able to extrapolate various post-
modern insights regarding the inability of philosophy to grasp metaphysical truth, the 
influence of language on rationality, etc.151 However, Hamann’s thought is strongly 
Trinitarian and Christological. These elements are manifest in the idea of condescension 
(Herunterlassung) and the Logos.  
The condescension of each member of the Trinity has considerable bearing on the 
theological structure of Hamann’s thought.152 It is fairly uncommon to carry the concept of 
                                                          
150 The superstition and idols of his age were critiqued for their philosophical deficiencies.  
151 One example of this can be found in, Terezakis, “J. G. Hamann and the Self-Refutation of Radical 
Orthodoxy.” 
152 Walter Liebrecht argues that in the Biblical Observations the humility or condescension of God is the 
precondition upon which people can come into contact with God. Walter Liebrecht, Gott und Mensch bei 
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condescension of God over to each member of the Trinity. It is, of course, commonly used in 
reference to the incarnation and crucifixion, but is intrinsic to all members of the Godhead 
according to Hamann. Particularly significant to the idea of humility is the conception of 
God as author. In reference to the Father, he states, “’God an author’ – The creator of the 
world and the father of humanity is denied and reprehended.”153 Here the idea of humility 
is paramount, “How has God the Father humbled (gedemüthigt) himself, for he not only 
formed a clod of dirt, but also animated it through his breath.”154 From these quotes one can 
extract a precursor to Hamann’s later attacks on the superstition of the Enlightenment, 
which included an attack on its arrogance regarding knowledge.155 The act of creation does 
not at first appear to be an act of humility; however, in regards to creation, humility is the 
means of revelation to humanity. God reveals himself indirectly in nature, mediated 
through experience and sense perception. Insofar as the individual is not compelled to 
respond to this revelation, it is indeed the self-lowering of God. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Johann Georg Hamann (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1958), 20. Since God can only be experienced in his self-
lowering – mediated through people, history, and experience – one can better grasp Hamann’s statement that 
for him “every book is a bible” ZH I, 396. This is his way of saying that revelation is to be found everywhere.  A 
more detailed article on the topic of Hamann’s idea of the condescension of God is contained in, Matthew 
Cierzan, “The Condescension of God as Found in Hamann’s Biblical Meditations: A Foundation for Hamann’s 
Thought and Its Significance within the Dialogue Surrounding Religious Plurality,” in In Pluribus Unum: 
Jednota v Mnohosti (Prešov: Prešovská univerzita v Prešove Gréckokatolícka teologická fakulta, n.d.). 
153 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 59:3-4. “Gott ein Schriftsteller! - - (Der Schöpfer der Welt und der Menschen 
ist geleugnet und getadelt worden.” 
154 Hamann, 151:37-39. Londoner Schriften. “Wie hat sich Gott der Vater gedemüthigt, da er ein[en] 
Erdtenkloß nicht nur bildete, sondern auch durch seinen Othem beseelte.” 
155 Hamann’s attack on the confidence of Enlightenment thought might seem counter-intuitive. For one, it was 
a time which moved from truth to probability. It would appear that he did not properly understand his age. 
However, Enlightenment thinkers’ claim to truth was at times a methodological one. Yet the methodologies 
themselves were dependent on language and experience, meaning that they were still based on faith. This 
made these positions contingent; a fact that was not broadly acknowledged by the Enlightenment. The words 
“superstition” and “idolatry” were used in order to offend the taste of the times and in so doing hoped to 
awaken some to their own contingency. For the move from truth to probability see, Annette Meyer, Von der 
Wahrheit zur Wahrscheinlichkeit: die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in der schottischen und deutschen 
Aufklärung, Hallesche Beiträge zur europäischen Aufklärung 36 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2008), 1–92.  
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 Likewise, the Spirit also lowers himself, “How has God the Holy Spirit humbled 
himself, that he would be a historian of the smallest, most disdainful, inconsequential 
occurrences on the earth, to reveal to man in his own language, in his own history, along his 
own paths, the counsel, secrets, and ways of the Godhead?”156 Here one of the primary 
points of Hamann’s authorship arises: not only in the fact that history is a revelation to 
humanity, but also in the emphasis on the small, disdainful, and inconsequential. In this 
way, faith is indirect in that God does not speak directly (e.g. even using a donkey on one 
occasion, a point not lost on Hamann).157 
 Finally there is Christ’s self-lowering – becoming a man. There are elements which 
echo traditional Christian doctrine, “How the Son of God has humbled himself, he was a 
man, he was least among men, he took the form of a servant.”158 The doctrine of the 
incarnation quickly takes on a broader significance for Hamann. Upon his return from 
London, Hamann wrote to Linder, “Freely he [Christ] created us in his image – because we 
had lost it, he took on our own image – flesh and blood, like children have, learned to cry – 
babble – speak – read – write like a true son of man; imitated us that we might be 
                                                          
156 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 152. “Wie hat sich Gott der heil. Geist erniedrigt, da er ein Geschichtschreiber 
der kleinsten, der verächtlichst[en], der nichts bedeutendesten Begebenheit[en] auf der Erde geworden[en] 
um d[em] Menschen in seiner eigenen Sprache, in seiner eigenen Geschichte, in seinen eigen[en] Wegen die 
Rathschlüsse, die Geheimnisse und die Wege der Gottheit zu offenbaren?” 
157 The story of God speaking through Balaam’s donkey is found in Numbers 22:21-39. Hamann references 
this rather humorously in The Last Will and Testament of the Knight of the Rose-Cross: Concerning the Divine 
and Human Origin of Language, Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 100. N III, 27:22. 
158 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 151–52. Biblische Betrachtungen. “Wie hat sich Gott der Sohn gedemüthigt, er 
wurde ein Mensch, er wurde der geringste unter den Menschen, er nahm Knechtsgestallt an...”. 
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encouraged to imitate him.”159 The image of the word made flesh serves as the foundation 
of Hamann’s philosophical impulses and insights,  
All philosophical contradiction and the entire historical riddle of our 
existence, the impenetrable night of their termini a quo and termini ad quem 
are resolved in the record of the word made flesh. This testimony is the spirit 
of prophecy, and the reward of its promise a new name which he 
commends.160  
Therefore this Christology, which is laden throughout much of his work, undergirds 
Hamann’s linguistic insights as well as his emphasis on the concrete and organic.161 Much of 
the above quoted content was written for either family or friends and was composed 
shortly after his conversion. Because of the much more lucid nature of these early 
devotional writings compared to his published works (i.e. his authorship), it can be 
tempting to use them as the clearer expression of his ideas. Importantly, Hamann did not 
consider these early texts part of his “authorship” as he did not intend them for 
publication.162 Therefore, it is the opinion of the present study that the early devotional 
writings can be helpful in better understanding the man Hamann and his thoughts, but 
should not be taken as the representation of his philosophical thought as a whole. Through 
his admission of the historical contingency of his own Christian faith, it is not an 
extrapolation to read his critique as unreliant on theology. That being said, one can see that 
                                                          
159 ZH I, 394:4-9. To Linder August 9, 1759. “Freylich schuf er uns nach Seinem Bilde – weil wir dies verloren, 
nahm er unser eigen Bild an – Fleisch und Blut, wie die Kinder haben, lernte weinen – lallen – reden – lesen – 
dichten wie ein wahrer Menschsohn; ahmte uns nach, um uns zu Seiner Nachahmung aufzumuntern.” 
160 N III, 192, “aller philosophische Wiederspruch und das ganze historische Rätzel unserer Existenz, die 
undurchdringliche Nacht ihres Termini a quo und Termini ad quem sind durch die Urkunde des Fleisch 
gewordenen Worts aufgelöset. Dies Zeugnis ist der Geist der Weißagung, und der Lohn seiner Verheißung, ein 
neuer Name, welchen niemand kennt, denn der ihn empfäht.” 
161 E.g. ZH V, 177. To Herder, April 6, 1784. “Reason is language - Logos.” 
162 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, ix. 
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Hamann considered authorship to be a mirror of the condescension of the Trinity found in 
these early works.163 It is this framework of condescension which Hamann came to 
incorporate following his conversion. Indeed, this influenced his philosophical approach, 
and went on to inform his subsequent view of language.  
 The next section will discuss Hamann’s views regarding the relationship between 
faith and reason. Particularly, showing how he did not see a contradiction between the two 
of them, but rather, he saw them as alternate, interdependent faculties, which, when 
working in unison, helped to make up the content of human knowledge. 
Faith and Reason: Two Interdependent Faculties of Human Knowledge 
 
In this section faith and reason will be juxtaposed. Here it will be demonstrated that 
faith and reason are two separate faculties in Hamann’s thought. This is not to suggest that 
there is no relationship between the two faculties; quite to the contrary, they are both 
present in the thought processes of the human being. In fact, they are considered 
relationships more than entities (this will receive more treatment in the final chapter). 
Notwithstanding, the convoluting of these two, or worse yet, one usurping the other, leads 
only to philosophical malaise. In reference to this state of affairs, Hamann frequently 
utilized the metaphor of a tree which is organic, living, and gives nourishment. The 
improper usurpation of faith or reason over the other is compared to sterility or death. In 
his words, “to what end is such a violent, unjustified, willful divorce of that which nature 
has joined together! Will not both stems wither and be dried up through a dichotomy and 
                                                          
163 Christina Reuter makes a great case for reading Hamann’s authorship as a mirror of his own 
understanding of divine condescension. See, Christina Reuter, Autorschaft als Kondeszendenz: Johann Georg 
Hamanns erlesene Dialogizität, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Bd. 132 (Berlin ; New York: De Gruyter, 
2005). 
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rupture of their common root?”164 The perversion present in the elevation of one of these 
faculties over the other is one of the grounds for Hamann’s interpretation of his 
contemporaries as idolatrous, based upon a latent superstition bolstering their respective 
philosophies.  
Hamann speaks of reason quite often, but in order to ascertain his understanding of 
it demands more attention than a mere glance. Clearly, in his comments on reason he refers 
to his interlocutors' application of abstract reason.165 However, when it comes to his own 
assertive claims, there lies a greater ambiguity. This is due to his uncompromising stance 
when it comes to conforming to the spirit of his age. Generally this means he insists on 
speaking of these things (i.e. reason, being, etc.) from a holistic perspective. Therefore a 
clear definition becomes problematic without an explication of his entire thought. Since the 
task at hand is that of distinguishing between the faculties of faith and reason, a few 
comments will be made in order to aid in understanding why Hamann held that 
distinguishing the difference between faith and reason paramount.  
What is apparent is that reason is the human capacity to order that which is 
received through revelation – because of the individual nature of revelation one cannot 
think of reason as singular; in fact, one might better speak of various “reasonings”. Yet, 
even with reason losing its purity, the fact remains that it is the inner ability of the mind to 
order that which is received through the senses. Therefore reason is a different faculty than 
                                                          
164Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 212. Here Hamann is referring to the sensibility and 
understanding, which are closely related to the faculties under consideration. 
165This is to say, to take one example, Hamann does not seek to redefine the notion of reason in Mendelssohn, 
but seeks to work from within the system itself in order to reveal its own deficiencies. In fact, Hamann 
recommended this approach to Jacobi upon his response to Mendelssohn in the pantheism controversy. See, 
ZH VII, 174, To Jacobi, April 30, 1787. 
73 
 
faith, as it always follows that which is revealed in immediacy and whose principles are 
dependent on faith. Whereas some Enlightenment philosophers limited faith to that which 
was not understood, Hamann held these two faculties (faith and reason) of the human 
mind equal in importance and interdependent upon each other.166 In reference to the above 
sketch, Hamann states, “Why should only uncertain faith be named? – what are not – 
grounds of reason? Is knowledge (Erkenntnis) without grounds of reason possible just as 
little as sensus sine intellectu?”167 Here the connection between the senses and faith is 
present as well as the intellect and reason. Hamann regularly convolutes the faculties of 
human knowledge – reason, language, faith – in order to emphasize their malleability, to 
keep their interdependency in focus, while still recognizing a difference.  
 In the second section of the Socratic Memorabilia – preceding a discussion of 
Socratic ignorance and Socrates’ daemon – reason and the intellect are contrasted with 
faith. Initially, this may present itself as a strange example of contrasts; however, it 
underscores the different faculties wonderfully. He begins with the consideration of 
mortality, “What is more certain than the end of man, and from which truth is there a more 
general and reliable knowledge?”168 The knowledge that one will die is fully supported by 
the intellect, through accumulating data, observing the world, and ordering it accordingly. 
                                                          
166 In this section Hamann includes a very interesting footnote: Fidei hoc crepusulo commune obtigit, quod ad 
utrumque tenebrarum admixtio necessaria sit, quum alias copiosiori accedente luce, illa in scientiam, hoc in 
diem transeat. Quaedam mysteria – in quibus Fides intellectui felicius facem praeferre soleat – quam hic ad 
procreandam fidem viam munire. Johann Georg Hamann, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. Sven-Aage 
Jørgensen, Bibliogr. rev. Ausg, Reclams Universal-Bibliothek 926 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2004), 53. What is 
suggested here is that faith has an element of the unknown which can later pass into knowledge. This is to say 
there is a base understanding that is not completely foreign to that of some of his contemporaries, only 
Hamann emphasizes its necessity and not its hindering of knowledge.   
167 ZH VII, 165. To Jacobi, April 27, 1787. “Warum soll bloß die ungewiße Glaube genannt werden? – Was sind 
nicht – Vernunftgründe? Ist Erkenntiß ohne Vernunftgründe möglich, eben so wenig als sensus sine intellectu.” 
168 N II 73:22-24. Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten. “Was ist gewisser als des Menschen Ende, und von welcher 
Wahrheit gibt es eine allgemeinere und bewährtere Erkenntnis?”  
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Yet, the fact that one will die cannot be fully comprehended – in Hamann’s understanding – 
and appropriated in life. In reference to this, he comments further, “There are proofs of 
truths, which are so little suited for the application; yes, one can believe in the proof of a 
proposition without giving the proposition itself approval.”169 His point is that the 
acceptance of principles is not based entirely upon consistent proofs. Hamann’s skepticism 
is essential for this position. There can be an assent to proofs of propositions, but not a 
faith in the respective propositions. Put differently, the proofs of propositions are not the 
foundation of faith; and faith is always connected to the concrete, it is never purely in the 
intellect. It comes back around to the immediacy of the senses. “Faith is not a work of 
reason and also, therefore, cannot be subjected to its attacks; because faith happens so little 
through grounds as by tasting and seeing.”170 Faith, then, cannot be subjected to the critique 
of abstract reason but works in conjunction with reason.  
 Some have interpreted Hamann’s authorship as a tirade against reason.171 Critical 
comments on abstract reason surface frequently in his authorship. Although faith and 
reason play different roles, they are neither opposed to each other, nor does the 
recognition of their separate functions solve the problem of philosophical knowledge. 
Firstly, they are inter-dependent, “Faith is as in need of reason as it is in need of faith .”172 
Later in a letter he gives further insights into his thoughts, as well as reveals that he is not 
on a crusade against reason as such. “Sensation cannot be as easily separated from human 
                                                          
169 N II, 73:30-33. Socratic Memorabilia. “Es giebt Beweise von Wahrheiten, die so wenig taugen als die 
Anwendung, die man von den Wahrheiten selbst machen kann; ja man kann den Beweiß eines Satzes glauben 
ohne dem Satz selbst Beyfall zu geben.” 
170 N II, 74:2-5. Socratic Memorabilia. “Der Glaube ist kein Werk der Vernunft und kann daher auch keinem 
Angrif derselben unterliegen; weil Glauben so wenig durch Gründe geschieht als Schmecken und Sehen.” 
171 Cf. Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy, Second Edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 317–443. 
172 ZH VII, 165, To Jacobi, April 27, 1787. “Glaube hat Vernunft eben so nöthig, als diese jenen hat.” 
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nature as reason, nor can reason be separated from the senses [Sinnlichkeit]. The 
affirmation of identical propositions includes the denial of contradictory propositions at 
the same time. Identity and contradiction come from the same certainty, yet are often 
based on an optical or transcendental appearance, thought-shadows, and 
wordplay…sensation must be limited by grounds of reason. Knowledge from faith is 
essentially identical with the nil in intellectu.”173 Here we begin to see the role that reason 
has to play, that is, a regulatory one. 
 A brief note should be made regarding the veracity of faith. Just because history, 
experience, and language – and thereby reason – are dependent on faith to a certain extent, 
it should not be equated with truth. “Faith is likewise the source of unbelief and false belief 
or superstition.”174 This has its origins in language itself, “The adiutorium, the help, 
language, is the seducer of our understanding.”175 This observation demonstrates that there 
should not be a unilateral acceptance of the content of faith. What is critical to note in the 
above quote is that faith might not only be the source of false belief but of superstition as 
well. Therefore when Hamann critiques his age for failing to acknowledge the role of faith, 
he is not referring to the lack of acknowledgement but the superstition that may be 
present. Furthermore, the failure to acknowledge the faith-based commitments makes one 
more susceptible to superstition; it is to the explication of the superstition of his age which 
will now be addressed. 
                                                          
173 ZH VII, 165-166, To Jacobi, April 27, 1787. “Empfindung kann in der menschl. Natur eben so wenig von 
Vernunft, als diese von der Sinnlichkeit geschieden werden. Die Bejahung identischer Sätze schliest zugleich 
die Verneinung widersprechender Sätze in sich. Identität und Widerspruch sind von gantz gleicher Gewisheit, 
beruhen aber oft auf einem optischen oder transcendentellen Schein, Gedanken-Schatten und 
Wortspiele...Empfindung muß durch Vernunftgründe eingeschränkt werden. Erkenntnis aus dem Glauben ist 
im Grunde identisch mit dem: Nil in intellectu.”  
174 ZH VII, 173, To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Glaube eben so die Quelle des Un- wie des Aberglaubens…” 
175 ZH VII, 173, To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Das Adiutorium der Sprache ist die Verführerin unseres 
Verstandes.” 
76 
 
Philosophical Superstition 
 
 That Hamann’s work has larger philosophical connotations extending beyond his 
critiques, in the view of this study, will become clearer presently. Hamann considered 
himself as little a philosopher as a theologian, most likely due to his narrow view of the 
parameters of philosophy. He expressed this in a letter, “For if those who are fools deny in 
their heart the existence of God, it appears to me even more nonsensical to want to prove 
that very thing. If this is what reason and philosophy are, then it is hardly a sin to 
blaspheme these things.”176 To reiterate, the present study understands his critique of 
superstition as a philosophical one because today the term philosophy carries far more 
variations and ambiguities than it did for Hamann. Even his insistence on being a 
philologian can be interpreted as a philosophical stance.177 Hamann’s “philologian” is a 
“lover of the word.”178 As explained previously, the Word (i.e. language, Logos) comes 
through revelation in history through experience. Language is his philosophical starting 
place of knowledge. Furthermore, language is the basis of reason itself. Only through 
language can one receive the revelation of God; therein the idea of the lowering of God into 
history mediated by language.  
                                                          
176 ZH VI, 277, To Jacobi, February 18, 1786. “Denn wenn die Narren sind, die in ihrem Herzen das Daseyn 
Gottes leugnen; so kommen mir die noch unsinniger vor, die selbiges erst beweisen wollen. Wenn das 
Vernunft u. Philosophie heißt: so ist es kaum eine Sünde, selbige zu lästern.” 
177 Elfriede Büchsel correctly connects Hamann’s philology to his “mimic style”, that is, his taking up the 
position of the other to demonstrate its weaknesses from within. Elfriede Büchsel, Biblisches Zeugnis und 
Sprachgestalt bei J.G. Hamann: Untersuchungen zur Struktur von Hamanns Schriften auf dem Hintergrund der 
Bibel, Monographien und Studienbücher (Giessen: Brunnen Verlag, 1988), 188–92. Hence, there are times 
when Hamann does not employ clear arguments against his interlocutor, but simply works to make it look 
ridiculous by exposing the faith-based principles upon which it stands. 
178 N II 263:50-53. Beurtheilung der Kreuzzüge, “Erstlich deutet sein Name einen Liebhaber des lebendigen, 
nachdrücklichen, zweyschneidigen, durchdringenden, markscheidenden und kritischen Worts an.” 
77 
 
 The term, “philosophical superstition” at first appears problematic from the 
perspective of Hamann’s authorship, insofar as he interpreted philosophy as always 
involved in abstractions. However, he held to a rather narrow conception of philosophy 
that was normally confined to his contemporaries and was not referring to the ancients as 
superstitious. 179  However, with the expanded boundaries of philosophy since the 
Enlightenment and his critique of theological abstractions, today one can well speak of a 
philosophical superstition that does not contradict Hamann’s own stance toward 
philosophy and reason, despite his instance on being a philologian.  180 
 The present study has thus far primarily addressed the Enlightenment’s own 
understanding of superstition and Hamann’s notion of faith. Hamann’s notion of 
philosophical superstition will receive explication of its own in the proceeding. Its contents 
will better clarify the idea of how the critique of superstition is philosophical through a 
comparison of Hamann’s work to the work of Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996). 
Hamann's Critique of Superstition and Hans Blumenberg's Metaphorology 
  
 The metaphorology of Hans Blumenberg will be taken up as a paradigm that will 
serve as an analogy for Hamann’s concept of superstition. Through this lens, how a critique 
of superstition can be classified as philosophical will come into greater focus.181 In his book, 
                                                          
179 Hamann was more than willing to appropriate the ancients. Also, his use of Latin and Patristic sources – 
which most contemporary readers would include in the history of philosophy – demonstrate his narrow view 
of philosophy. 
180 Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann Philosophy and Faith, 158. 
181 In this analysis one could have utilized the idea of episteme of Foucault or a paradigm in the sense of 
Thomas Kuhn insofar as they are also examples of foundations of knowledge accepted by a society. However, 
Blumenberg’s thought lends itself better to bringing out Hamann’s philosophical approach insofar as it deals 
more closely with theology and philosophy as opposed to science. Cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Vintage books edition (New York NY: Vintage Books, 1994); Thomas S. 
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Paradigms for a Metaphorology (Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie),182 Blumenberg 
acknowledges the inability of the Cartesian project to provide the grounds for philosophical 
reflection. He postulates that in order for thought to grasp at any notion of an All (or an 
absolute), metaphor is required. Even when unacknowledged, metaphors undergird 
thought and the corresponding concepts of philosophy. A controlling metaphor may 
dominate a specific historical period; however, they can also exist alongside one another in 
history. Hamann, in speaking of his “critical century”, similarly interprets different epochs 
as having controlling impulses, paralleling some of Blumenberg’s ideas. There are two 
absolute metaphors postulated by Blumenberg that will be useful for developing the idea of 
philosophical superstition in the context of Hamann, namely, “the powerful truth” and “the 
naked truth.”183 The former will be applied to Hamann’s comments regarding some forms of 
theology (e.g. Roman Catholic theology of the Middle Ages) and the latter Enlightenment 
philosophy, both of which were accused of superstition and idolatry due to their 
abstractions. 
Foundations of Philosophy beyond Reason: Blumenberg's Absolute Metaphors 
 
 Absolute metaphors embody modes of thought – fundamental positions towards 
reality taken to be true. Some of these answers to fundamental questions were deemed 
superstitious in Hamann’s mind and are therefore useful for the present study.  The broad 
and theoretical nature of absolute metaphors make the philosophical aspect of even 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Kuhn and Ian Hacking, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Fourth edition (Chicago ; London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
182 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, ed. Anselm Haverkamp, Dirk Mende, and Mariele 
Nientied, Erste Auflage, Suhrkamp Studienbibliothek 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013). 
183 Blumenberg has many absolute metaphors, but these two correspond most closely to Hamann’s critique. 
They are also the two closest to Hamann’s time period. 
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theological thought structures – at least in the process of analysis – part of a philosophical 
project. 184 The boundary between theology and philosophy was considered either non-
existent or irrelevant in regards to absolute metaphors. Blumenberg’s philosophy seeks to 
delve deeper into the constructs driving thought. In reference to the pursuit of truth and 
reality, Blumenberg asserted that there was a need to develop concepts such as the visio 
beatifica. He writes: 
These are all questions that barely a philosophical school has attempted to 
answer with systematic means; we nonetheless maintain that everywhere in 
the language of philosophy, indications can be found that answers to these 
questions have always already been given in a subterranean stratum of 
thought, answers that, although they may not be contained in the systems in 
propositional form, have never ceased to pervade, tincture, and structure 
them.185  
When Hamann references the superstition of his contemporaries he is referencing 
something of this nature. Namely, that his age had specific answers to fundamental 
questions and one was not supposed to question these underlying answers. Hamann’s 
authorship focused on questioning the underlying presupposition of his age (e.g. his 
critique of the supremacy of critique or the paradigmatic nature of Enlightenment 
utilization of abstract reason as presiding over all other forms of thought). Hence Hamann 
treats many philosophical propositions as subterfuges, distracting from what Blumenberg 
                                                          
184Blumenberg never gives a clear definition of the metaphor within his book, and later abandons some of the 
language utilized in the Metaphorology, perhaps due to ambiguity of the terminology. Cf. Anselm Haverkamp, 
“Prolegomena: Das Skandalon der Metaphorologie,” in Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Erste Auflage, 
Suhrkamp Studienbibliothek 10 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013), 200. 
185 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, trans. Robert Savage (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2016), 7. 
80 
 
would call the absolute metaphor of a specific epoch. One of these was the metaphor of the 
mighty truth.  
The Absolute Metaphor of the Mighty Truth and Hamann’s Critique of the Superstition of 
Theology 
 
Blumenberg’s absolute metaphor of the “mighty truth” (mächtige Wahrheit) 
parallels Hamann’s critique of the theology of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle 
Ages. The underlying notion of truth is what is under scrutiny, not theology per se. The 
mighty truth metaphor is the description of a group of truth metaphors 
(Wahrheitsmetaphern) that share a similar foundation. “Although it does not constitute a 
legitimate object of theology, a fundamental conviction of this kind can also assume a 
theological guise [kann sich theologisch einkleiden].”186 Articulated differently and much 
more obscurely, Hamann has a similar idea of a getting below the surface of dogma and 
theology – the “object” underneath the philosophical, dogmatic framework so to speak – in 
an attempt to reveal that they were based on abstractions.  
The mighty truth has to do with the ability of truth to make itself clear, analogous to 
the function of light in darkness.187 The mighty truth metaphor held that truth was 
something which would continue to advance and could not be hindered. Truth would 
become known; it would make itself known. Hamann allows for the ability of truth to be 
revealed; this is even a necessity for him. Yet to him, how revelation manifests itself is quite 
different from that suggested by the mighty truth metaphor. According to Hamann, truth is 
                                                          
186 Blumenberg, 7. In this sentence the word “guise” is a fine word but misses the original meaning to a 
degree. The original German alludes to the idea of being “theologically clothed”. 
187 Blumenberg, 9. 
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always dependent on faith and the concrete events of experience in history – including all 
of the philosophical uncertainties which come along with this position.  
According to Blumenberg the mighty truth is a paradigm that demands adherence, 
and in so doing upholds a social and political order legitimized entirely on its basis. 
Blumenberg upheld that the mighty truth was the underlying metaphor of thought in a 
Christian era, nothing more. “Christianity arose from a self-surrender, in that it ‘equipped 
itself with a theology only when it wanted to make itself possible in a world that, strictly 
speaking, it denied.’”188 Hamann had a similar opinion. He considered that much of what 
Roman Catholic theology had turned into was a system of human speculation meant to 
legitimize despotism.189 This is not a rejection of its Christian foundations, but what he saw 
as a distorted system, itself founded upon dubious intentions. Take for example, “System is 
already in itself a hindrance of the truth” and, “You must expect the same way of thinking 
from each systematician as a Roman Catholic thinks of his own church.”190 These quotes 
demonstrate that his critique is not a theological one as it is not concerned with the object 
of the theology of the Church (i.e. God), but in the abstractions and their inconsistencies 
and repercussions.  
 
                                                          
188 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace, First MIT Press paperback 
ed, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985), 119. 
189 Blumenberg does not construe this negatively as in the case of Hamann. Rather, he seeks to expose these 
underlying absolute metaphors as a means of understanding the bases of thought in different epochs, even 
providing an argument for speaking of epochs at all. 
190 ZH VI, 276. To Jacobi, February 18, 1786 and April 9, 1786. “System ist schon an sich ein Hinderniß der 
Wahrheit.” And to Jacobi, April 8, 1786. “ Von jedem Systematiker müssen Sie eben die Denkungsart erwarten, 
daß er von seinem System wie ein römisch Katholischer von seiner einzigen Kirche denkt.” Hamann and 
Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):285. 
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The Absolute Metaphor of the Naked Truth 
 
The truth did not want to let bandits come too near to her; she wore dress 
upon dress that one doubted her body could be found. How frightened they 
were when they had their way and saw the terrible specter before them, the 
truth.191 – Johann Georg Hamann 
Following Blumenberg’s analysis of the metaphor of the mighty truth (present primarily in 
the Middle Ages and corresponding to Hamann’s critique of the Roman Catholic Church), 
the metaphor of the naked truth (nackte Wahrheit) will here receive treatment. “The 
metaphor of the ‘naked truth’ pertains to the self-awareness of enlightened reason and its 
claim to mastery.”192 It is built upon the idea that the clothing of truth (in culture, theology, 
society, etc.) was in fact a disguise that needed to be removed. “As soon as clothing [of 
truth] begins to be understood as a disguise to be cast aside, ripped off, or seen through, the 
existing state of society loses its quality of self-evidence.”193 Furthermore, this was used by 
the changing politics and social-economic situation. “In the modern age, talk of the ‘naked 
truth’ has mainly figured in bourgeois diatribes against the sartorial world of the First and 
Second Estates, but it could equally be adopted by every up-and-coming class that thought 
itself naked and wanted to strip others of their vestments as so many disguises.”194 This 
point is particularly relevant for Hamann’s critique of the idols of abstract reason, 
                                                          
191 ZH I 381:8-11 Letter to Kant, July 27, 1759. "Die Wahrheit wollte sich von Straßenräubern nicht zunahe 
kommen laßen, sie trug Kleid auf Kleid, daß man zweifelte ihren Leib zu finden. Wie erschacken [sie], da sie 
ihren Willen hatten und das schreckl. Gespenst, die Wahrheit, vor sich sahen." This is not a one-to-one 
comparison with Blumenberg's absolute metaphor of the naked truth. The statement comes at the end of a 
long letter to Kant seeking to explain and defend himself against the attempt to convert Hamann back to 
Enlightenment ideals following his conversion in London. Particularly pertaining to his friend Berens' disdain 
for Hamann's newfound perspective was in view. The affinity it shares with Blumenberg is the desire of the 
Enlighteners to wrest truth from anything not in accordance with abstract reason.  
192 Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology., 47. 
193 Blumenberg, 42. 
194 Blumenberg, 43. 
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specifically that there was no getting down to the "truth" in an absolute sense but only an 
exchange of fundamental faith-based presuppositions. Blumenberg also locates the move 
from sapientia to scientia in the metaphor of the naked truth.195 Significant for Hamann’s 
critique of superstition is its emphasis on pointing to the Enlightenment’s attempt of 
overcoming the clothing of truth in the past. This became, and is noted by Blumenberg, 
significant difficulty for Enlightenment thought. “The discovery of history within the 
Enlightenment and against its semantic current is the discovery of the illusion of the ‘naked 
truth’ or the illusoriness of nakedness.”196 Its metaphorical nature is revealed and its 
legitimacy called into question by the discovery of history. This brought about a new 
orientation, namely, “the ‘disguises’ of truth now no longer issue from the poetic 
imagination and the need for rhetorical ornamentation – they do not represent fashion 
accessories, so to speak, that could be cast off without further ado – but are themselves 
constitutive of the way in which truth manifests itself.”197 From this point of view the naked 
truth is a form of ‘clothing’ whereby one might approach reality – there is no getting out of 
an underlying metaphor (contingency). Ironically, those who sought to do away with a 
“clothing” of truth were only upholding another form of clothing. The recognition of this is 
paramount for Hamann, as he saw his contemporaries ignorantly assuming methodological 
superiority without recognizing the contingent nature of their systems. Moreover, it was 
that their systems ascribed to fundamental answers to questions of truth without 
acknowledgment - or even awareness - of the contingent nature of their undertakings. 
Blumenberg would frame this in the language of an absolute metaphor to which 
                                                          
195 Blumenberg, 46. 
196 Blumenberg, 48. 
197 Blumenberg, 48. 
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Enlightenment philosophers were ascribing, whereas Hamann would employ the language 
of faith – that all philosophy grounds itself in faith by certain principles which cannot be 
secured through the use of abstract reason.  
Blumenberg's Metaphorology and Hamann's Condescension of God 
 
Blumenberg’s project is not tied to the rhetoric of Hamann, but it does provide the 
modern reader an excellent framework for processing Hamann’s application of highly 
religious language in a philosophical manner. Here a brief excursus considering Hamann’s 
thought from the vantage point of the Metaphorology will be given in order to demonstrate 
how the theological opinion of the condescension of God had significant bearing on his 
philosophical approach. 
The God of condescension could be seen as Hamann’s absolute metaphor. Hamann 
demonstrates a strong belief in that metaphor and yet acknowledges that its superiority 
could not be definitively proven by reason. Because the framework (or metaphor in the 
terms of a metaphoralogical approach) of Hamann’s thought is very Christian – not to 
mention the importance of his conversion experience in the development of his thought – 
there is a tendency to conflate his personal religious convictions with his critique of 
abstract reason.198 This is not to suggest that his personal and public life can be separated, a 
point Hamann would have vehemently opposed,199 but only to say that the metaphor of 
condescension, be it applied personally or publicly, can be considered philosophical as it 
contains the architecture for a philosophical approach. The arguments he employed when 
                                                          
198 Lieb, “Glaube und Offenbarung bei J. G. Hamann,” 129. 
199A point of which he explicitly critiques others is in their “belief” in reason being outside of one exercising 
one’s own reasoning.  
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critiquing his contemporaries stand on their own; they are not tied to a contrasting 
system.200   
Hamann’s Notion of History 
 
 There are difficulties presented by the historical and contingent nature of existence, 
and these bring to light the differences Hamann has with others in the modern era. The 
modern could be characterized by suspicion, founded on the idea of one's own limited 
access to, or the absence of, metaphysical grounding.201 In describing the tension of the 
modern age, Blumenberg states, “The modern age was the first and only age that 
understood itself as an epoch and, in so doing, simultaneously created the other epochs. 
The problem of legitimacy is latent in the modern age’s claim to carry out a radical break 
with tradition, and in the incongruity between this claim and the reality of history, which 
can never begin entirely anew.”202 Abstract reason did not adequately regard historicity in 
seeking to get to the “naked truth” but was limited by a historical consciousness in its 
attempts at knowledge. Hamann was one of the figures to stress this weakness in 
Enlightenment philosophy. The dilemma of contingency would lead later thinkers towards 
a suspicious and even nihilistic view of humanity being historically situated. If the modern 
reaction to contingency is suspicion, then Hamann’s is one of trust. There is no “latent 
                                                          
200 In consulting Jacobi’s response to Mendelssohn in the controversy surrounding Lessing’s potential 
pantheism, Hamann provided the following advice that reveals his own approach. “Why do you [addressing 
Jacobi] contrast your own philosophy to that of others?... you should have taken their philosophy as your own 
and make all its own disagreement (Misstimmung) evident.” ZH VII, 175. To Jacobi, April 30, 1987. “Warum 
setzst Du Deine eigene Philosophie entgegen?...Du hättest Dir ihre Philosophie zu eigen machen sollen, und 
ihre Misstimmung augenscheinlich machen.” 
201 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 3–22. In this first chapter Rorty provides a good summary of a philosophy void of metaphysics in the 
traditional sense. 
202 Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 116. 
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break” as noted in the above quote, but a complete embrace of the tension of historical 
contingency.203  
 Moreover, for Hamann, knowledge is always historically situated. The consciousness 
of one’s own historicity makes up part of the modern construct and, as noted above, was 
already present in Hamann’s authorship. On the one hand, his understanding of humanity 
as historically situated changed the way humanity approaches reality, modifying how 
philosophy should be done. On the other hand, his notion of history is directly connected 
with the Christian faith and does not consist in the break with the past sought by his 
contemporaries.204    
 
 
 
                                                          
203 This is a position in opposition to the ethos of the post-modern embodied by Lyotard’s, albeit cursory, 
description of the post-modern as, “incredulity towards meta-narratives”. Jean-François Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Theory and History of Literature, v. 10 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
204 Hamann interprets the ancients from the perspective of a greater revelation in Christ, which harkens back 
to a Christian age. This has led to the discussion by some, of whether Hamann’s thought is “pre-modern”. 
Oswald Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical Enlightener (Grand Rapids, 
Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2011), xvi. However, some of Hamann’s comments concerning language have 
led others to place him in a post-modern corner. Heinzpeter Hempelmann, Prämodern - Modern - Postmodern: 
warum “ticken” Menschen so unterschiedlich?: Basismentalitäten und ihre Bedeutung für Mission, 
Gemeindearbeit und Kirchenleitung (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Theologie, 2013), 43. However, much 
contemporary scholarship has taken its cue from leading scholar, Oswald Bayer, who finds both categories 
unfitting (discussed in Bayer citation above.) Undoubtedly Hamann sees the ultimate resolution of history 
within the Logos, Christ. Yet how he understands Christianity fits within a post-modern sensibility, because 
his thought is always qualified by the uncertain certainty of faith. So while situated between pre- and post-
modern Hamann’s thought is nevertheless conscious of a contingent historical factor which allows for its own 
existence alongside that of other competing belief systems, relying on the appeal of its own aesthetic and not 
by asserting a greater access to “truth” in an objective sense this study does not wish to delve into the tedious 
discussion of what post-modernism is, or if one should understand it as a part of the modernism). What this 
approach offers is not the rejection of a larger narrative, but regulating it to the personal rather than the 
abstract.  
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Atemporality of Enlightenment Reason 
 
Hamann focused on the implicit break with history attempted by his 
contemporaries. The presumption of Enlightenment thought to find truth in nature or 
reason apart from history is a fundamental aspect of Hamann’s notion of their superstition. 
The initial pages of Hamann's Metacritique of the Purism of Reason deal precisely with the 
lack of addressing and dealing with the historical basis in the thought of Immanuel Kant. 
Hamann begins the text by drawing attention to Hume’s indebtedness to Berkeley, “First of 
all, the recent skepticism seems to me to owe infinitely more to the older idealism than this 
single and fortuitous occasion would have us superficially understand, and that without 
Berkeley, Hume would hardly have become the great philosopher that the Critique, with a 
similar indebtedness declares him to be.”205 His point is to implicate Kant's thought as an 
historical phenomenon. This is not meant to trivialize Kant’s thought itself, but to humble 
it. Commenting on Berkeley’s great insights in this passage he states, “But as for the 
important discovery itself: it lies open and uncovered, without any special profundity, in 
the very use of language of the most common perception and observation of the sensus 
communis.”206 In pointing this out, Hamann is indirectly accusing Kant of ignoring the 
historical contingency of reason. He further argued that to lean too heavily on abstract 
reason without taking historical revelation into account, was nothing other than a 
superstitious belief in the efficacy of abstract reason. 
 
                                                          
205 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 206. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
206 Hamann, 206. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
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The Road to Superstition: Its Causes  
 
One of the causes engendering superstition was the failure to acknowledge 
philosophical faith commitments, as this often led to a misplaced faith in a system or 
method. Misplaced conveys a negative reading of his contemporaries, yet faith (Glaube) is 
not itself sufficient grounds of truth. Additionally, that which was negated or overlooked 
was only part of the issue. Hamann was most concerned with the outworking, the potential 
effect of this superstitious faith. “A confusion of ideas is not without practical 
consequences.”207 Hamann's comments qualifying faith (he did not give it a carte blanche) 
can be lost in the midst of his hostile comments on reason. He saw the application of 
abstract reason as the most detrimental element and driving force of his epoch, thus 
warranting it being targeted. These concerns will be elaborated on presently.  
Limitations of Abstract Reason 
 
When philosophy is regulated to the use of abstract reason it fails to comprehend its 
own limitations. To Hamann, it neglects to recognize what it is “doing”, that it was not a 
higher form of thought or somehow closer to an absolute than poetry or painting.208 “A 
                                                          
207 Hamann, 180. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
208 One of Hegel’s largest critiques of Hamann is that he focuses on the subjective to the detriment of the 
absolute. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel on Hamann, trans. Lisa Marie Anderson, Topics in Historical 
Philosophy (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 20. It is in Hamann’s emphasis on the 
concrete whereby he falls short of transcending religious thought. But for Hamann it is this very point which 
vouchsafes his Christianity, and philosophical insight, from becoming subsumed by an idolatrous philosophy. 
In a discourse on art, Gianni Vattimo makes a statement on Hegel’s philosophy which can be brought to bear 
on the subject of Hegel’s evaluation of Hamann. “It is possible that if Hegel can be said to sum up the whole 
tradition of modern philosophy (at least that part of tradition that Hegelian philosophy, in its historical self-
awareness, recognizes as its own) and to be the prophet of our epoch, it is because he recognized and 
theorized as the center of his philosophy the Aufhebung, the mediation, that is, the overcoming and abolition 
of what is ‘mediated.’” Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, ed. Santiago Zabala, Columbia Themes in 
Philosophy, Social Criticism, and the Arts (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2010), 108. For Hamann there is 
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demonstration of the relationship and agreement of concepts is the same as relation and 
symmetry of figures (Zahlen) and lines, sounds (Schallwürbel), and colors in musical 
composition and painting. The philosopher is just as subjugated to the law of imitation as 
the poet. For the latter, his muse and its hieroglyphic shadow theater is as true as reason 
and its system of doctrine (Lehrgebäude) is for the former.”209 Hamann does not make these 
comments to trivialize sound reasoning, but types of philosophy undertaken by his 
contemporaries that neglected its faith-based foundations by focusing on abstract reason. 
Hamann deems this to be creating conceptual “castles in the sky”.210 The philosopher, being 
compared with the poet, can be found in various passages of Hamann's authorship. When 
speaking of system as the fabrication of human art serves as another demonstration of this 
conviction, emphasizing that reason was limited when removed from human existence 
(experience). Furthermore, the systems created by abstract reason - insofar as they lacked 
the dynamic of considerations of history and contingency - were only passing innovations 
like the work of art.211 Significant in this regard is his statement, “Tremble, deceived 
mortals, who make the nobility of your intentions your justification! The system of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
no getting out of that which is mediated insofar as all things are grounded in language. Due to this, access 
outside of mediated truth remains an impossibility.  
209 N II, 74:6-12, Socratic Memorabilia. “Die Beziehung und Uebereinstimmung der Begriffe ist eben dasselbe 
in einer Demonstration, was Verhältnis und Symmetrie der Zahlen und Linien, Schallwürbel und Farben in 
der musikalischen Composition und Malerey ist. Der Philosoph ist dem Gesetz der Nachahmung so gut 
unterworfen als der Poet. Für diesen ist seine Muse und ihr Hieroglyphisches Schattenspiel so wahr als die 
Vernunft und das Lehrgebäude derselben für jenen.” 
210 Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence, 249. Hamann’s contemporaries’ failure to 
acknowledge their faith-based commitments can be difficult to understand without first having dealt with the 
broad idea he had of faith, since many regulated faith to the field of religion and the occult. 
211 Hamann's critique of the use of reason resembles Hilde Domin's (1909-2006) analysis and defense of 
poetry and art in a modern society located in Wozu Lyrik Heute. Particularly in that the judgment and criteria 
for poetry cannot be proven in the sense of mathematics or the natural sciences. This is not to say that one 
does not give reasons for poetry, but that the reasons provided are intrinsically tied to social and historical 
developments. Furthermore, Domin’s assertion that the work of art is always at the crossroads of the past and 
the future, with an eye to the future, mirrors Hamann's emphasis on the eschatological elements present in 
philosophy. Hilde Domin, Wozu Lyrik heute: Dichtung und Leser in der gesteuerten Gesellschaft, Fischer-
Taschenbücher 12204 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl, 1993), 47, 67. 
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year, which you use to degree the proofs of your premises, will be the fairytale of 
tomorrow.”212 Any system of philosophy based on abstract reason was bound to the fate of 
being a passing consideration. This furthers Hamann's idea that abstract reason was not 
something outside of the subjective.213   
Reason, Knowledge, and Eschatology 
 
Beg your friend that it becomes him least to laugh at the eyeglasses of my 
aesthetic imagination, for I must arm the naked eyes of my reason with those 
same glasses.214 – Johann Georg Hamann 
Hamann thought the Enlightenment philosophers also limited in their thinking due to their 
narrow view of knowledge. When knowledge is equated with the use of abstract reason in 
the search for mathematical certainty or access to an absolute it (a) ignores a whole facet of 
human knowing. “Reason and language are therefore the inner and outer band of all social 
life. If that which nature, through having been established, has joined together is divorced 
or divided, then faith and fidelity are annulled, and lies and deceit, shame and vice, are 
confirmed and stamped as a means to felicity.”215 And (b) loses historical orientation. An 
example can be found in the second essay of his Cloverleaf of Hellenistic Letters when he 
speaks of the field of history, “like that open valley that was full of bones - - and, lo, they 
were very dry. No one but a prophet can prophesy of these bones that sinews and flesh will 
                                                          
212 N II, 140:16-19. Die Magi aus Morgenlande. “Zittert, betrogne Sterbliche, die ihr den Adel eurer Absichten, 
zu eurer Gerechtigkeit macht! Das System des heutigen Jahres, das euch den Beweiß eurer Vordersätze erläst, 
wird das Mährchen des morgenden seyn.” 
213 Hamann even speaks fondly of Descartes’ "method" insofar as it was a history of Descartes’ own reason, N 
IV, 221-27-29. 
214 ZH I, 380. To Immanuel Kant, July 27, 1759. Arnulf Zweig provides a good interpretation in his book on 
Kant’s philosophical correspondence. Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, 42. 
215 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 175. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
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be brought up upon them and skin will cover them.”216 So it is prophecy, eschatology, that 
gives orientation - not only to history, but the present, as well, “The future determines the 
present, and the present determines the past, as the purpose determines the nature and 
use of the means.”217 One can infer from the above thoughts that for Hamann it is not 
possible to avoid eschatology in thought, regardless of how much one might attempt to 
ignore its role. 218 This is because language always points towards the future. For this 
reason, Hamann often points out the troublesome consequences unperceived by the 
intellectuals of his day. Hamann viewed philosophical opinions more like interpretations, 
shedding light on why Hamann reacts to Enlightenment thought and furthermore justifies 
why he can declare that it leads to superstition. 
Contingency of Reason and Faith 
 
 The failure to acknowledge the element of faith in human knowledge can lead to 
troublesome foundations for philosophical methods and systems. Acknowledging this 
alone would not suffice for the construction of healthy thought – more is required. Of 
course, faith and reason are essential, but in and of themselves must be tested. For 
Hamann, reason not only needs faith, but it is the tool that humanity possesses to 
investigate truth. Concurrently, reason is also the source of falsehood. “Reason is the source 
of all truths and all falsities. It is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Therefore both 
[Reason and Faith] have parts that are right and parts that are wrong, that deify and 
                                                          
216 Hamann, 46. Cloverleaf of Hellenistic Letters. 
217 Hamann, 46. Cloverleaf of Hellenistic Letters. 
218 Eschatology is fundamentally connected to faith – faith in future things. Hence, whenever future is 
postulated there is an eschatology according to Hamann: truths of history are understood through the belief 
one has of the future. This can also be extrapolated to the field of moral convictions and actions. The 
grounding for moral action cannot be derived from abstract reason alone, but is informed by one’s belief in a 
type of future, i.e. eschatology.  
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blaspheme the same.”219 However, faith is not a simple solution of this dilemma. “Faith [is] 
likewise the source of un-faith and superstition."220 Of importance here is that although 
abstract reason may be an idol of his century, reason itself is not the source of 
Enlightenment superstition. The faulty faith upon which abstract reason is grounded - the 
faith-based preconditions upon which the emphasis on abstract reason is based - is the 
source of Enlightenment superstition. Since reason and faith constitute all thought, the 
lines between the two can easily become blurred. One instance of this convolution is 
pointed out by Hamann when he criticizes the attachment to system itself. Although a 
system itself may be largely a construct of reason, it is the belief in the system which falls 
under the critique of superstition. It is particularly the abstract nature of system that 
incites Hamann’s ire.  
 It has already been demonstrated that reason and faith are not faculties of human 
thought which must only be properly balanced to achieve true knowledge.221 If it were only 
the proper combination of these two faculties, one would end up with a similar disposition 
as that of the rationalists: the human being in the position to achieve ultimate truth 
regarding reality by one’s own devices. Since all thought, whether known or unbeknownst, 
is caught up in the application of both reason and faith, they intrinsically cannot be 
separated. The following quote reveals Hamann’s opinion of the propensity towards 
abstraction in systematic thought:   
                                                          
219 ZH VII, 172-173. To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Vernunft ist die Quelle aller Warheiten und aller Irrthümer. Sie 
ist Baum des Erkentißes Gutes und Böses. Allso haben beide Theile Recht, beide Unrecht, die selbige 
vergöttern und selbige lästern.” 
220 ZH VII, 173. To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Glaube eben so die Quelle des Un- wie des Aberglaubens.” 
221 Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann Philosophy and Faith, 44.  
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Metaphysics has its school and court languages; both are suspicious to me, 
and I am neither capable to understand them, nor to serve them myself. 
Hence I am nearly able to assume that our entire philosophy consists more of 
language than of reason, and the misunderstandings of innumerable words, 
the prosopopoeia of arbitrary abstractions, the antitheses τῆς ψευδωνύμου 
γνώσεως [of pseudo-knowledge, quoting 1 Timothy, 6:20], yes the most base 
figures of speech of the sensus communis have produced an entire world of 
questions that have as little reason to be posed as to be answered. We are 
still missing a grammar of reason, like writing and their collective elements 
that go through each other, like strings on a psaltery muddle together and yet 
together sound.222 
In this quote Hamann’s linguistic critique of reason receives some of its clearest 
explication. What is relevant is the broad assertion of philosophy squabbling over things 
that do not exist. He saw much of philosophical language as merely constructing concepts 
unrelated to life. These comments align with his idea that the philosophical systems of 
individual philosophers are only a "fabrication of human art" (see, pages 26 and 42). 
Moreover, the arbitrary abstractions based on the confusion of language only serve to 
distract and mislead. This adds further explanation as to why his critique tends to focus on 
foundational issues as he interpreted much of philosophy being more involved in 
logomachy than in addressing fundamental problems. His reference to music, in particular 
strings playing in unison, hints at his understanding of reason and how it is interdependent 
                                                          
222 To Jacobi December 1, 1784. “Die Metaphysik hat ihre Schul – und Hofsprache; beide sind mir verdächtig, 
und ich bin weder im Stande sie zu verstehen, noch selbst mich ihrer zu bedienen. Daher ich beinahe 
vermuthe, daß unsere ganze Philosophie mehr aus Sprache als Vernunft besteht, und die Mißverständnisse 
unzähliger Wörter, die Prosopopöien der willkührlichsten Abstractionen, die Antithesen τῆς ψευδωνύμου 
γνώσεως, ja selbst die gemeinsten Redefiguren des sensus communis haben eine ganze Welt von Fragen 
hervorgebracht, die eben mit so wenig Grund aufgeworfen, als beantwortet worden. Es fehlt uns also noch 
immer an einer Grammatik der Vernunft, wie der Schrift und ihrer gemeinschaftlichen Elemente, die durch 
einander gehen, wie die Saiten auf dem Psalter durcheinander klingen, und doch zusammen lauten.“ Hamann 
and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):21–22. 
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on other faculties of knowledge. To carry the musical analogy, the faculties of knoweldge 
should all harmonize together as out of the psaltry. 
He expresses the danger of the abstractions of his contemporaries in the Aesthetica, 
“Oh for a muse like a refiner’s fire, and like a fuller’s soap! - - She will dare to purify the 
natural use of the senses from the unnatural use of abstractions, by which our concepts of 
things are as maimed as the name of the Creator is suppressed and blasphemed. I speak 
with you, oh Greeks! For you deem yourself wiser than the chamberlains with the gnostic 
key.”223 The reference to Gnosticism is important, insinuating that the abstractions of his 
contemporaries are able to achieve not just greater knowledge but a higher knowledge, not 
of God in this case but of truth. 
System as the Worst Form of Abstraction 
 
 Hamann’s distaste for abstraction has already been noted in the present study and is 
a conspicuous tenant of his thought. His aversion to the abstractions of his contemporaries 
makes up a significant portion of his authorship. Abstraction is a direct correlate of 
systemization. This fact alone would warrant a discussion of the relationship between the 
concept of superstition and abstract system. However more specifically, it will be argued 
that Hamann’s distaste of abstraction and system is based on his critique of superstition. 
The notion of the superstition permeating his century was actually its faith in systems 
constructed by abstract reason. 
The worst form of abstraction, and a major instance of Enlightenment superstition, 
was attachment to system, “Every devotion to a system is a leaven for the pure, sincere 
                                                          
223 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 79. Aesthetica in Nuce. 
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truth, which is not tolerated by one reliant on milk-food. We must be weaned from system; 
and for babes strong wine is not good.”224 This point corresponds directly with Hamann’s 
statement, “Our knowledge is patchwork – no dogmatician is able to properly feel this great 
truth, if he is to play his role, and play it well. And through an unavoidable circle of pure 
reason Σκεψις itself becomes dogma.”225 Skepticism, becoming a form of dogma, relates 
back to the idea of a critical century and criticism as an atemporal stance. His 
contemporaries, despite the appearance of searching more intensely for the truth through 
their use of reason, had fallen into that which they sought to avoid: allegiance to a 
historically contingent approach.  
The tenants of Hamann’s understanding of faith covered in the first part of this 
study establish how and why he conceived of attachment to system as superstition. A 
philosophical system that is naturally abstract is bound to language with its historical and 
empirical foundations. Insofar as it is attached to language, one only comes to a system 
through faith. To impose that system on the conditions of existence is essentially a false 
faith. Whether acknowledged or not, every philosophy has conditions of faith that cannot 
be avoided, yet these conditions can be put to the test. This state of affairs does not 
necessitate Hamann’s harsh reaction to his contemporaries at first glance; however, one 
must see this in light of Hamann’s notion of faith. This notion does not allot for the 
permanent or absolute alongside his age’s attempt to do away with the superstition of 
                                                          
224 To Jacobi, April 9, 1786. “Jede Anhänglichkeit eines Systems ist ein Sauerteig für die reine, lautere 
Wahrheit, welcher sich mit ihrer Milchspeise nicht verträgt. Entwöhnt vom System müssen wir werden; und 
für Säuglinge taugt kein starker Wein.” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, Des Magus im Norden, 
Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):284–85. 
225 ZH V, 432. To Herder, May 8, 1785. “Unser Wißen ist Stückwerk – diese große Wahrheit ist kein 
Dogmatiker recht im stande zu fühlen, wenn er seine Rolle, und noch dazu gut spielen soll, und durch einen 
unvermeidl. Zirkel der reinen Verunnft wird die Σκεψις selbst zum dogma.” 
96 
 
religion, which leans upon faith. Since all knowledge is based upon revelation and a 
corresponding faith, any attempt to get beyond faith is futile. This was a driving force 
behind Hamann’s approach of sowing “the seed of doubt”, to reveal disunity – replacing one 
contingency for another resolves nothing. His critique of the dependency of systems on 
language was not only applied to his Enlightenment contemporaries’ approach to abstract 
system, but was at the core of his critique of theology, as well (e.g. both Roman Catholicism 
or Deism). To take one example, the common denominator of Rationalism and Roman 
Catholicism is each one’s dedication to system, which was placed upon experience in order 
to conform experience to the will of the respective system. This is inherently a violence 
upon experience and limiting in its ability to unfold human existence in history. 
He encapsulates his attitude towards system in his statement on Apollo (who 
represented order and system), “[Hamann desires] to destroy the despotism of Apollo, who 
fetters truth and freedom through demonstrative proofs , grounds, and conclusions.”226 
Taken together with Hamann’s positive comments regarding reason, here he is targeting 
the basis of the proofs of his contemporaries. These thoughts help to explain why Hamann 
was so interested in exposing the (false) faith in Enlightenment thought that led to abstract 
systems, which are despotic in their very nature. This further clarifies Hamann’s style of 
writing that essentially sought to circumvent systematization. 
Abstraction Relativized 
 
Commonly found in Hamann’s authorship alongside his hostile, critical rhetoric – in 
this case, of abstraction – one finds other passages which nuance his position. In a letter to 
                                                          
226 N II 272:8-10. Beurtheilung der Kreuzzüge des Philologen. “den Despotismum des Apolls zu zerstören, der 
in demonstrativischen Beweisen, Gründen und Schlüssen Wahrheit und Freiheit fesselt.”  
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Jacobi, Hamann expresses an acceptance of some abstraction in order to make revelation 
more visible, “[as] nature is revelation, not of itself but of a higher object, not their vanity, 
but his glory, which is not visible without illuminated and properly armed eyes, but can be 
made visible under new terms, instruments, and institutions, abstractions and constructs, 
which must just was well be given and cannot be created out of the air even as old [terms, 
instruments, etc.].”227 Insightful here is his emphasis on the historical precedent of new 
institutions and abstractions. Hence, it is actually the amount of certainty and worth placed 
upon (or belief in) a particular abstraction from which the condemnation of superstition 
stems. It is particularly in the construction of systems by means of abstractions – systems 
which would then be given jurisdiction over knowledge – which led to despotism. It is not 
abstraction, which is present in linguistic expression, but rather a dogmatic belief in the 
system itself that leads to despotism. This is closely related with the metaphysics of the 
Greeks and the despotism of Roman Catholic theology in the Middle Ages insofar as they 
sought to impose abstract systems upon the concrete, historical human existence.  
Before moving to the explication of idolatry and the analysis of the various idols that 
Hamann identifies, it will be helpful to take up concrete examples of superstition in specific 
Enlightenment thinkers. 
 
 
                                                          
227 ZH VII, 173. To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Wie die Natur Offenbarung ist, nicht ihrer selbst, sondern eines 
höheren Gegenstandes, nicht ihrer Eitelkeit, sondern Seiner Herrlichkeit, die ohne erleuchtete und 
bewaffnete Augen nicht sichtbar ist, noch sichtbar gemacht werden kann, als unter neuen Bedingungen, 
Werkzeugen und Anstalten, Abstractionen und Constructionen, die eben so gut gegeben werden müssen und 
nicht aus der Luft geschöpft werden können als die alten Elemente.” 
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Examples of Superstition 
 
Hamann takes elements of Kant’s and Mendelssohn’s theories that do not seem too 
problematic at first glance, but after further inspection reveal a latent superstition. Hamann 
points to assertions by Kant and Mendelssohn as ‘the way things are’, or are regarded as a 
peripheral or even procedural remarks; where in fact Hamann sees the entirety of the 
respective system susceptible to doubt.  
Superstition in Kant’s System of Pure Reason 
“The Critique of Pure Reason, which could have justifiably called mystic…”                               
– Johann Georg Hamann228 
 The first example of superstition in the thought of Hamann's contemporaries comes 
from his metacritique of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Hamann views Kant’s thought 
beginning on faulty, superstitious grounds. In fact, where Kant might take something at face 
value, Hamann points to the dependency on faith, in this case a faulty one (i.e. a 
superstitious one). In three cases this can be clearly observed: the transcendental object, 
antiphrasis, and Kant’s assertions regarding space and time as foundational aspects of 
sensibility. Important to these three cases is that they are more than a mere acceptance of a 
certain line of argumentation, but rather are foundational elements based on a belief in that 
asserted by the philosopher.229 
                                                          
228 ZH IV, 330. To Johann Friedrich Reichardt, August 25, 1781. “...Kritik der reinen Vernunft, welche ebenso 
füglich Mystik hätte heißen können...” 
229 It should be stated that despite Hamann’s harsh criticism, he also acknowledged Kant taking revelation 
into greater account than other of his contemporaries. There are numerous times when Hamann speaks 
positively of Kant; not only of his personal demeanor and actions towards him and his family, but also of his 
philosophical abilities. A specific example of this was Kant taking revelation into account to a greater degree 
than others critiqued by Hamann. To Jacobi, April 9, 1786. “Er [Kant], wie ich vermuthe, ohne Heuchelei von 
der Offenbarung bescheidener redet und selbige mit in sein Interesse zu ziehen scheint.” Hamann and Jacobi, 
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Transcendental Object 
 
  Speaking on the transcendental object, Kant states, “All our representations are, it is 
true, referred by the understanding to some objects; and since appearances are nothing but 
representations, the understanding refers them to a something, as the object of sensible 
intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that 
is meant a something = x, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our 
understanding can know, nothing whatsoever.”230 Hamann singles this out, stressing that it 
rejects, through a prejudice for mathematical certainty, the real contact with reality 
through experience. “Yet the synthesis of predicate with subject (the proper object of pure 
reason) has for its middle term nothing more than an old, cold prejudice for 
mathematics….metaphysics abuses the word-signs and figures of speech of our empirical 
knowledge by treating them as nothing but hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations.”231 
Further to the point of the dubious nature of the transcendental object, Hamann singles out 
the famous formula, something = x, which is nothing more than a type of superstitious 
belief propping up Kant’s philosophy in his eyes. He viewed this not as an attempt at a 
more humble philosophy regarding the ability of reason to access metaphysical truth, but a 
subterfuge distracting from the shaky foundations of Kant’s system. Despite Kant's attempt 
at a critique of reason, Hamann finds Kant in a similar position as the rationalist. “Through 
this learned troublemaking it works the honest decency of language into such a 
meaningless, rutting, unstable, indefinite something = x that nothing is left but a windy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi):285. 
230 The references to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason follows, in accordance with Kenneth Haynes, the 
translation by Norman Kemp Smith. Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (Place of publication not identified: publisher not identified, 2010), A 250. 
231 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 210. 
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sough, a magic shadow play, at most, as the wise Helvétius says, the talisman and rosary of 
a transcendental superstitious belief in entia rationis, their empty sacks and slogans.”232 
Hence, in terms of Hamann’s notion of superstition, Kant’s thought has superstitious 
foundations insofar as it reaches conclusions based upon elements which are not founded 
on reason but prerequisite to it and are based on faith. Hamann sees the weakness of Kant’s 
system in that it fails to take faith and language into full account. 
Antiphrasis 
 
 A related passage from the Metacritique demonstrates how superstitious elements 
are not merely regarded as an alternative perspective but are problematic and even 
unhealthy. This is present when Hamann speaks of the interrelated nature of the sensibility 
and understanding, which are joined together in nature, “from one common root.”233 Yet 
Kant’s philosophical system seeks to divorce them from each other. In so doing they 
become convoluted, which does not lead to a purer philosophy but to a problematic 
metaphysics. “These [knowledge and sensibility] have been made so dark, confused, and 
desolate by a pure reason, christened per antiphrasin, and its metaphysics which serve the 
prevailing indifferentism.”234 The key here is per antiphrasin, “antiphrasis”: the system of 
pure reason using words opposite their proper meaning. Specifically, "pure reason" is an 
antiphrasis insofar as reason is never pure, according to Hamann. It is a misleading use of 
language insofar as it denies the common root - language - and in so doing does not take 
proper account of these two “stems” of human knowledge. Hamann states that it is a, 
“metaphysics which serves the prevailing indifferentism (that ancient mother of chaos and 
                                                          
232 Hamann, 210. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
233 Hamann, 212. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
234 Hamann, 212–13. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
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night in all sciences of morals, religion, and law-giving!).”235 Again Hamann juxtaposes that 
which is intended by the Enlightenment and its outcome, based in part on their antiphrasis. 
Indifferentism brings chaos not order; night signifies obscurity rather than the proposed 
enlightening. This closely relates to the common motif of his contemporaries’ denial, in this 
case by duplicitous language, of their faith-based presuppositions (read: superstition). 
What is clear, however, is that Hamann resolves the aforementioned issues through 
language, as language contains both “sensible and intelligible nature[s]”, having “aesthetic 
and logical faculty.”236 Language is then, that which ties together the different types of 
human knowledge, but can itself be abused (i.e. antiphrasis). 
Space, Time, and Sensibility 
 
 Hamann exposes what he sees as another superstitious element of Kant’s 
conjectures regarding space and time and their place in a transcendental method of 
instruction (transcendentale Methodenlehre). In particular, Hamann brings to the fore their 
unquestioned status as a foundation of the human sensuousness (sensibility). “In the first 
section of the doctrine of elements, space and time as the pure forms of sensuousness ab 
extra sicut ab intra, whose empirical reality and transcendental ideality in the 
transcendental aesthetic were so certain and undoubtedly presented and elucidated ‘as 
ever might be claimed by a theory, which might serve as its organon.’”237 Space and time 
were held by Kant as, “two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of a priori 
                                                          
235 Hamann, 212–13. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
236 Hamann, 215. Metacritique on the Purism of Reason. 
237 N III, 278:30-35. Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Hamann’s review of the Critique of Pure Reason], “Raum und 
Zeit, als die reinen Formen der Sinnlichkeit ab extra sicut ab intra, ihre empyrische Realität und 
transcendentale Idealität werden in der transcendentalen Ästhetik, als dem ersten Theil der Elementarlehre, 
so gewiß und unzweifelhaft dargestellt und erläutert.” 
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knowledge.”238 This helped form a transcendental method of instruction, wherein space and 
time played an essential part. Hamann interpreted Kant’s entire system being based upon 
this. “The transcendental method of doctrine determines the formal conditions of a 
complete system of pure reason.”239 Hamann counters this viewpoint in his assertion that it 
is sounds and letters which are the “pure forms a priori”, thereby seeking to show that they 
are the foundation of the concepts of space and time (they are a priori according to Hamann 
insofar as they receive part of their meaning prior to perception, i.e. passed down in 
history).240 Not only does Hamann disagree on this point, but he further rejects Kant's 
presumption that his transcentale Elementare Methodenlehre is not susceptible to the same 
criticism of any faith-based theory. Furthermore, since this upholds the entire system, 
Kant’s project can be placed under suspicion. In his characteristically bombastic fashion, 
Hamann speaks of the “aesthetic lies of transcendental writings”,241 which further point to 
Hamann’s estimation of the misplaced faith (superstition) present in Kant's philosophy. 
This reiterates Hamann's charge of antiphrasis, the duplicitous use of language leading to a 
weak and superstitious philosophy. Where Kant runs into issues, as far as Hamann is 
concerned, is the systematic and therefore absolute nature of his philosophy. In Hamann’s 
perception, the primary problem is, namely, the inability of system to capture reality. It is 
Hamann’s consideration that it is the misplaced faith in the foundations of Kant's 
philosophical system which makes up the superstitious elements of his thought. This drove 
Hamann’s critique of the Critique of Pure Reason.  
                                                          
238Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 22, B 36.  
239 N III 279:18-19. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. “Die transcendentale Methodenlehre bestimmt die formalen 
Bedingungen eines vollständigen Systems der reinen Vernunft.” 
240 For his argument Cf. Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 211–12.  
241 N III, 280:9. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, “ästhetische Lüge transcendentaler Schriften”. 
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Superstitious Elements in the Thought of Moses Mendelssohn: “The State of Nature” 
 
 Golgotha and Scheblimini! contains Hamann’s critique of Mendelssohn’s On Religious 
Power and Judaism, wherein Mendelssohn argues for religious tolerance and a secular state. 
Mendelssohn’s approach involves the concept of a state of nature upon which much of his 
argumentation depends. Mendelssohn’s “first principles” were attacked by Hamann as 
elements requiring faith. In fact, the detrimental consequences of antiphrasis are again at 
work here. The first part of Golgotha and Scheblimini! addresses the fabricated state of 
nature and the problematic issues that arise from it. Later in the text he seeks to answer 
Mendelssohn’s assertions regarding the difference between Christianity and Judaism. 
Presently, the focus will remain on the concept of the state of nature and the consequences 
of accepting it as a basis for one's political philosophy. 
 Making a strong entrance on the first page of Golgotha and Scheblimini!, Hamann 
does not accept the claims of a state of nature prima facie. “Herr Mendelssohn believes in a 
state of nature, which he partly presupposes and partly opposes to society… I grant him 
and every dogmatist his belief, even if I am myself incapable of making either proper 
concept or use of this hypothesis.”242 His reference to “dogmatism” supports the argument 
that Hamann’s critique was driven by the totalizing element of the Enlightenment’s 
superstitious adherence to abstract system. Where Enlightenment philosophers sought to 
get away from the naive beliefs of the past, Hamann points to what he sees as their own 
naive beliefs. Mendelssohn employed his idea of the state of nature to help establish the 
rationality of some rabbinical statements.243 Specifically, he attempted to demonstrate how 
                                                          
242 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 165–66. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
243 Hamann, 166. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
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some assertions condoning coercive elements in the Torah were connected to the state and 
not religion.244 The more intensely Hamann investigated these first principles - which 
established his state of nature - the more nebulous they became. 
 Jerusalem: on Religious Power and Judaism, was a response to one of Mendelssohn’s 
critics who accused him of negating first principles.245 In response, Mendelssohn wrote, 
“Must one never doubt principles? If so, men of the Pythagorean School could dispute 
forever how their teacher happened to come by his golden hip, and no one would dare to 
ask: did Pythagoras actually have a golden hip?”246 He wanted to express his willingness to 
question even the most foundational elements of his philosophy. In his perfunctory, ironic 
fashion, Hamann plays on this comment, saying that Mendelssohn’s first principles are his 
golden hip.247 Although Mendelssohn attempted to put his state of nature under the 
scrutiny of abstract reason, Hamann found its foundation to be inherently faith-based.  
  What follows in Hamann's critique is a meticulous analysis of the definitions of the 
first principles, concluding with how they amount to little more than Hobbes’ emphasis on 
external tranquility and safety. Certainly Mendelssohn would not have appreciated the 
comparison with Hobbes. Indeed, he specifically argues against Hobbes' conception of the 
state of nature as “war of all against all” and that “right is grounded in power.”248 
                                                          
244 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism, 130. 
245 Mendelssohn, 81. For the text that instigated Mendelssohn’s writing of Jerusalem see, Daniel Ernst 
Mörschel, “Das Forschen nach Licht und Recht in einem Schreiben an Herr Moses Mendelssohn auf 
Veranlassung seiner merkwürdigen Vorrede zu Manasseh Ben Israel.” (Berlin : Mauer, 1782). 
246 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism, 81. 
247 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 166. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
248 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism, 35.  
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Mendelssohn sought to derive rights from natural law through reason.249 John Betz has a 
poignant passage relating to the problems pointed out by Hamann in Mendelssohn’s 
attempt to ground rights in a state of nature based solely on reason.250 “Hamann’s more 
proto-Nietzschean point, however, is that Mendelssohn’s language of rights is ultimately 
indistinguishable from a language of power…Mendelssohn grounds human rights on the 
‘laws of wisdom and goodness,’ but since these laws are given no further explanation, not 
further grounding in divine revelation…any set of rights founded upon them cannot help 
but appear as an arbitrary self-interested positioning.”251 Therefore, the attempt to 
establish equality on atemporal abstract reason was only shifting around the meaning of 
words whose foundational concepts must be taken on faith before moving forward. 
Consequently, these concepts betray themselves as they were unable to overcome the 
Hobbesian power struggle (the bellum omnium contra omnes).  
 Indeed, if the above reconstruction of Mendelssohn’s position is correct, it is both 
antithetical to its proposed intentions as well as problematic in its own right. Rather than 
creating philosophical legitimacy for political and religious tolerance, it ends up 
sanctioning Hobbes to a degree. This is in itself problematic in that it is contradictory with 
regards to its own ambitions. However, this is not the only issue; because it severed the 
convictions and actions of individuals, Hamann considered it an abomination. In Hamann’s 
view, the faulty foundation upon which this thought was constructed was based on a faulty 
                                                          
249 Betz makes an important observation when dealing with Hamann’s critique. “Hamann was profoundly 
suspicious of the language of rights in general – not whether they should be conferred, but whence they should 
be derived” [italics mine] Betz, After Enlightenment, 261. 
250It is not that Mendelssohn rejects faith altogether, but for him faith can never contradict the conclusions of 
reason. Alexander Altmann, “Commentary,” in Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism (Hanover: 
Published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1983), 207. 
251 Betz, After Enlightenment, 275. 
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faith in a “state of nature”, which was only another form of dogmatism. This supports the 
thesis that Hamann’s authorship is motivated by critiquing the superstition of his 
contemporaries and undergirded by his notion of faith.252 In sum, the faith in spontaneous 
foundational elements of a system, which must be assented to in order to hold to the 
veracity of the respective system, led to what Haman considered superstition. The 
superstitious element, to Hamann, is that which forms the groundwork of philosophical, 
political, or religious systems based on abstract reason. It is the object of their systems 
which would become the idols of Hamann's contemporaries. 
Up to this point the primary focus of this work has been on Hamann’s notion of 
superstition and how this is essential for understanding the motivation of his authorship. 
However, this is only one side of the coin, as superstition needs an object: the idol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
252 The intention is not to evaluate the veracity of Hamann’s critique of Mendelssohn’s idea of a state of 
nature. Mendelssohn scholarship has a more critical reception of Hamann’s critique. E.g. Cord-Friedrich 
Berghan points out that Hamann was addressing generalities whereas Mendelssohn was responding to a 
particular concrete situation. Also, Berghan argues that the questions being answered by the respective 
thinkers were not the same. See, Cord-Friedrich Berghahn, Moses Mendelssohns “Jerusalem”: ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte der Menschenrechte und der pluralistischen Gesellschaft in der deutschen Aufklärung, Studien zur 
Deutschen Literatur, Bd. 161 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), 257, 271–73. 
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Chapter III 
 
From Superstition to Idolatry 
 
Idols are the object of faith, an object upon which worth and even truth is placed. 
With the term “idol”, Hamann meant the false objects in which one’s faith might be placed. 
In this chapter the various idols, as perceived by Hamann, will be discussed. 
Philosophy has the propensity – in its use of abstract reason in generating concepts 
– to create systems to explain the world. It is these systems which were the object of 
superstition and were the philosophical idols that his contemporaries were serving. 
Hamann’s entire authorship appears purposefully unsystematic, and as such is a rejection 
of his contemporaries.253 Hamann’s idea of a philosophical system is that it is an 
abstraction and as such, static – an attempt to ascertain the absolute, atemporal truth 
(which might manifest itself in the form of a comprehensive methodology.254 It is not that 
he condemns the attempt to clarify the world or one’s own existence in the world through 
careful analysis.255 Yet, when the system becomes paramount (abstract system most of all), 
                                                          
253 Andreas Pangritz, in a discussion on Karl Barth and the relationship between objectiveness (Sachlichkeit) 
and the scientific character, notes that Hamann was used as an example of one who was unscientific but 
highly objective. Andreas Pangritz, Vom Kleiner- und Unsichtbarwerden der Theologie: Ein Versuch über das 
Projekt einer “impliziten Theologie” bei Barth, Tillich, Bonhoeffer, Benjamin, Horkheimer und Adorno 
(Tübingen: Theologischer Verlag, 1996), 36. 
254 Stafan Majetschak addresses Hamann’s critique of Descartes, in particular the methodology postulated by 
Descartes. Majetschak points out the boundaries that Hamann placed on any type of method that would seek 
to generalize the use of one’s reason. Seeing, as it were, that individuality was the boundary of any general 
idea of reason (p. 231). See, Stefan Majetschak, “Der Stil als Grenze der Methode: über Hamanns Descartes-
’Lektüre’.” 
255 Hamann’s critique of systems and abstract reason notwithstanding, he does not reject the need for rigor 
when it comes to ideas. Hamann works to reveal the underlying problems with Enlightenment prejudice built 
upon its own superstitious faith in abstract reason. Yet he seeks to continually work to provide explanations 
of the world. He even stated once that his thought contained “a stricter logic and are more closely glued 
together (geleimtere Verbindung) than in the concepts of livelier heads.” ZH I, 378. “eine strengere Logic und 
eine geleimtere Verbindung als in den Begriffen lebhafter Köpfe.” 
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life is forfeited. System, once set in place, is lifeless; it is closed to the organic unfolding of 
historical existence, incessantly trying to fit the myriad of human experience into its form. 
System effectually becomes out of date the moment the system is set in place, or it is 
nothing more than the representation of a thinker at one point in time.256 
An additional aspect making philosophical systems idolatrous in the eyes of 
Hamann is in the attempt of a respective system to be all encompassing. When there are 
emerging factors that have not been explained, the system must utilize its already-in-place 
logic to justify the new factors hitherto unknown. To reject new factors which arise in the 
course of time would be willful ignorance. The other alternative would be to recognize the 
system as false or lacking. Because of this, systems vary in their complexity; often becoming 
ever more complex, insofar as ahistorical systems try to encompass historical reality.  
The ahistorical element of abstract systems is a further frustration for Hamann. 
Ahistoricity is not only due to the static nature of systems – created at a point in history 
and amended during the course of life – but its abstract nature as well.257 These systems of 
thought are entirely in the intellect governed by abstract reason, specifically the systems of 
the rationalist and the Enlightenment thinkers whom Hamann was addressing. The 
                                                          
256 Reiner Wild, in his explication of Hamann’s critique of the natural sciences, indirectly speaks to this issue. 
In the discussion regarding certainty derived from faith, Wild notes that Hamann realizes that his certainty in 
matters of faith is something that cannot be forced upon another to agree to (beipflichten), but is a subjective 
description of reality. Reiner Wild, “Überlegungen zu Hamanns Kritik der Naturwissenschaften,” in Johann 
Georg Hamann und die Krise der Aufklärung: Acta des fünften Internationalen Hamann-Kolloquiums in Münster 
i.W. (1988), ed. Bernhard Gajek and Albert Meier, Regensburger Beiträge zur Deutschen Sprach- und 
Literaturwissenschaft, Bd. 46 (Frankfurt am Main ; New York: P. Lang, 1990), 152. Working off of this 
understanding, in the context of the present study, Hamann would not accept propositions based on 
principles that were faith-based. They were merely the description of the faith of the subject. The certainty of 
these claims could be argued for, but not forced on others.  
257 The systems based on abstract reason must be ahistorical according to Hamann, insofar as abstract reason 
wanted to make itself independent of “tradition, custom and belief in them”. Hamann, Writings on Philosophy 
and Language, 207. For some brief but good comments of the importance of history for Hamann see, Mary 
Anne Perkins, Christendom and European Identity: The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789, Religion and 
Society, v. 40 (Berlin ; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 119–22. 
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abstract nature of systems only added to their lifelessness; hence he thought of them as 
life-denying (Hamann would attempt to be life-affirming). Herein lies an essential element 
to understanding Hamann’s harsh critique of how most Enlightenment thinkers utilized 
reason. Essentially Hamann saw himself as advocating a disposition that promoted life.  
In Hamann’s mind, the origins of the turn towards abstract systemization, that is, 
the supremacy of system manifest in the Enlightenment had its origin in Decartes’ cogito. 
Here, the intellect superseded experience and history. The abstract presided over 
existence. Indeed, humanity had used reason to solve problems and organize society, 
government, and religion throughout history; what changed was its dominance. The 
dominance of abstract reason permeated nearly every level of thought. As previously 
discussed, there was an understanding – at times explicit and often implicit – that reason 
was capable of finally ridding humanity of superstitious prejudice latent in tradition. 
The cogito ergo sum was the perfect example of the change which marked his age from that 
of past generations. It elevated reason to nearly godlike status, while helping rid society of 
superstitious elements that had encouraged violence and ignorance; yet all the while failed 
to see its own shortcomings. Hamann relentlessly sought to point out these shortcomings. 
Hamann’s conviction that reason, instead of seeking the usurpation of the other 
elements of human knowing (experience, history, etc), must work in relationship with the 
other faculties of human knowledge (e.g. faith, experience, etc.). It is in fact reason’s 
usurpation of the other elements of human knowing that leads to arbitrary systems. And 
this led Hamann to take aim at speculative thought.258 
                                                          
258 Some of Hamann’s most pointed language regarding abstract can be found in his, Zweifel und Einfälle, See, 
N III, 191. 
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Philosophical Idols Specified 
 
 “System is in itself a hindrance to the truth.” – Johann Georg Hamann259 
 
The idolatrous nature of specific systems will receive greater explication, all of them 
having a close connection to and a high esteem for abstract reason. Abstract reason was 
addressed by Hamann in his early writings but would become more and more a focus 
throughout the course of his authorship. The following will commence with an analysis of 
the system of economics represented by his friend, Berens. It was the clash of thought 
between these two men that instigated Hamann’s authorship; therefore it warrants initial 
explication. Berens’ service to the spirit of his age (Enlightenment abstract reason and new 
political and cultural changes) was less conceptual than the other idols treated in this 
chapter.260 Notwithstanding, one can clearly reconstruct from Hamann’s own writings as to 
how he understood Berens and the problem this viewpoint posed. Secondly Hamann’s 
critique of the attempt to bring German orthography into accordance with abstract reason 
will be explicated. This critique is found in the essay, New Apology of the Letter h. This essay 
is practical in that it demonstrates the breadth of Hamann’s concerns, and also provides 
some of the clearest statements on the idolatry of his century. Thirdly, Mendelssohn’s 
political system will be discussed. Hamman attempts to reveal its idolatrous nature and the 
inconsistencies therein. The forth point of departure is the Idol of the Public. This idol 
                                                          
259 To Jacobi, April 9th, 1786. “Entwöhnt vom System müssen wir werden.” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg 
Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich 
Jacobi):284–85. 
260 Berens was not a philosopher per se, but was actively engaging in the intellectual and public life of 
Königsberg. Berens was greatly interested in persuading Hamann to return to his pre-conversion views 
regarding the Enlightenment; that is, returning to his commitment to Enlightenment ideals. Furthermore, 
Hamann and Berens took part in one of the earliest magazines written primarily for women, Daphne. Bayer, A 
Contemporary in Dissent, 224. 
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undergirded the overreliance on theoretical reason present in his age. Some preliminary 
aspects of the Idol of the Public was already in the introduction. Yet a more in depth will be 
given. Additionally, the idol of the Public can be found in writing outside of the Socratic 
Memorabilia, particularly in his critique of Herder’s subservience to the Berlin 
Enlightenment. The final idol to be addressed is that of abstract reason itself in the section 
on the evolution of the Idol of Reason. Hamann’s increased interest in this idol throughout 
the course of his authorship will be examined, demonstrating the continuities and the ways 
in which his critique matured.  
The Idol of the Economics of Reason: Johann Christoph Berens 
 
 Although Hamann would commence his authorship with a critique of Enlightenment 
reason and its counterpart found in the economic system of Johann Christoph Berens 
(1729-1792), he did not always posses the focus that can be found in his later writings. As a 
matter of fact, earlier in his life he contributed to the philosophical project of 
Enlightenment thought. Hence, some historical background will be provided in order to 
shed light on Hamann’s relationship to the “idol” of economics (i.e. manifest in Berens’ idea 
of work), which he would later criticize. 
Hamann’s economic world was one of transition. As with any historical period, the 
variety of experience and changes occurring make it difficult to come to a clear consensus 
on when and to what degree things changed. The lines blur, so to speak. While the influence 
of Mercantilism had waned, the policies of free trade and the rise of the middle class had 
not yet spread to the extent seen in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, on nearly all 
fronts, rapid changes were taking place. In the philosophical realm, the breaking of 
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Enlightenment philosophy with organized religion and traditional theological 
presuppositions coincided with Frederick the Great’s secular policies and the rise in 
importance of merchants and trade. The task at hand is to point out some of the 
developments occurring that were significant for Hamann. He was exposed to the rising 
influence of the market and modern Enlightenment forces through his friend Berens, who 
sought to, as stated in Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia, “promote industry, bourgeois 
virtues, and the welfare of the commonwealth.”261 These qualities alone were not ruinous, 
but the way in which Berens’ imposed his values on others was what Hamann found 
problematic.   
 Johann Christoph Berens was very much a man of the Enlightenment. He was 
engaged in trade and business affairs and later in the politics of Riga – serving as 
Oberwettherr, a position dealing with issues of commerce. Additionally, he played a key 
role in forming the Berensscher Kreis, a group devoted to furthering Enlightenment ideals 
and ideas.262 He was also involved in one of the first journals devoted to a female audience, 
Daphne, of which Hamann also served as a contributor.263 Berens and Hamann became fast 
friends after meeting during their studies in Konigsberg. At one time, Hamann even 
referred to him as his best friend, demonstrating his fond feelings and respect for Berens.264 
Shortly before Hamann would be offered a position in the Berens’ family business, 
and after a short period tutoring a young, aristocratic boy in the countryside, Hamann 
translated Dangeuil’s Remarques sur les avantages et les désavantages de la France et de Gr. 
                                                          
261 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 5. Socratic Memorabilia. 
262 Georg v. Rauch, “Berens, Johann Christoph, Ratsherr.,” Neue Deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1955), 71. 
263 Baur, Johann Georg Hamann Als Publizist, 18. 
264 N IV, 227:12. 
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Bretagne par rapport au Commerce et aux autres sources de la puissance des états.265 
Included in the translation was an appendix wherein Hamann advocates for the role of the 
merchant. “[The appendix] is in effect praise of the new society which under the leadership 
of the new race, the merchants, was to serve man as part of the divine plan. Hamann was 
ready to become a useful member of this society. He was never to be in closer accord with 
the world of the Enlightenment than he was at this time.”266 Despite his nearness to 
Enlightenment thought at this time, it is worth noting that some themes that he would later 
take up were also contained in the appendix (e.g. critique of the arbitrary abuse of 
power).267 He demonstrates his view of work as it being connected to one’s involvement in 
trade, “the labor and work and perspiration make the life of our contemporaries (die 
Zeitgenossen) blissful.”268 He goes on to speak of the “nobility of merchants” (Der Adel der 
Kaufleute), who were to fill an essential role in the future. During this period he was 
utilizing his philosophical abilities to advocate for both his friend and mainstream 
Enlightenment ideas.  
This would continue until his conversion in London. While in London he recorded 
his thoughts, which can be found in his autobiographical work, Thoughts on the Course of 
My Life.269 “I had moved to a coffee-house, since I had not a soul to consort with, in order to 
seek some cheer in society, and by this means perhaps to become known and build a bridge 
                                                          
265  For an excellent analysis see, Manfred Beetz, Andre Rudolph, and Christoph Meineke, eds., “Die Vortheile 
unserer Vereinigung,” in Johann Georg Hamann: Religion und Gesellschaft, Hallesche Beiträge zur 
europäischen Aufklärung 45 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012). 
266 Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence, 28. 
267 T. J. Beech, Hamann’s Prophetic Mission: A Genetic Study of Three Late Works against the Enlightenment, 
Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies Bithell Series of Dissertations, v. 34 (London: Maney Pub. for the 
Modern Humanities Research Association, 2010), 14. 
268N IV, 234. Hamann's apendix to Dangeuil translation. 
269 In addition to its inclusion in Nadler, a more modern, academic version is located in, Hamann, Londoner 
Schriften, 313–52. 
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to fortune.”270 Of particular importance for the purpose of explicating the idol of economics 
is that after the failed mission he was still pursuing wealth. His attempts at attaining 
fortune did not bear fruit and he fell into financial destitution and personal despair. It is 
interesting to note that Hamann found his salvation in a situation which was nearly 
antithetical to Berens’ system of values.  
Upon Hamann’s return to Germany following his conversion, he possessed radically 
differing opinions to that of Berens. His religious views and his lack of desire to engage in 
the economic world of the merchants were of particular concern to Berens. Much of their 
disagreement manifested itself in the concept of work, specifically, what it meant to work. 
One of Berens’ main points particularly offensive to Hamann was the detrimental 
element of religion. “He [Berens] wants to winnow (sichten) my religion of superstition and 
enthusiasm.”271 Once advising Hamann, “retain only as much religion as necessary”, to 
which Hamann humorously commented, “wise advice, like that of Job’s wife.”272 This was in 
conjunction with Berens’ dissatisfaction with how Hamann was living. Berens seemingly 
equated proper work with upright moral life. Assuming that Berens’ ideas were close to 
those expressed by Hamann in his appendix to the Remarques, working in trade and 
commerce would indeed be the highest form of life for the citizen.273 Because of this 
position, any form of faith that would dissuade the individual from a life of gainful 
employment in commerce would be seen as a threat to the betterment of society at large. In 
this same letter, Hamann takes up Descartes’ search for truth as an analogy to Berens’ 
                                                          
270 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 150. Thoughts on the Course of my Life. 
271 ZH I, 310:16-17. 
272 ZH I, 306:8.  
273 N IV, 234. Hamann's apendix to Dangeuil translation.  
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position on work. In Descartes’ doubting of nearly everything, he was unable to find truth, 
but was only able to develop a method.274 “Descartes did not find truth, never loved, and 
also could never understand. This method, as he called it, is suitable as a project or system 
(Würbelsystem).”275 Hamann insinuates that this method was estranged from reality as he 
equates this to Berens’ elevation of work; that is, overvaluing the work of a merchant. “To 
seek work – the great care that one does not take. I sought work out of favorableness, or 
placed myself as one searching. To look for work is a scary thing just as having to search for 
air that one should create.”276 Additionally, Berens equated a specific type of work (i.e. 
trade) with morality, which particularly frustrated Hamann. The statement, “Let him stop 
making such a fuss about my praying, folding of the hands, confessing…work, what do you 
have to do with the morality of my actions? Such is not the way friends speak to each other, 
but a lord to his slaves” demonstrates Hamann’s feelings towards Berens’ opinion.277 
Essentially, Berens’ was treating him as inferior, denigrating his way of life for not 
conforming to what he [Berens] viewed as the superior way. The disagreement about the 
concept of work was essentially a clash of values. 
 Berens’ second issue with Hamann was that of utility and benefit 
(Nutz/Nützlichkeit), or the lack thereof in Hamann’s case. In regards to this, Hamann 
wrote, “he [Berens] wants to make the world utilizable to me, and to make me a convert to 
                                                          
274 Hamann states that Descartes, “ forgot and denied everything and held nothing for true - - except the tricky 
artifice of a Catacisum and his own self“; “er [Descartes] vergaß und leugnete alles und hielt nicht für 
Wahrheit - - außer den schlauen Kunstgriff einen Catechismum und Sein eigen Selbst als 2 wichtige 
Wahrheiten zum Grunde zu legen”. ZH I, 306:29-31. 
275 ZH I, 306:31-32. 
276ZH I, 306:34-36. 
277 ZH I, 306:21-24. 
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freethinking and libertine views.”278 Conjoined to this attempt at converting Hamann back 
to the Enlightenment and his concept of productive work, was his trouble with Hamann’s 
perceived idleness and non-productivity. Hamann states, “Then he [Berens] brags of good 
commercial activities (voller Geschäfte) and sees me as an idler. If this is true, he has 
overlooked much to which I can be made useful.”279 Here one perceives a great disparity 
between the two men. Hamann has a foundationally different definition of work – what it 
means to be productive – than Berens.  
Hamann was not opposed to trade, working in business or productivity; he even 
encouraged his brother to be faithful and thankful for his job. Additionally, he also 
recognized a qualitative difference between Berens’ activities and his own. One could argue 
that he is defending “leisure” as another viable way of life as opposed to “work”, however, 
this would be an inaccurate interpretation. A better understanding of this would be the 
difference between worldly and spiritual work. From the perspective of Berens, Hamann’s 
activities are merely leisure/idleness. To pick up Hamann’s own analogy, from the 
perspective of Martha [Berens] in the Gospel story, Mary [Hamann] is not working, when in 
fact Martha failed to see that sitting at the feet of Christ is of greater value.280 This fits well 
into Hamann’s critique insofar as he accepts the work in which Berens is engaged, but 
opposes Berens’ definition of work. Hamann primarily focuses on its limitations, 
specifically finding Berens’ attempt to force his values on others as appalling.  
 In the preceding analysis, one can see a system of economics starting to take shape; 
one that is conjoined to a philosophical position which takes revealed religion – and from 
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Hamann’s perspective tradition – out of the picture. This system of economics, based on a 
specific notion of work, is not a type of economic theory, but rather a worldview based 
upon the abstract reason of the Enlightenment. It sought systematic purity in matters of 
productivity, which denigrated the spiritual. Furthermore, this system was held to be above 
other value systems that did not yield as much economic value. Hamann found this position 
idolatrous. 
 One of Hamann’s fundamental disagreements with Berens was the arbitrary nature 
of his system of worth, particularly the manner in which it dismissed tradition in favor of 
the abstract reason of the Enlightenment. What is fascinating about this disagreement with 
Berens is that he does not engage on Berens’ terms. Instead, Hamann attempts to set his 
own terms, thereby bringing out the arbitrary nature of their respective positions towards 
work. As has been shown, Berens dismissed Hamann’s religious inclinations (not religion 
as such, but Hamann’s “enthusiasm”) and this was anathema to Hamann. This had a 
philosophical foundation which was not based on some fideistic religiosity, rather (as has 
been demonstrated in the section on superstition and faith) every system is founded upon 
certain presuppositions that one must accept by faith. This being established, Berens does 
not have the high ground in the argument; justifying not only Hamann’s radical departure 
from Berens’ value placed upon work, but his refusal to argue within its parameters as well. 
The tenants of Berens’ system are a bit difficult to specify. In Hamann’s published 
work, the Socratic Memorabilia deals most explicitly with Berens’ position; however, the 
critique contained therein is broader, addressing the disposition of his age present in 
philosophy as well as economics. Therefore, one can only discern a skeletal framework of 
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the idol of economics. This system is not understood as a self-contained system but the 
outworking of the larger philosophical ideas of his day which provided the foundation for 
his position. 
 Berens’ dismissal of Hamann’s religion was a major point of contention. Perhaps 
even more contentious to Hamann was what was substituted in favor of it, namely, 
Enlightenment reason. Hence, in the Socratic Memorabilia he speaks on contemporary 
philosophic prejudice and not Berens’ economic stances directly.281 A comment wherein 
one might discern his critique of Berens is when he states:  
And perhaps philosophical chroniclers and image galleries are less to blame 
than their misuse by their admirers. A little enthusiasm and superstition 
would here deserve a little forbearance, but some of that sourdough is part 
and parcel to mitering the soul in a philosophical heroism.282  
Although he had already stated that there might be something other than our reason 
needed to unlock the field of history,283 here he is more concerned with the contemporary 
application of what had been chronicled. The sourdough is an obscure reference to the 
misuse of the work of the philosophical chroniclers.  
Reason itself was not criticized, but how it was utilized. For instance, the utilization 
of reason in the fashion of Descartes’ cogito was particularly problematic for Hamann. 
                                                          
281 Hamann speaks of Berens’ work on the “Philosopher’s Stone”, alluding to the generation of greater wealth. 
Hamann sees Berens’ endeavors akin to searching for the alchemic means of turning normal elements into 
gold. “This is, with reason, the highest project and highest good of our astute statesmen (Staatsklugen).” 
Hamann, Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, 9. 
282 Hamann, 21–23.“Doch sind vielleicht die philosophischen Chroniken und Bildergallerien weniger zu 
tadeln, als der schlechte Gebrauch, den ihre Liebhaber davon machen. Ein wenig Schwärmerey und 
Aberglauben würde hier nicht nur Nachsicht verdienen, sondern etwas von diesem Sauerteige gehört dazu, 
um die Seele zu einem philosophischen Heroismus in Gährung zu setzen.” 
283 Hamann, 27. In Nadler, N II 65:9-13. Socratic Memorabilia.  
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Berens did just that, as he utilized a form of reasoning which denigrated the individual, 
history, and values found in other sources (i.e. religion). For any merit it might have, this 
fundamental disposition manifest in Berens was detrimental and violent towards the 
variety of human life. This limited view was consequently an idol in Hamann’s mind: it was 
not and could not be comprehensive. It was taken as true and the requisite faith therein 
was ignored. 
 This section on the idol of economics serves as a good introduction to the 
Hamannian view of philosophical idolatry. The Hamannian vantage point clearly portrays 
how systems of thought can concretely be interpreted as a philosophical idol based upon 
faulty foundations.  
The Idol of Orthography of Reason: The New Apology of the Letter h 
 
 At first a bit perplexing, and not without humor, one finds some of Hamann’s most 
articulate explication of Enlightenment superstition and idolatry in a short essay on 
orthographic reform. Note for English and other non-German speakers: this topic may at 
first be a bit confusing as the English language is not proliferated with syllables with an 
unpronounced h.284 This is still common in German (despite some of them being removed 
since the eighteenth century). Frequently removing the letter h is not a misspelling but 
changes the word entirely. For example, take the words “truth” (Wahre) and “commodity 
                                                          
284 There are cases of this phenomenon. For instance, in American English the h in “herbs” is not pronounced. 
Merriam-Webster, Inc, ed., “Herb,” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 
2014), 581. 
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(Ware)”: they are pronounced the same, yet when the h is removed they are spelled the 
same.285  
This section takes a straightforward explicative approach by primarily focusing on 
one essay, The New Apology of the Letter h. The essay is divided into three sections: the title, 
the main body composed under the pseudonym “H.S.” (i.e. Heinrich Schröder),286 and the 
conclusion written by the letter h defending its own existence. All sections will be 
addressed in order to demonstrate the notion of the idolatry in an orthography based on 
abstract reason.  
Title Page and Introductory Remarks on Hamann’s New Apology of the Letter h 
 
 Hamann took issue with Enlightenment attempt to bring all thought, religious or 
otherwise, under the domain of abstract reason. Christian Tobias Damm (1699-1778) was 
one Enlightenment figure attempting to do this. It was Damm’s writings that instigated 
Hamann’s authoring the New Apology of the Letter h. The full title of Hamann’s book reads: 
New Apology of the Letter h, or Extraordinary Observations on the Orthography of German by 
H.S., Schoolmaster. Additionally, the title page includes a Latin quote from Horace and a 
feigned place and date of publication. As with all of Hamann’s title pages, it serves as a 
precursor to that which follows – containing the kernel of his thought. Hamann calls the 
title page the nucleus in nuce.287 A defense of the removal of the letter h is indicated by using 
                                                          
285 This example demonstrates the difference, yet in the case of these two words the gender differs, meaning 
there are very few instances when this might be confused. Confusion can be found in a few cases of spoken 
German. However, more ambiguities would arise were the silent h taken out entirely. 
286 ZH III, 63. To Herder, November, 1773. 
287 ZH VI, 137. 
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the word “apology”, and is also indicated in the quote by Horace. 288 The pseudonym 
employed by Hamann is also revealed: H. S., which stands for Heinrich Schröder.  
 In the initial pages a great bit is revealed about Hamann’s pseudonymous author. He 
is “neither a retired nor dismissed school teacher.”289 A simple and humble man one might 
say, but one compelled to take up arms for the sake of his faith threatened by the attack on 
the letter h. In fact, the fictitious author is much more developed than is often the case in 
Hamann’s writings.290 Schröder is an elderly school teacher who wishes, “to lead my 
students (who currently number 120) to a proper spelling of our mother tongue”.291 This 
humble figure is juxtaposed to the scholar arguing against the use of the letter h in the 
middle and end of syllable.292 Not uncommon for Hamann, he takes on a character that is 
weaker and even simple: a humble schoolteacher contra scholar.293 
The scholar referred to above – Hamann’s interlocutor – Christian Tobias Damm, 
contended in favor of the removal of the letter h on the grounds of abstract and universal 
reason in his work, Observations on Religion.294 Although Hamann focused his attack on the 
orthographic proposal advocated in Observations on Religion, Damm’s book had broader 
implications. For instance, in regards to religion he stated that religion “must be grounded 
                                                          
288 The quote by Horace on the title pages, “- - et nobilis et decens, Et pro solicitis non tacitus reis, Et centum 
puer atrium Late signaferet militia TVAE”. In this quote Hamann is cryptically declaring that he will stand up 
in defense of the letter h and in so doing, for his faith. The last line of the Latin quotes reads, “bear YOUR 
standards of warfare widely”. The language of warfare coincides with the language used in the essay of the 
altercation when he speaks of an “orthographic duel”. Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 149.  
289 Hamann, 148. 
290 Often the pseudonymous author merely sets the tone with little biographical information provided. E.g. 
“Aristobulos” in the Essay on an Academic Question (N II, 119, Haynes, 9) or the “Preacher in the Wilderness”, 
Golgotha and Sheblimini! (N III, 291, Haynes, 165). 
291 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 148. 
292 It is interesting to note that Hamann emphasizes the local and specific in his pseudonym (e.g. teacher of 
German, his mother tongue, works to support his wife and daughter as well as enjoying of “a small pot of 
beer” after his labors) as opposed to Damm’s “universal, sound, and practical human reason”.  
293 Again Hamann’s Christian influence is seen here, e.g. the Christological idea of strength in weakness. 
294 Christian Tobias Damm, Betrachtungen über die Religion (Berlin, n.d.). 
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on healthy human reason.”295 Due to this, one can see that Hamann’s polemic – in attacking 
the idolatrous use of reason in orthographic reform – had wider implications than merely 
orthography.  
In perhaps the most whimsical of Hamann’s writings, prior to getting into the 
specifics of orthography in the Observations on Religion, the vanity of its author [Damm] is 
discussed, all the while pointing to the gravity of his conjectures. In these remarks the 
idolatrous use of Enlightenment reason is indicated. Leaning heavily on quotations taken 
from Damm‘s book, Hamann (in the voice of Schröder) observes that for Damm those who 
are unfaithful in the spelling of the letter h risk being “unfaithful and unjust also in the 
great revelations and mysteries of universal, sound, and practical human reason.”296 
Hamann asserts that Damm insists on complete accordance with reason in both his 
orthographic and religious postulates. Because the letter h in the middle and end of 
syllables does not agree with Damm’s reason, it is a "pointless, groundless custom.”297 This 
position parallels the attempt to make religion free of traditions which do not accord with 
sound and universal reason. Hamann asserts that his interlocutor transgresses these 
attempts at consistency and, furthermore, does not touch “the whole burden of his method 
in the prevailing matter of the letter h”, and by extension, religion.298 Hamann is convinced 
that Damm himself will be unable to stand before the judgment of his own assertions. 
Hamann’s modus operandi of sowing doubt and turning things on their head is on display, 
not to mention his wit. After discussing Damm’s impressive credentials as a scholar, 
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297 Hamann, 147–48. New Apology of the Letter h. 
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Hamann comically states, “- is it not a terrible shame that a life so laudably employed 
should be darkened by the worst treachery against an innocent letter!”, which bespeaks 
much of his tone in the entire essay: humorously ironic yet earnest in intent. 299 
More critical for the present study are the results of a superstitious belief in reason 
when applied to orthography. In Hamann’s words it led to “the strange apparition of an 
orthographic canon, a true god ex machina.”300 Hamann perceived the opposite of the 
purification of language sought by Damm, but instead language being brought into 
accordance with the prejudices of the spirit of his age. In the course of his essay Hamann 
sought to defend the retention of the letter h, and, by extension, defend both language and 
revealed religion. Additionally, how abstract reason had turned even orthography into an 
idol was brought to the fore in this essay. 
Main Body of the New Apology of the Letter h 
 
The main body of the New Apology of the Letter h consists of three subsections: two 
subsections concerning the reasons for the removal of the letter h in the voice of the school 
teacher Schröder as well as his short response. In the third and final subsection Hamann 
gives voice to the letter h itself, responding directly to those who would remove it.  
 First, Potential Answer: Because it is not Pronounced 
 
 Hamann’s first conjecture as to why Damm wanted the removal of the letter h at 
certain times is that it is not always pronounced. In conjunction with this, words should be 
pronounced according to their letters. Hamann playfully says, “I do not claim this answer is 
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anything but potential and do not actually burden my adversary with it, so that I am not 
obliged to start being ashamed of him too soon.”301 Again, this is meant ironically, as much 
of Damm’s argument depended on the letter’s unpronounced status.302 However, Hamann 
finds this argument wanting and continues to carry the argument further. He states that if 
this is the case, then all unpronounced letters should be done away with, making ihn ( In 
English: “him”) become in (In English: “in”).303 Moreover, if spelling dictated pronunciation 
– as pure reason would have it, according to Damm – there would be a “Babylonian 
confusion” within Germany. Hamann points out that if those using dialects began writing 
words according to the way they are spoken, “what dam could withstand this orthographic 
deluge?”304 Of course Hamann is being hyperbolic, but it does bring to light some of the 
inconsistency, as well as making a pun on the author’s name.305  
 As Hamann progressed with his potential answer, his objection to these attempts 
become clear, “a universal, sound, practical human language, and human reason, and 
human religion, without arbitrary fundamental principles, are his own furnace of ice.”306 
This statement criticizing his interlocutor suggests that one element cannot be thought to 
have dominance over the others. Reason, language, and religion are all bound to one 
another – they are interdependent elements – there is no hierarchy. An important idea 
                                                          
301 Hamann, 150. New Apology of the Letter h. 
302 Hamann, 150. New Apology of the Letter h. 
303 Hamann, 150. New Apology of the Letter h. 
304 Hamann, 151. New Apology of the Letter h. 
305 The dialects in Germany are so distinct that some people living just a few kilometers away can have 
difficulty understanding their respective dialects. For a discussion of the variances see, Internationale 
Gesellschaft für Dialektologie des Deutschen et al., eds., Deutsche Dialekte - Konzepte, Probleme, 
Handlungsfelder: Akten des 4. Kongresses der Internationalen Gesellschaft für Dialektologie des Deutschen 
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306 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 154. The reference to a furnace of ice comes from one of 
Damm’s examples of something contradictory. Hamann is using one of Damm’s own examples to criticize him. 
Damm, Betrachtungen über die Religion, 65. 
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contained in this quote is that of arbitrariness. At one point Damm conjectured, “The voice 
of healthy reason is the voice of God.”307 Hamann demonstrates his radical disagreement on 
the concept of knowledge in general. Not only was human reason based on arbitrary 
principles, so was religion, drawing a strong contrast to Damm’s presupposition of the 
universality of reason.  
Second, Actual Answer 
 
The next subsection is where Hamann seems to think the real problem lies for his 
interlocutor, namely, in the letter h appearing barbaric to foreigners. Hamann picks up on 
Damm commenting to this point in his book, Observations on Religion. This can be easily 
deconstructed by pointing to the fact that neither the English nor French language (to name 
his two primary examples) are purely consistent.308 In this subsection one also sees 
something that arises occasionally in Hamann’s critiques. He states that he clearly has too 
many prejudices against the aforementioned nations that he cannot judge fairly. This is not 
only a candid admission of prejudice on his part, but is a statement of sorts pointing to the 
prejudices that his contemporaries hold. In favoring the French language they 
consequently favor the philosophical influence coming from France.309 There is no concrete 
argument given here besides the point itself. For to advocate orthographic reform based on 
a wish to appear a certain way to foreigners, is not to rely on the universal reason Damm 
held in such reverence. The point itself – if true – undercuts Damm’s ambitions. The 
                                                          
307 Damm, Betrachtungen über die Religion, 87. ”Die Stimme der gesunden Vernuft ist die Stimme Gottes.” 
308 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 155. New Apology of the Letter h. 
309 Not only did Frederick the Great’s favoring of the French language add to its importance socially, it also 
contributed to the influence of philosophical thought coming from France. By referencing this, Hamann points 
yet again to his focus on the subjective, the subtleties influencing one’s approach towards philosophy. 
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forthcoming response reveals much more clearly the idolatrous nature and superstitious 
foundations of Damm’s orthography of abstract reason. 
Final, Merely Probable Response to the Question 
 
Two main points are contained in Hamann’s response in the voice of Schröder. The 
first speaks of the arrogance of abstract reason, “There is a kind of ignorance in the will, 
and it can be cured neither by Christian-Wolffian merits in Latin and German nor by careful 
translations and explications of sacred scripture.”310 Of note, ignorance is not just a flaw in 
the reasoning but an ignorance of the will. Hamann sees no such thing as abstract reason 
standing on its own apart from the human will. He speaks of reason as “poor and naked”, 
that is, insofar as it relies on ideas in the rationalist sense, it neglects the historical to its 
own detriment (as seen in the section demonstrating the absurdity of Damm’s argument if 
taken to its logical end).   
Ideas derived by abstract reason have no place forming language to fit its own 
image. Attempting to do so was at best naive and, at the end of the day, entirely off base. 
Just as language has historical foundations, so does Enlightenment reason. The 
orthographic reform based itself on, “Powerful errors and a more than miraculous 
superstitious faith in lies and mysteries of darkness and wickedness! - - Obstinate stupidity 
in pallio philosophico.”311 This quote brings together many of the elements of Hamann’s 
critique of superstition and idolatry covered thus far. The errors referred to in the quote 
are based on a superstitious faith in lies. Reason sought to clarify, but Damm’s reforms 
                                                          
310 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 156. New Apology of the Letter h. 
311 Hamann, 157. New Apology of the Letter h. 
127 
 
based on abstract reason were characterized as “lies and mysteries of darkness”, all the 
while his arguments were dressed in pallio philosophico – philosophical clothing. 
Excursus on Philosophy of Language 
 
 The intention of the critique in the New Apology is not to set forth a prescriptive 
philosophy of language, but a defense against the onslaught of abstract reason. In reference 
to Damm, Hamann states, “do not regard as a blind game of chance the fact that the 
orthography of the extraordinary religious teacher is as closely related to the main subject 
as to the spirit of his illuminated century.”312 Hamann appropriately saw the position 
towards the letter h as part of a larger philosophical, religious, and societal movement. 
Therefore, a close reading of the essay does not accord with Graeme Garrard’s 
interpretation, who suggested that Hamann sought to get back to a more primitive 
language similar to Rousseau’s noble savage.313 This interpretation is incorrect on a number 
of accounts. In regards to language, Hamann nowhere affirmed that there is some sort of 
truer, primordial language that humanity might reacquire outside of the analogy of pre-fall 
humanity.314 Moreover, since the point of the New Apology was to demonstrate the misuse 
of abstract reason when applied to orthography and its wider implications, no such 
conjecture is warranted. The reoccurring elements of tradition and experience do appear, 
                                                          
312 Hamann, 157. New Apology of the Letter h. 
313 Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth-Century to the Present (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 35.  
314 This does not correspond to Hamann’s Lutheranism, where mankind and even language are contaminated 
by sin. Tom Kleffmann gives an important explication of original sin in Hamann’s thought. Particularly, he 
argues that the idea of sin relates to the self-deification of universal reason and to language’s original state of 
condescension. Tom Kleffmann, Die Erbsündenlehre in sprachtheologischem Horizont: eine Interpretation 
Augustins, Luthers und Hamanns, Beiträge Zur Historischen Theologie 86 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994), 259–
305. 
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but not in the context of postulating an alternative orthography. The focus is on the 
idolatrous use of reason, not a philosophy of language.  
Essentially, Hamann’s argument in the main body of the essay is as follows. If the 
letter h is taken out on the basis that it is not pronounced, then this principle must be 
adhered to with all letters in all circumstances. Yet with pronunciation being so varied – 
particularly acute due to the widely variant German dialects – communication would 
disintegrate and writing would become unintelligible. Furthermore, to change language 
because of how it appears to foreigners betrays the principles of reason attested to by 
Damm. 
The Letter h Defends Itself 
  
 In the last subsection of the essay Hamann’s pseudonym changes entirely. He gives 
voice to the letter h itself. The voice he bestows it is bombastic and critical, spoken in the 
voice of a prophet of the Old Testament.315 The criticism shifts from Damm in particular to 
the “prophets of Böhmisch-Breda”, which appears to be a reference to Enlightenment 
philosophy as a whole.316 Although the Enlightenment is broadly under attack, the letter h is 
still addressing the content of Observations on Religion. What follows is an explicate attack 
on the superstitious and idolatrous aspect of the use of abstract reason by Enlightenment 
philosophers, manifested here in an idolatrous orthography.  
                                                          
315 Walter Lowrie, Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist. (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2016), 35. 
This also adds weight to dealing with Hamann’s pseudonyms more seriously, as here one observes that  the 
voice of the pseudonym has changed entirely.  
316 In the speech made by the letter h, an analogy to Paul’s speech before the Athenians in Acts 17:23 is made, 
indicating that the Enlightenment philosophers are more broadly in focus.  
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 Although only three short pages, because of its dense prophetic language there is 
much upon which to expound. The letter is used symbolically and expositorily. It is used to 
symbolize human mortality and hidden knowledge. In its own voice, it exposits the idolatry 
and arrogance present in the claim of abstract reason to an absolute position. 
The Symbols of the Letter h 
 The letter h begins its defense by humorously pointing to its ability to speak – being, 
as it were, analogous to Balaam’s donkey.317 It serves as a symbol of human mortality when 
it states, “Your life is what I am – a breath.”318 For Hamann the letter h is a symbol of 
mortality, and because of the passing nature of life the letter gives itself license to speak 
bluntly to the false prophets of the Enlightenment.319  
 The second symbolic use of the letter h is more significant. The letter h is a symbol 
of the unknown, the knowledge of God. Consider, “But you belong to the world, and he who 
is not of this world, his language you do not know and cannot hear his words.”320 The 
unspoken h is the analogy of that which is beyond, which cannot be grasped by rationality 
alone. Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) – who held that the New Apology was the key text of 
Hamann’s authorship – asserted that the letter h, “in its inaudibleness, is representative of 
the concealed, secretive thing, the symbol of the spiritual portion of words.”  321 This is a 
                                                          
317 Numbers 22:21-39. 
318 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 160. 
319 The letter h is understood as a breath in the word, and Hamann makes the biblical analogy of life being like 
a breath. Hence, the letter h speaks to those who share a similar fate. Hamann, 160. 
320 Hamann, 162. 
321 Ernst Jünger, Sgraffiti, Jubiläumsausg (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985), 104. “Der Buchstabe H wird in seiner 
Unhörbarkeit als Vertreter der verborgenen, verschwiegenen Dinge, als Symbol des geistigen Anteils an den 
Worten aufgefaßt.” Eckhard Schumacher has a similar and ultimately further reaching interpretation. 
Working closely with Hamann’s Clouds (Wolken) Schumacher argues that the way Hamann constructs texts 
out of other texts, coupled with an ironic, subversive voice, pushes back against the idea that there is a hidden 
meaning to be uncovered underneath difficult texts. Rather Hamann upholds a manifold of meaning in texts. 
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very good analysis, finding support in Hamann’s use of the principium coincidentiae. “Is not 
your human reason an indeterminate organ, a nose of wax, a weathercock, to which the 
letter of a holy canon, which was once written and has lasted till now, is not to be 
preferred? Is the famous principium coincidentiae oppositorum entirely unknown to you? It 
is the spirit that quickens, the letter is flesh, and your dictionaries are straw.”322 For 
Hamann, some contradiction in experience - reflected in language - is to be expected. This is 
tied to the larger idea of a resolution, which Hamann resolves in God. What Jünger lacks in 
his interpretation, however insightful, is neglecting to mention that Hamann always bases 
this within a theological framework (e.g. all opposites coinciding in God). 
These contradictions and mysteries find their resolution in God; however, this is not 
a subterfuge for avoiding rigorous thought and investigation. It is in fact the presumption of 
knowledge wherein superstition is found. “I perceive that in all things you are too 
superstitious. The invisible GOD, who is therefore unknown to you, is of course the father 
of reason and religion, which however are spirit and truth and thus as hidden from your 
senses as the invisible GOD, who is therefore unknown to you.”323 Hamann assesses that 
they – the prophets, that is, Enlightenment Deists – glory in their knowledge of God, but 
their knowledge is limited insofar as they neglect the inner life of the human being with 
how they utilize reason. Particularly bothersome, abstract reason was given priority over 
that of other faculties of knowledge, and as such was intrinsically limited in its ability to 
provide orientation, organize experience, and interpret the world without acknowledging 
its dependence on language. The person is not subject to one definition of the world – one 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
See, Eckhard Schumacher, Die Ironie der Unverständlichkeit: Johann Georg Hamann, Friedrich Schlegel, Jacques 
Derrida, Paul de Man, 1. Aufl, Aesthetica (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 144–45.   
322 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 162–63. 
323 Hamann, 160–61. New Apology of the Letter h. 
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which was provided by abstract reason – knowledge was always unfolding, developing.324 
Each individual was a vehicle for revelation and the letter h represented the hidden 
knowledge which required revealing. 
The Superstitious Claim to Truth by Abstract Reason 
  
For Hamann, Enlightenment religion is appalling; not for its pursuit of truth, but for 
its claim upon it (as revealed by the letter h, God and truth are not something able to be 
grasped solely by the intellect). “‘Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered 
into the heart of man’ – Herein is the only religion which is worthy of a supreme creature 
and befitting to him, and which GOD has prepared for them that love him.”325 Because of the 
ungraspable nature of God, that which is purported to be knowledge of God attained 
through the use of abstract reason was only a philosophical idol. Addressing those who 
think truth (i.e. God) is knowable solely by the means of reason he states, “Lie not against 
the truth with your vainglorious knowledge of God; for lies belong to the wisdom which is 
earthly, human, and devilish.”326 The letter h makes some illuminating comments that aid in 
grasping how Hamann understood the inventions and ideas advanced by philosophers of 
his time (such as removing the letter h) as falsehoods: 
 You little prophets of Böhmisch-Breda! The object of your observations and 
devotion is not GOD but a mere verbal image which you have deified through 
a more than poetic license into a real person, and you make so many gods 
                                                          
324 Günter Wohlfart, in pointing to the relationship of reason to language in Hamann, asserts that Hamann 
understands reason in a manner that provides for a dialectic after Hegel. In reference to Hamann’s thought, 
he states, “Denken der Sprache heißt, die Gedanken Vernunft und Sprache zusammenzubringen.” Günter 
Wohlfart, Denken der Sprache: Sprache und Kunst bei Vico, Hamann, Humboldt und Hegel, Alber-Broschur 
Philosophie (Freiburg: K. Alber, 1984), 165–66.  
325 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 161. New Apology of the Letter h. 
326 Hamann, 161. New Apology of the Letter h. 
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and persons of this sort through the transubstantiation of your verbal images 
that on judgment day the coarsest heathendom and the blindest popery, in 
comparison with your philosophical idolatry, will be justified and perhaps 
absolved.327 
Present in this passage is a clear portrayal of Hamann’s notion of philosophical idolatry and 
a clarification as to why abstract reason is involved in creating “lies” (which could also fall 
under the umbrella of an idol). This philosophical idolatry consists of “verbal images” 
which are turned into objects of worship, “gods and persons”. One must recall that reason 
is always already bound up in language; therefore, elements derived by abstract reason are 
nothing more than mere fabrication. Additionally, it is significant that these objects of 
devotion are created by the prophets of Böhmisch-Breda [read: Enlightenment 
Philosophers]. Furthermore, these self-made idols are grounded in ideas that are deified 
into “a real person”. In the present case, the idea of a language purified by reason becomes 
the deified idea, the idol. 
 Hamann is again utilizing religious language as part of a critique that is primarily 
philosophical, e.g. speaking of their fabrications as being a sort of “transubstantiation”. 
Hamann, by using this language, seeks not only to provoke – which of course the language 
employed here was certainly meant to do – but also to draw parallels between philosophy 
and religious dogmatism. Analogous to the change in substance of the wafer in the 
sacrament (transubstantiation), the Enlightenment philosophers change the substance 
(transubstantiate) of their conjectures. In doing so, they deify their own fabrications, 
making their fabrications into self-made idols.  
                                                          
327 Hamann, 162. New Apology of the Letter h. 
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 An implicit part of the argument involves the contradiction pointed out by Hamann 
in his critique of Damm’s reasons for removing the unpronounced letter h. Hamann 
demonstrated the inconsistencies in ideas which were supposed to be based on a universal, 
sound human reason. In so doing, he demonstrated the contingent nature of knowledge 
and the limitations of abstract reason. Based on this background, the letter h facetiously 
asks, “Is all your human reason anything other than tradition and inheritance”, and “Is not 
your human reason an indeterminate organ?”328 The use of this “organ of reason” is 
determined by elements beyond itself; therefore, any claim to universality by reason is null 
and void.  
Summary and Final Thoughts on the Idol of the Orthography of Reason 
  
A few final observations will be provided to summarize the Idol of the Orthography 
of Reason. The essay is composed entirely by pseudonymous authors. Hamann’s 
pseudonyms often reflect a consistent critique – in contrast to someone such as Fernando 
Pessoa (1888-1935). Pessoa used what he called heteronyms to emphasize that his 
pseudonyms represented differing views of the world as a whole.329  
Although Hamann’s pseudonyms tend not to be taken as seriously as those of 
Kierkegaard,330 one sees in the New Apology just how significant they can be. Firstly, the 
                                                          
328 Hamann, 162. New Apology of the Letter h. 
329 Cf. Fernando Pessoa, A Little Larger than the Entire Universe: Selected Poems, trans. Richard Zenith, 
Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin Books, 2006). Pessoa writes in the voices of Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo 
Reis, Álvaro de Campos, and his own. He developed a history of sorts for what he calls his “heteronyms” in 
order to emphasize their distinctive identities, which should be held as different than his own. 
330 Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms distinctive voices and differing opinions are easier to spot than Hamann’s. Cf. 
The differing voices of the aesthetic and religious in Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard’s Writings 3–4 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987). One example of 
both taking Hamann’s pseudonyms seriously and providing an analysis of them is found, Wilhelm Koepp’s 
work, Der Magier unter Masken. Interestingly, Koepp connects Hamann’s pseudonyms (what he calls, 
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humble voice of the teacher is used to bring out Damm’s vanity. This “voice” takes on the 
specifics of Damm’s text and adheres to a more stringent argumentation. Secondly, there is 
the prophetic voice of the letter h lambasting the Enlightenment as a whole, used to voice 
larger concerns with the presuppositions of the age of Enlightenment. Irony is a common 
denominator between these two voices. It is not always the content itself voiced by the 
pseudonyms but the character Hamann gives them that retain Hamann unique 
perspective.331 Additionally, the use of pseudonyms and irony is another objection to the 
systematic application of abstract reason. A pseudonym pushes against the idea of the 
systematic nature of thought, demonstrating the situational and perspective nature of 
knowledge. This illuminates the need to pay close attention to Hamann’s use of 
pseudonyms.332  
Generally as a published author, Hamann wrote with a mask: a statement to the 
unquantifiable, ungraspable nature of human existence, which cannot be contained in any 
overarching system. Hamann is not writing as Johann Georg Hamann in the essay, adding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“masks”) with his overall motivation of his authorship (Koepp, p. 245). Indeed, the pseudonyms can be easily 
connected to the fragmentary and limited nature of knowledge insofar as they represent the multiplicity of 
knowledge and type of knowledge. Furthermore, Hamann’s masks can be seen as an implicit critique of his 
contemporaries as Hamann tried to unmask them, thereby showing that they have been wearing masks the 
entire time. Cf. Wilhelm Koepp, Der Magier unter Masken. Versuch eines neuen Hamannbildes, (Göttingen: V & 
R, 1965)  
331 One can also look to the Rhapsodist found in the Aesthetica differing from the Knight of the Rose Cross 
(Knight of the Rose Cross) and the Preacher in the Wilderness (Golgotha and Sheblimini!). Hamann’s texts are 
often filled with a plethora of references to both recent and ancient texts. However, there is a marked 
difference in the pseudonyms of the Knight of the Rose Cross and the Preacher in the Wilderness. Both follow 
the arguments of the texts which they are critiquing, whereas the Rhapsodist is piecing every point together 
from disparate sources. This point is further supported by Eric Achermann, in Worte und Werte, where he 
analyzes the Crusades of the Philologian. Achermann speaks of the pseudonymous authors’ voices being 
unified in their “parodic writing style” (parodischen Schreibart). See, Eric Achermann, Worte und Werte: Geld 
und Sprache bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Johann Georg Hamann und Adam Müller, Frühe Neuzeit, Bd. 32 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997), 168. 
332 In the case of the New Apology, both pseudonymous authors retain a similar position but are voiced from 
two different perspectives. This is often the case in Hamann’s authorship. Because of this, one can draw larger 
motivations of his authorship and ascertain a perspective offered by Hamann.  
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nuance to, and additional support for, his notion of the idolatry of system. By using 
differing voices he is making a subtle but important point regarding the multitudinous 
nature of even one single human being.  
The fact that the motif of idolatry is found in his letters and is found throughout his 
authorship further bolsters the legitimacy of reading Hamann through the lens of his 
critique of the philosophical idolatry of his contemporaries. In the attempt to purify 
spelling according to the principles of abstract reason Hamann saw two things which led 
him categorize it as idolatrous. Namely, the underlying faith involved in the philosophy of 
that endeavor, as well as the attempt to craft a language free from history and contingency. 
In his eyes, the thinkers of his day created an idol out of the orthography of reason. This 
idol did not serve truth, but the purposes of his contemporaries. And it was further 
problematic insofar as it was supported only by a superstitious faith in a universal, abstract 
reason. 
The Idol of the Public 
 
 In the introduction to the current study, the Idol of the Public was used as a means 
of evincing Hamann's concept of superstition and idolatry, thereby conveying the 
importance of undertaking the explication of these ideas. Presently, the concept of this 
idolatry will be discussed in further detail. Specifically pertaining to how the Idol of the 
Public manifested itself in other aspects of philosophy outside of the Socratic Memorabilia 
will be discussed. In the course of this explication the extent to which this "idol" permeated 
philosophy will become clear. 
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 Hamann was not the first and certainly not the last to criticize the Public. Rousseau 
(1712-1778) is one famous example of a philosopher expressing skepticism toward public 
opinion (opinion publique). 333 However, Hamann’s understanding of the public as a 
philosophical idol was unique and constituted a distinction from those critical of public 
opinion. Understanding the idea of the public in Hamann will be aided by first looking to 
the individual as developed by Kierkegaard in relation to Hamann’s idea of the Idol of the 
Public.  
Understanding the Public in Hamann through the Concept of the Individual in Kierkegaard 
 
Often mentioned in Hamann scholarship is his influence upon Kierkegaard.334 One 
can observe a direct parallel in Kierkegaard and Hamann in both their notions and 
descriptions of the public. However, Kierkegaard provides a more lucid account than 
Hamann. Kierkegaard utilized a language less enigmatic as well as forgoing the idea of an 
Idol of the Public (favoring instead the idea of the present age which contained similar 
objections to the public as Hamann).335 Hence, a brief outline of the Kierkegaardian 
objections to the public will be briefly addressed. This approach will provide a better 
indication of Hamann’s objections to the public amidst his, at times, scattered approach. 
Kierkegaard - in response to suffering abuse from a literary magazine - critiqued the 
idea of the public through the idea of the crowd over the individual in the text, On the 
                                                          
333 Cf. Jürgen Oelkers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 2014, 160. Certain aspects of these tendencies can even be 
observed in Rousseau’s first published work, where he argues that society has corrupting aspects. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress, 2nd ed (Indianapolis, IN ; Cambridge: 
Hackett Pub. Co, 2011), 1–26.  
334 For an extensive list of secondary sources on this subject consult, Anders Moe Rasmussen, Kierkegaard 
and His German Contemporaries, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources; v. 6 (Aldershot, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 97–114. 
335 Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages the Age of Revolution and the Present Age: A Literary Review, trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009), 85. 
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Dedication to ‘That Single Individual’.336 Interestingly, this dedication parallels Hamann’s 
dedication to the public so much so that it is undoubtedly drawing from Hamann.337 
However, Kierkegaard addresses the antithesis of the public – that being the individual – 
and as such gives further insight into Hamann’s public; the other side of the coin so to 
speak.   
Kierkegaard’s goal is to show that the public or the crowd are themselves 
abstractions and sowers of untruth. He argues this by discussing how every action or 
opinion coming from the crowd ultimately derives from human beings, i.e. from 
individuals.338 The crowd minimalizes the individual’s responsibility, and thereby tends to 
encourage actions that are not in accordance with the truth but with its own predilections. 
The public sets itself up as the truth, “daily press and anonymity make our age even more 
insane with help from ‘the public,’ which is really an abstraction, which makes a claim to be 
the court of last resort in relation to ‘the truth’.”339 It is this claim to the truth, a claim made 
by an abstraction, to which Kierkegaard adamantly objects. Nearly every paragraph of the 
essay begings with the declaration: “The crowd is untruth”.340 Kierkegaard resolves the 
problem of the public with the biblical idea of the love for one’s neighbor.341 Kierkegaard 
has the social in mind whereas Hamann largely focused on philosophical movements. Yet 
                                                          
336 Søren Kierkegaard, Crowd Is Untruth. (Merchant Books, 2014). 
337 Not only does Kierkegaard explicitly mention Hamann’s influence, but the beginning of this text employs 
similar language to Hamann’s dedication to the Public in the Socratic Memorabilia with one slight difference. 
Kierkegaard seems to have taken up Hamann’s condemnation of the Idol of the Public while engaging with the 
anonymous reader, whereas Hamann turns to the concrete, e.g. “The Two” (Kant and Berens). 
338 Søren Kierkegaard, “On the Dedication to ‘That Single Individual,’” trans. Charles K. Bellinger (Public 
Domain, 1846). “The untruth is first that it is "the crowd," which does either what only the single individual in 
the crowd does, or in every case what each single individual does. For a crowd is an abstraction.” 
339 Kierkegaard. On the Dedication to 'That Single Individual'. 
340 Kierkegaard. On the Dedication to 'That Single Individual'. 
341 Kierkegaard. On the Dedication to 'That Single Individual'. “And to honor every individual human being, 
unconditionally every human being, that is the truth and fear of God and love of "the neighbor"; but ethico-
religiously viewed, to recognize "the crowd" as the court of last resort in relation to "the truth," that is to deny 
God and cannot possibly be to love ‘the neighbor.’” 
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the neighbor is always an individual and Hamann was concerned with the individualistic 
character of reasoning and discussion. Hamann addressed concrete people, individuals - 
neighbors if you will. Kierkegaard’s individual serves as a good counterpoint to Hamann’s 
public. One might say that it was the idolization of the public which led to the concept of 
crowd in Kierkegaard. 
The Public as Philosophical Idol 
 
 Hamann’s notion of the Idol of the Public can be difficult to delineate. One might say 
it was a sensibility that undergirded the overreliance on theoretical reason of his age. This 
idol manifests itself in a variety of ways. The Idol of the Public is not as confined as the 
Kierkegaardian idea of the crowd, yet the foundations are similar. In the introductory 
remarks of the Socratic Memorabilia, Hamann determined that the foundation of idolatry in 
philosophy and economics consisted of the service to the spirit of the age by Berens and 
Kant. The Socratic Memorabilia provides an excellent example of how Hamann's authorship 
was motivated by the need to critique the superstition and idolatry of his age. The Idol of 
the Public was not only present in this early text of Hamann’s authorship, but was also 
present in other writings critiquing his contemporaries. 
 The idolatrous elements of the public are twofold. The first has to do with the 
abstract nature of the public and those who control the knowledge sanctioned by it. The 
second has to do with the content of this knowledge sanction, namely, a philosophy based 
on abstract reason and its claim to universality. The Idol of the Public is very present in his 
critique of the essay on the origin of language by Herder, which represented the acquiesce 
of Hamann’s friends and contemporaries to the prejudicies of the age. Additionally, the 
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critique of the ubiquitous bon sens ( as well as gesunde Vernunft) falls under the Idol of the 
Public as it was employed to enforce the knowledge sanctioned by the spirit of the age. It is 
in this critique of Herder and in the bon sens that one finds some of the clearest examples of 
the Idol of the Public in Hamann’s thought.  
Herder's Servitude to the Idol of the Public 
 
 The Hamann-Herder relationship can be a bit baffling. Hamann's authorship is 
peppered with both praise and denunciation of his once pupil and long time friend, Johann 
Gottfried Herder. There are competing opinions as to who was more influential on whom, 
and who first developed the idea of Metacritique. Questions regarding the intricacies of the 
Hamann-Herder relationship, both personally and philosophically, will be left to others.  342 
The intention here is the explication of how the notion of idolatry motivated Hamann's 
critique. His and Herder’s mutual concern for language, history, and revelation 
notwithstanding, Hamann did not hesitate to impugn Herder when concessions to the spirit 
                                                          
342 Most Hamann scholarship treats Hamann as the father of the Metacritique. Even if Herder had used the 
word first, Hamann’s ideas had influenced what was later to become Metacritical thought. One must only look 
to the continuity between the Socratic Memorabilia and the Aesthetica in Nuce (published in 1759 and 1762, 
respectively), with his later Metacritique on the Purism of Reason to observe that Hamann certainly played an 
important role in developing these ideas. However, Michael Forster is one of those who argue for the greater 
importance of Herder in developing the Metacritque. He argues that Hamann had a radically different view of 
the Enlightenment prior to Herder’s publications that indicate thought’s dependence on language. Namely, 
that Hamann held that thought was indeed prior to language. This critique of Hamann overlooks the fact that 
much of what he would later discuss regarding language is already present in his early works, i.e. his focus on 
the faith grounding our existence. Additionally, Hamann indicates a very broad idea of language. Perception 
itself having its foundations in language, see, Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 64. Hamann’s 
thought was indeed focused less on language and more one feeling, yet this is his response to a philosophy 
that had ignored the priority of the senses: a theme that would be intrinsic to his later statements about 
language. (e.g. Metacritique Hamann, 215.). Hamann utilizes phraseology from his Aesthetica in his 
Metacritique, as well as connecting the ideas between the two. Cf. Aesthetica in Nuce Hamann, 63–65. and the 
Metacritique Hamann, 211–12. Therefore, it can be strongly argued that Hamann’s views – particularly 
regarding the Enlightenment and language – did not radically change, but they did mature.  For Forster’s 
arguments regarding Herder, Hamann, and the development of Metacritique see, Forster, After Herder, 70–72. 
140 
 
of the age were perceived. One such instance came about when Herder wrote for the Berlin 
Academy's essay contest on the origin of language.343 
The Idol of the Public manifested itself in Herder's serving the philosophical 
prejudices of the Berlin Academy. Its agenda was viewed by Hamann as entirely 
unacceptable as it upheld and purported the dependence on, and superiority of, the 
abstract reason so abhorred by Hamann. Herder’s thought - although critical in many of the 
same ways as Hamann’s - was more engaged with the thought of his time. Herder earnestly 
tried to advance philosophical positions to be taken up by his contemporaries.344 He was 
unlike Hamann, who would ever remain the gadfly, attempting to disrupt to a far greater 
degree than build up a type of system or school of thought which could be followed 
(Hamann did seek to build up, but in the Christian sense of reproof).345 Hamann determined 
that Herder was serving the Idol of the Public manifest in the Berlin Academy by the 
content of his submission to its essay competition. Of interest to the present study is 
Hamann’s critique of Herder, namely, for conforming to the prejudices of his day insofar as 
he advocated the ability of philosophy to achieve universal claims.346 
                                                          
343 Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century, 1st ed, Oxford 
Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10. 
344 One must only look to Herder’s thought as a whole in support of this point. Whereas Hamann prized his 
enigmatic and at times contrarian style, Herder took a different approach. For instance, Hamann thought the 
manner in which Herder had written his Treatise on the Origin of Language was itself giving in to the 
prejudice of his day. Herder was puzzled with Hamann’s harsh critique since Herder believed them to be 
advancing the same view of language. Michael Morton, Herder and the Poetics of Thought: Unity and Diversity 
in On Diligence in Several Learned Languages (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 36. 
345 Hamann consistently utilized the language of reproof and exhortation. Cf. In the New Apology of the Letter 
h the letter writes, “to punish your [Enlightenment philosopher’s] transgression.” Hamann, Writings on 
Philosophy and Language, 160. Also, in his Golgotha and Sheblimini!, Hamann takes on the pseudonym of the 
Preacher in the Wilderness. These are only two among numerous examples. Hamann, 164. 
346 Georg Baudler speaks of Hamann’s concern not only being for an outward obedience to the ideas of the 
Berlin Academy, but that his inner thought was infected with exalting the human spirit. Georg Baudler, “Im 
Worte sehen”: das Sprachdenken Johann Georg Hamanns, Münchener philosophische Forschungen 2 (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1970), 131. 
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The origin of the contention was in regards to Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of 
Language, which addressed the question on the divine or natural origin of language.347 
Herder defended neither viewpoint, rather charting his own path wherein he advanced the 
thought that reason is dependent upon language. “For Herder, then, language is not an 
invention of reason in the abstract, i.e., it is not something that comes forth from reason as 
the mere instrument for communicating its concepts (as was commonly held by the 
Aufklärer).”348 Despite the similarities in regards to the dependence of reason on language, 
Hamann’s response was harsh. Indeed, one can point to explicit passages and elements that 
diverge only slightly from Hamann’s own understanding of language. Notwithstanding, 
these small differences were seen as allowing for the propensities of his age to creep in (e.g. 
systematic purity through the application of abstract reason).  
On a broader, one might say meta-level, Hamann's critique of Herder was motivated 
out of his desire to call out those philosophers propagating and serving the idols of his age 
– even if one of them happened to be his former disciple. In Herder’s treatment of the 
“higher” (read: divine) hypothesis he had worked to please the academy in Berlin – one of 
the faces of the Enlightenment and the public controlled by it. Herder argued against the 
idea of a divine origin of language, evoking Hamann's ire. This act was done (á la Hamann) 
in service of the Idol of the Public, the faceless sentiment making up the general prejudices 
of the epoch. This can be clearly seen in his statement that Herder has gone “whoring after 
the beautiful spirits of his century and their bon ton.”349 As is often the case with Hamann, 
biblical imagery is intermingled with philosophical language. In this instance, it was the 
                                                          
347 Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings, trans. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge Texts in the History 
of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65–166. 
348 Betz, After Enlightenment, 143. 
349 ZH III, 16. 
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idea of the Children of Israel whoring after false gods.350 This imagery and rhetoric connects 
his critique of Herder to the critique of idolatry. The idea of Herder “whoring” has to do 
with seeking the approval of those of influence. As far as Hamann was concerned, those of 
influence were not specific persons but merely an abstract sense of what could rightly be 
called knowledge, epitomized in the Berlin Academy. Hamann thought that Herder's 
outright condemnation of the higher defense of language was merely a means of appeasing 
the Berlin Academy, and therewith the critical century as a whole. This demonstrates that 
the Idol of the Public did not only involve an adherence to rationalist opinions but also the 
quest for recognition; which he deemed Herder to be seeking.351 Interestingly, Hamann sees 
Herder’s quest for recognition as service to an abstract idol, i.e. the public, not a specific 
person or even school of thought. 
Herder's Perceived Naturalism and the Consequences of Serving “Healthy Reason”  
 
 Hamann’s concern advances to an even deeper philosophical level, namely, Herder’s 
perceived naturalism. The naturalism here refers to Herder allowing for the capacity of the 
individual to develop language and reason by their own abilities. The abilities then, have 
the power to substantiate the veracity of general truths on their own account. Herder’s 
similarities notwithstanding, Hamann points to the same elements that he did when 
critiquing rationalism: the faith-based foundations of every philosophical system. Hamann 
thought that Herder’s attempts to ground the origin of language in nature through 
                                                          
350 A plethora of biblical examples exist: Exodus 34:12-17; Leviticus 17:7; 20:1-7; Deuteronomy 31:16-30; 
32:16-21; Judges 2:16,17; 8:27; 8:33; 1 Kings 21:25,26; to reference only a few. 
351 Albeit Herder held that philosophy should indeed be utilized by all in a society and should not remain 
within the confines of professionals. Cf. Michael Forster, “Johann Gottfried von Herder,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), n.d. Yet it is not this that Hamann finds appalling, 
rather it is that Herder is trying to please the Berlin Academy. This further reinforces Hamann’s idea that it is 
not that the reason of people is set free, but rather that people are directed into a certain type of reason that is 
alienated from other sources of knowledge. 
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philosophical arguments were only an expression of – or a creation by – the idiosyncratic 
reason of the Enlightenment: 
He [Herder] had, out of the power of his own testimony, collected solicitous 
‘solid data out of the human soul, out of the organization of human persons, 
out of the structure of all ancient and wild languages and out of the entire 
household [Haushaltung] of humanity in order to prove his position, as the 
most permanent philosophical truth can be proven’; yes! more provable than 
all proofs of the divinity of the Koran by the Turks can be; for who can be 
intimately convinced of the power and strength of a proof than the creator 
[Artschöpfer] of that proof.352  
Again there is the equating of religious systems with philosophical systems and their 
respective claims to truth. Hamann was opposed to any presumption of truth in itself – 
religious, philosophical, or otherwise – by any system.353 It is the nature of truth that is at 
stake; specifically, the attempt to philosophically ascertain truth on its own account 
through the use of abstract reason. Visible in the quote above, Hamann affirms the role of 
the subject in the creation of philosophical proofs. In so doing he sought to undercut the 
veracity of any attempt to ascertain access to an absolute via a philosophical method that 
might be universally applied. Hamann accused Herder of engaging in this very thing.  
 
                                                          
352N III, 19:6-15, “Er [Herder]hat sich, kraft seines eigenen Zeugnisses, beflissen ‘feste Data aus der 
menschlichen Seele, aus der menschlichen Organisation, aus dem Bau aller alten und wilden Sprachen und 
aus der ganzen Haushaltung des menschlichen Geschlechts zu sammlen und seinen Satz so zu beweisen, wie 
die festeste philosophische Wahrheit bewiesen werden kann’; ja! beweisbarer, als alle Beweise der Türken von 
der Göttlichkeit des Korans seyn können; denn wer kann inniger von der Macht und Kraft eines Beweises als 
der Artschöpfer desselben überzeugt seyn?” 
353 Henri Veldhuis constructively points out that Herder’s principle was that of analogy and it is then no 
wonder that Hamann’s response heavily utilizes analogy. Veldhuis, Ein versiegeltes Buch: der Naturbegriff in 
der Theologie J.G. Hamanns (1730-1788), 195–96. 
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Bon sens, gesunde Vernunft and the Idol of the Public 
 
The French bon sens and German gesunde Vernunft embodied the Idol of the Public 
for Hamann par excellence. Bon sense and gesunde Vernunft can both be translated into 
English as “common sense” or “good sense” and are a variant of the Latin sensus communis. 
However, to translate this as simply “common sense” would lack precision insofar as the 
common sense developing during the Enlightenment period carried local variations 
between languages; it had a more specific philosophical idea depending on the time period 
and the philosopher at hand.354 In order to avoid confusion, instead of employing the 
English “common sense”, Hamann’s rendering of these terms will retain the French bon 
sens unless the German is used specifically. The motivation for his use of the French was to 
indicate the French philosophical influence which Hamann saw as advocating the misuse of 
reason. This bon sens was particularly disconcerting to Hamann on multiple levels. It was in 
itself a fabrication which upheld the philosophical prejudice of his day and was employed 
to that end. What aligns the bon sens with the Idol of the Public is its intangible nature that 
was connected to a larger idea of reason, which was validated by philosophical consensus.  
 
 
 
                                                          
354  Philosophical discussion regarding the nature and use of sensus communis continued well beyond 
Hamann’s time. The myriad of its application and the controversy it has caused can be observed in Lyotard’s 
critique of Kantian notion of sensus communis. See, Jean-François Lyotard, “Sensus Communis,” in Judging 
Lyotard, ed. Andrew E. Benjamin, Warwick Studies in Philosophy and Literature (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 1992), 9. Lyotard opposes those who wanted to employ Kant’s ideas in the political sphere, such as 
Hannah Arendt. Hannah Arendt and Ronald Beiner, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 3. Dr. (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990).  
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Early Reservations and Hamann’s Curious Translation 
 
Prior to Hamann’s trip to London and subsequent conversion, in a text entitled 
Letters of a Father (Briefe eines Vaters) published four years before his authorship, he 
proffered a version of bon sens that could be supported in his view. However, it had the 
three sources of “history, nature, and revelation” and did not conform to “neither the 
teaching nor the method which are currently fashionable.”355 Later in is authorship he 
would speak much less favorably of bon sens, seeing that it was utilized in the service of 
abstract reason. 
 Before Hamann commenced his authorship he translated various texts. Most 
pertinent to the present discussion is his translation of various essays by Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) in his Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times. In the following quote from Shaftesbury’s work there is a particular 
passage which mirrors Hamann’s later opinion of reason: 
‘If by the word Sense we were to understand Opinion and Judgment, and by 
the word common the Generality or any considerable part of Mankind; 
’twou’d be hard, he said, to discover where the Subject of common Sense 
cou’d lie. For that which was according to the Sense of one part of Mankind, 
was against the Sense of another. And if the Majority were to determine 
common Sense, it wou’d change as often as Men chang’d. That which was 
                                                          
355 N IV, 217:3-9, Letters of a Father. “Die gesunde Vernunft, die mit der wahren Weltweisheit im gleichen 
Paar geht, kennt weder die Lehre noch die Methode, die jetzt Mode ist, Die Geschichte, die Natur, die 
Offenbarung sind die drei Quellen, aus denen euer Verstand eine Menge fruchtbarer Einsichten schöpfte und 
die ihr niemals in Erfindung der Wahrheit aus den Augen setzen müßtet.” This was set in contrast to Jean-
Baptiste de Boyer d’Argens, La philosophie du bon sens, ed. Guillaume Pigeard de Gurbert, Libre penseé et 
littérature clandestine 11 (Paris: Champion, 2002). 
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according to common Sense to day, wou’d be the contrary to morrow, or 
soon after.’356 
Hamann translated the English “common sense” as “gesunde Vernunft”, which when re-
translated into English reads “healthy reason”.357 Although his translation of common sense 
may seem strange, there was some precedence for this: Descartes connected bon sens with 
reason in his Discourse on Method.358  Nevertheless, this was a somewhat peculiar 
translation given by Hamann. Keeping Hamann’s translation in mind, one observes that the 
idea of the sensus communis was linked much closer to that of reason than ordinary 
understanding.359 This idea of the bon sens, indeed the fabrication of it by those controlling 
knowledge, would come to dominate Hamann’s interpretation of the bon sens. 
Bon sens Weaponized in the Service of the Enlightenment 
 
The idea of the bon sens serving the prejudice of Hamann’s age and thereby 
belonging to what is here called The Idol of the Public can be found throughout his 
authorship. A concentrated form of his critique of bon sens can be found in the aptly titled 
“French Project”, an essay from the Crusades of the Philologist. 
                                                          
356 Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence Eliot 
Klein, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
357 Hamann’s translation reads thus, N IV, 163: “‘Wenn wir durch das Wort Vernunft eine Meynung und 
Urtheil verstehen, und das Wort gesund nach der Allgemeinheit und dem ansehnlichen Theil des 
Menschlichen Geschlechts erklären wollen; so würde es schwer seyn’, sagt er, ‘zu entdecken, worinn [sic] der 
Gegenstand der gesunden Vernunft liegen könne. Denn was mit der Meinung eines Theils des Menschlichen 
Geschlechts übereinkommt, ist wieder die Meinung eines andern. Und wenn wir die gesunde Vernunft nach 
den größern Haufen bestimmen wollten, so würde selbige sich so öfters ändern als sich der Mensch ändere. 
Das was einen Tag der gesunden Vernunft gemäs ist, würde den andern Tag oder bald nachher das Gegentheil 
seyn.’”  
358 Descartes, Discourse on Method; and, Meditations on First Philosophy, 1–2.  
359 This term is commonly rendered “gesunder Menschenverstand” in German. That is, healthy human 
understanding instead of Hamann’s healthy reason. With reason in his day being so connected to Rationalist 
thinkers, Hamann could easily associate it with the dominance of abstract reason.  
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 The title, “French Project”, corresponds with Hamann’s view that much of the 
rationalism of his time originated from French sources. In fact, he writes under the 
fictitious pseudonym of a Frenchman. The essay begins with a description of the age and 
the state of philosophy prior to equating bon sens to the alkahest of his time, that is, to the 
alchemic solvent which was to universally turn substances into gold.      
The Sickness and its Cure: bon sens 
 
 The initial pages of the essay are a sweeping analysis of the state of intellectual life, 
particularly French philosophy. He states that the previous century was ruled by genius 
and the next might be ruled by healthy reason, with his century currently lacking a clear 
direction.360 “We fear the suspicion of enthusiasm (Schwärmerey) more than a fervid fever. 
Are there perhaps as many enthusiasts (Schwärmer) in Italy, Germany, Russia, ending in 
the same syllable as here? Jansenists! Molinists! Convulists! Secourists! Pichonists! and 
Encyclopedists!”361 It is important to note that the Encylopedists are aligned with fringe, 
superstitious Christian groups and sects. He goes on to assert that reason and philosophy 
had become their religion.362 Hamann points to the power play on the basis of fundamental 
ideas that was taking place. “Our beautiful spirits, who deny the infallibility of the pope, 
assuring us that religion is not right, do so in order that we might more easily believe in 
                                                          
360 N II, 153:29-31. “Das vorflossene Jahrhundert war das Reich des Genies; das nächste wird vielleicht unter 
dem Scepter der gesunden Vernunft blühen.”  
361 N II, 154:1-5. “Wir fürchten uns vor dem Verdacht der Schwürmerey mehr als für ein hitzig Fieber. Giebt es 
aber wohl in Italien, Teutschland, Rußland so viel Schwärmer, die sich auf die Sylbe (ist) endigen, als bey uns? 
Jansenisten! Molinisten! Convulisionisten! Secouristen! Pichonisten! Encylopädisten!” Besides the 
Encylopedists the others are references to various Christian sects seen as fanatical. Unpartheyische Kirchen-
Historie Alten und Neuen Testamentes nach der Methode Herrn Johann Hübners. Dritter Theil hält in sich die 
Geschichte vom Jahre Jesu Christi 1731. Bis 1750., vol. 3 (Jena: Johann Wilhelm Hartung, 1754), 241. “Seckel - 
Secouristen,” Allgemeines Lexicon der Religions u. christlichen Kirchengeschichte für alle Confessionen. Nach 
den Quellen Bearbeitet von Dr. Ch. Gotthold Neudecker. (Weimar: Bernh. Friedr. Voigt, 1835), 192. 
362 N II, 154, 6-10. 
148 
 
their proofs, planting their own banner of infallibility; if not, what right would they have to 
take captive our reason?”363 Here the reoccurring theme of the absolute and infallible 
nature of Enlightenment philosophy can be observed. Writing or philosophizing for the 
public ultimately implied universality. By using the militant language of planting a banner, 
he points to their aggressive attempts to assert their cultural dominance. 
After this diagnosis, the pseudonymous author proceeds to present his own cure for 
this state of affairs. The multiple layers of Hamann’s irony are prevalent here. He writes as 
a Frenchman critiquing his century; alluding to its superstitious elements, only then to 
resolve it with another form of idolatry, the bon sens of French philosophy. However in 
doing so, he utilizes alchemic language, undercutting its entire claim to resolving the issues 
presented above (the superstitious and idolatrous elements in the philosophy of the day). 
The bon sens takes as its starting place the notion that human malady is due solely to 
problems present in the understanding or brain; itself posing as the solution to this 
problem.364 
“My alkahest du bon sens is the most unnatural composition, to which belongs a 
deep knowledge of alchemy (Scheidekunst).”365 After this statement Hamann goes on to 
describe some of the ingredients of this alkahest: various knowledge found in assorted 
lands throughout Europe. Continuing with his description of bon sens he states, “My 
alkahest du bon sens consists therefore in a miraculous epiphysial theriac, which French 
                                                          
363 N II, 154, 28-32, French Project. “Unsere schönen Geister, welche dem Papst die Unfehlbarkeit absprechen, 
versichern uns, daß es mit der Religion nicht richtig sey, um uns desto leichtgläubiger gegen ihre Beweise zu 
finden, und pflanzen ihre eigene Unfehlbarkeit zum Panier auf; den was für Recht würden sie sonst haben, 
unsere Vernunft gefangen zu nehmen?” 
364 N II, 155:9-12, French Project. 
365 N II, 155:13-14, French Project. “Mein Alkahest du bon sens ist die künstlichste Zusammensetzung, zu der 
eine tiefe Kenntniß der Scheidekunst gehöret.”  
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quicksilver fastens to the finest cells in the brain.”366 Hamann obviously wants to make 
himself obscene in the eyes of any respectable Enlightenment philosopher by mixing such 
ideas as healthy reason with the medieval antidote “theriac”. Again he speaks of multiple 
sources adding to this type of knowledge: British, Spanish, German, etc.367 Hamann’s text is 
working antithetically. He is praising this type of knowledge with an ironic voice, making 
the entire endeavor appear absurd. Furthermore, he alludes to its fabricated nature of the 
knowledge of bon sens insofar as it is treated as his “alkahest”. The ingredients are the 
contributions of differing places with their own histories and particularities, which one 
then presumes - when mixed together - would form a type of perfect knowledge. Hamann 
does not present any arguments in opposition to what he is proposing here; rather, he 
merely lets it stand there ridiculously. 
At the end of the essay the way in which bon sens is “weaponized” comes to the fore. 
He writes that one may “only look in accordance with the use of my alkahest du bon sens at 
those books which he formerly admired.”368 This indicates the mentality of those serving 
the Idol of the Public expressed in the bon sens. It was a modern dogma attempting to 
control what could be considered valid knowledge, and this knowledge was that which was 
deemed acceptable by the Enlightenment. He even facetiously encourages the nations of 
Europe to continue with experimenting in accordance with his project of bon sens. Here bon 
sens falls under the Idol of the Public as it was no one’s theory in particular, but a general 
                                                          
366 N II, 155:26.28, French Project. “Mein Alkahest du bon sens bestehet folglich in einem wunderthätigen 
Zirbeldrüsentheriack, der das französische Quecksilber in den feinsten Zellen des Gehirns fest macht.” 
367 N II, 155:29-31, French Project. 
368 N II, 156:5-7, French Project. “Wenn ein witziger Kopf von seiner Genesung urtheilen will, so darf er nur 
nach Gebrauch meines Alkahestes du bon sens diejenigen Bücher ansehen, die er vormals am meisten 
bewundert hat.” 
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knowledge and sensibility that was used to uphold the Enlightenment use of abstract 
reason. 
Summary and Transition 
 
 In the above discussion Hamann’s aversion to any overarching entity controlling 
knowledge (be it cultural sentiment or embodied in a particular institution), in this case the 
broad idea of bon sens, falls under the Idol of the Public. Furthermore, the knowledge 
propagated by his epoch was idolatrous insofar as its very foundations were, although 
unacknowledged, based on principles established on faith and did not possess the absolute 
claims they purported.  
Evolution of the Idolatry of Reason 
 
 Autonomous reason, abstract reason, theoretical reason, pure reason, are all 
descriptions of different forms of Enlightenment reason, or rather, how the many people 
involved in Enlightenment philosophy utilized reason. Hamann suggests that all of the 
above types of “reason” were approaches and understandings fundamentally opposed to 
life. All are seen to be outside of both experience and that which is organic, living, and 
reproductive. Reason in the abstract failed to see its own reliance upon language and the 
accompanying insights brought forth (tradition, faith, etc.). The application of reason in the 
manner of his Enlightenment contemporaries had specific consequences, particularly in the 
propensity to create abstract philosophical systems. It is these systems that were to 
become the object of the respective thinker’s faith in reason. In fact on multiple occasions, 
reason itself is connected to the notion of idolatry or the fanciful construct of something 
which can be considered a philosophical idol. 
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 In this section multiple examples will be taken from Hamann’s corpus to 
demonstrate the prevalence of his interpretation of abstract reason as either an idol or as 
responsible for the creation of an idol. Chronology will be adhered to as much as possible, 
exhibiting the extent to which Hamann had dealt with reason and its potential misuses 
critiqued throughout his authorship. Despite the common theme of reason and its misuse, 
his notion of reason is not static but develops over the course of time, where a certain 
amount of continuity alongside a continual evolution can be observed.  
Reason in his Pre-published Works 
 
The Biblical Observations present a critical view of reason, but it was not yet the 
object of critique. For instance, “A philosopher who is too pleased with reason that he loses 
sight of the divine word is in the same situation as the Jews, who more stubbornly reject 
the New Testament the more firmly they cling to the old.”369 Here, one observes that 
Hamann held that reason employed by the philosopher is not yet superstitious but has 
potential to mislead. Elsewhere, “Reason does not allow us to discover anything more than 
what Job saw - - the misfortune of our birth - - precedence of the grave - - and the 
uselessness and insufficiency of human life, because we have no insights - - and passions 
and impulses fill us, whose purpose (Absicht) is unknown to us.”370 Reason is worldly, not 
something opposed to faith but limited in scope. In fact, the quote above suggests that 
                                                          
369 N I, 9:8-10, Biblical Observations, “Ein Philosoph, welcher der Vernunft zu gefallen das göttliche Wort aus 
den Augen setzt, ist in dem Fall der Juden, die desto hartnäckiger das neue Testament verwerfen, je fester sie 
an das alte zu hangen scheinen.” 
370 N I, 147:3-7, Biblical Observations, “Die Vernunft entdeckt uns nicht mehr, als was Hiob sahe - - das 
Unglück unserer Geburt - - den Vorzug des Grabes - - und die Unnützlichkeit und Unhinlänglichkeit des 
menschlichen Lebens, weil wir keine Einsichten haben - - und Leidenschaften und Triebe in uns fühlen, deren 
Absicht uns unbekannt ist.” 
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reason plays a significant role in developing faith: it reveals the vanity of life and the futile 
attempts to grasp life by one’s own means and abilities.371  
 Later in the Biblical Observations there is indication that reason has a propensity to 
create false concepts, foreshadowing his future focus on the philosophical idolatry of 
abstract reason.372 Generally throughout his early work (things written surrounding the 
time of his conversion around 1758) it is revelation which receives most of the attention, 
be it through nature or other people. “How the lowest of circumstances in the holy 
Scriptures are prophetic! Here two excesses of human reason that persist to our age are on 
display: to explain the voice of God through natural effects or through subordinate 
miracles.”373 The futility of the ability of reason to systematize our perceptions and give 
orientation is seen by Hamann early on in life. In fact, he speaks of knowledge being 
“piecemeal” (Stückwerk), again evincing what would later develop into a robust critique of 
the systematic and abstract aspects of reason employed by his contemporaries.374 Near the 
end of the Biblical Observations, a passage in the commentary on the Gospel of Luke begins 
to place reason on its own, and adverse to the true knowledge of God. “This is one of the 
innumerable contradictions, which we find in our nature and whose resolution is 
impossible for us. Reason is inclined to serve an unknown God, but infinitely far away to 
known him. It does not want to know - - and even more astounding - - if it would know him, 
                                                          
371 Reiner Wild, in his explication of the Aesthetica in Nuce, notes how Hamann perceived in the emerging 
“Wissenschaft” the desire to control and command – much different to the humbler approach presented by 
Hamann. Wild Reiner, “Jeder Erscheinung der Natur war ein Wort,” in Hamann, ed. Oswald Bayer, Bernhard 
Gajek, and Josef Simon, Erste Auflage, Insel-Almanach 1988 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1987).  
372 N I 167:15-16, 18-21, Biblical Observations. 
373 N I, 217:31-35, Biblical Observations. “Wie die geringsten Umstände in der heiligen Schrift prophetisch 
sind! Hier sind zwey Ausschweifungen der menschlichen Vernunft angezeigt, die bis zu unsern Zeiten 
fortdauern. Die Stimme Gottes durch natürliche Würkungen zu erklären oder durch untergeordnete Wunder.” 
374 N I 167:26-27- 
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it would cease to serve him.”375 Thus reason is adverse to true knowledge; it will gladly 
serve an unknown god (later one of its own construction), pushing aside revelation. He 
never claims that one should not utilize one’s reason; only that thought must be informed 
by much more.  
 Another text of his pre-published works deserving attention is his “Fragments” 
(Brocken), wherein he indicates his strong empiricism. This text is less personal, yet lays a 
foundation for his later assertions that would show up in the Socratic Memorabilia as well 
as elsewhere. “And whereupon is everything based? On five loafs of barley, the five senses, 
which we have in common with unreasoning animals. Not only is the entire storehouse of 
reason based on this floor, but the treasure house of faith itself.”376 The importance of sense 
experience for both faith and reason is present. However, the focus of the role of language 
lacks development. It almost appears in the above quote as though faith is dependent on 
sense perception, whereas later Hamann focuses on the faith element in making sense of 
that which is perceived.  
Although not fully formed – nor written for publication – even in the earliest stages 
of that which would serve as the catalyst of his authorship was present: empiricism, faith, 
and the inability of reason to attain true knowledge on its own. These early texts sowed the 
seeds of what would later come to fruition. 
                                                          
375 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 286. (N I 224:13-17), Bibilical Observations. “Dies ist einer von den 
unzähligen Wiedersprüchen, die wir in unserer Natur finden und deren Auflösung uns unmöglich ist. Die 
Vernunft ist geneigt, einem unbekannten Gott zu dienen, aber unendlich entfernt ihn zu kennen. Sie will ihn 
nicht kennen - - und was noch erstaunender - - wenn sie ihn erkennt, so hört sie ihn auf zu dienen.” 
376 N I 298:14-17, Brocken. “Und worauf gründet sich alle? Auf 5 Gerstenbrodte, auf 5 Sinne, die wir mit den 
unvernünftigen Thieren gemeinschaftlich besitzen. Nicht nur das ganze Waarhaus der Vernunft sondern 
selbst die Schatzkammer des Glaubens beruhen auf diesem Stock.” 
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Early Publications and Abstract Reason 
 
 The Socratic Memorabilia, published in 1759, was the first text of his authorship. 
Therein, Hamann’s critique was more tempered regarding Enlightenment reason than it 
would later become. He had the rudimentary ideas but had yet to follow them to their 
foregone conclusions. Reason was indeed aligned with a form of worldly wisdom 
demonstrated by the oft quoted “Perhaps is the whole of history more mythology than it 
was thought by this philosopher [Bolingbroke], and like nature is a sealed book, a hidden 
testimony, a puzzle that does not let itself be unraveled without plowing with another calf 
than our reason.”377  
He begins the Socratic Memorabilia by accusing Kant and Berens of idolatry; 
however, it is their service to the spirit of the times and not necessarily to their use of 
reason, for which they are accused of idolatry. Of course, one characteristic of the spirit of 
the times would become the utilization of abstract reason in a philosophically idolatrous 
manner. However, in the Socratic Memorabilia it remains under development. Idolatry is 
connected to the public and this public has a predilection toward applying reason 
abstractly. 
 Another example from his early works is found in the “Clouds” (Wolken), where he 
states, “Reason is holy, right, and good; but through it comes nothing other than the 
awareness [Erkenntnis] of an exceedingly sinful nescience, which, if it becomes epidemic, 
will enter the wisdom of the world (Weltweisheit), as one of its own prophets has said, the 
                                                          
377 N II 65:9-13, Socratic Memorabilia. “Doch vielleicht ist die ganze Historie mehr Mythologie, als es dieser 
Philosoph meynt, und gleich der Natur ein versiegelt Buch, ein verdecktes Zeugnis, ein Räthsel, das sich nicht 
auflösen läßt, ohne mit einem andern Kalbe, als unserer Vernunft zu pflügen.” 
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Methuselah among the beaux-esprits of this generation: Les sages d’une Nation sont fous de 
la folie commune.”378 In this passage it is clear that reason has not yet become the abstract 
reason or Enlightenment reason criticized in his later works but, it was nevertheless unable 
to bring about a true knowledge of things, in fact it brought about the opposite – reason 
establishes the limitations of human knowledge. Note his emphasis on the necessity of faith 
for philosophy from the very beginning, whether in the texts written around his conversion 
or in the very broad ideas presented in the Socratic Memorabilia. It is almost as if Hamann, 
at this early stage, had not yet realized how instrumental the role of language and faith 
were to the application of reason in philosophical thought. In the above quote, philosophy 
is disconnected from reason in the sense that it is not based solely on the use of reason to 
the detriment of other modes of thought (tradition, history, language). 
 Some of his early essays were printed in a collection entitled, Crusades of the 
Philologist (Kreuzzüge des Philologen), wherein there is a similar sentiment toward reason 
reflective of that described above. The target of his critique was the idolatrous philosophy 
of the philosophers of his day, as well as their respective individual misuses of reason. Also, 
his Political Arithmetic (Arithmétique politique) should be considered. Although it was not 
included in the Crusades of the Philologist, it belongs to this early period of his writings. In 
each of these texts there is considerable concern with the influence of French philosophy in 
Germany, with its perceived anti-Christian sentiments latent in the use of abstract reason. 
Reason was attached to a way of thinking, in this case the bon sens. In his essay, Chimerical 
Thoughts (Chimärische Einfälle), he speaks of how, if reason had “flesh and blood”, it would 
                                                          
378 N II 108:19-24, Brocken. “Die Vernunft ist heilig, recht und gut; durch sie kommt aber nichts als Erkenntnis 
der überaus sündigen Unwissenheit, die, wenn sie epidemisch wird, in die Rechte der Weltweisheit tritt, wie 
einer aus ihnen gesagt hat, ihr eigen Prophet, der Metthysalah unter den beaux-esprits dieses Geschlechts: Les 
sages d’une Nation sont fous de la folie commune.” 
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not neglect the passions.379 Crusades of the Philologist, which includes the influential essay 
Aesthetica in Nuce, focuses on the passions and the senses, “The senses and the passions 
speak and understand nothing but images. All the wealth of human knowledge and 
happiness consists in images. The first outburst of creation, and the first impression of its 
chronicler; - - the first manifestation and the first enjoyment of nature are united in the 
words: ‘Let there be light!’.”380 Philosophy had become “murderous” of nature by denying 
the senses their proper place in the respective philosophical endeavors, which aired on the 
side of abstraction. The remedy for these abstractions was, according to the Aesthetica, to 
give proper credence to the passions. “A philosopher such as Saul sets up monastic rules - - 
passion alone gives hands, feet, and wings to abstractions as well as to hypotheses; - to 
images and signs it gives spirit, life, and tongue.”381 This point would later be focused more 
specifically on reason. It certainly had to do with the abstraction of nature and that was 
related to reason, but reason was less of a target than the philosophers themselves. 
Additionally, the fragmentary nature of our knowledge is emphasized: everything from the 
title, a “Rhapsody in Cabbalistic Prose” to the idea of nature as the disjecti membra poetae, 
all pointed to his conviction that every “devotion to a system is a leaven for the pure, 
sincere truth.”382 This thought would later be attached directly to abstract, autonomous 
reason (i.e. Enlightenment reason). In support of his belief in the fragmentary nature of 
knowledge and the multifaceted nature of the human being – not to mention his humor – 
                                                          
379 N II 164:19. Chimerical Thoughts. 
380 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 63, 64. Aesthetica in Nuce. 
381 Hamann, 81. Aesthetica in Nuce. 
382 To Jacobi, 9th of April 1786. “Jede Anhänglichkeit eines Systems ist ein Sauerteig für die reine, lautere 
Wahrheit.” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 
(Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):284–85.  
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he wrote reviews of his own works by other pseudonymous authors.383 The use of 
pseudonyms in this way provides further justification for reading Hamann with the larger 
motive or idea of philosophical idolatry. Through the analysis of this common motif of 
philosophical idolatry, an underlying current present within the numerous pseudonymous 
texts can be achieved. 
 Interestingly, in these early writings all of the elements that form his critique of the 
superstition of his century were present: animosity towards system, emphasis on the 
passions, the priority of language, distaste for abstraction, etc. However, despite his 
energetic style and passionate rhetoric, he seemed to possess a greater hope for where 
philosophy could go. Keep in mind that Hamann’s authorship extended from the late 1750’s 
to the mid-1780s. Despite minor changes, though articulated in a more subdued manner in 
these early texts, they remain quite consistent but as they become more refined throughout 
the course of his life. 
The Middle Years: the Critique of the Idolatry of Reason Coming to Fruition 
 
In Nadler’s Edition of Hamann’s work, Volumes II and III contain the longer 
philosophical works by Hamann. Between Hamann’s publications in Volume II and those in 
Volume III there is a nine year gap. Hamann was active in the interim period, writing letters 
and articles in periodicals (e.g. Königsberger Gelehrte und Politische Zeitung). However, the 
Hamann who surfaced in his reviews and essays on Herder’s text, Treatise on the Origin of 
Language, is much more critical of abstract reason.384 These texts written in the middle of 
his authorship (beginning 1772), have a greater focus on Enlightenment reason as a cause 
                                                          
383 Dickson and Hamann, Johann Georg Hamann’s Relational Metacriticism, 163. 
384 For the English translation of Herder’s Treatise see, Herder, Philosophical Writings, 65–164. 
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of philosophical idolatry rather than his former focus on the misuse of reason by 
philosophers themselves. This is demonstrated in a quote from The Last Will and 
Testament of the Knight of the Rose Cross, “The confusion of language, by which however 
they seduce and are seduced [philosophers], is of course a very natural magic of automatic 
reason, to which it comes at little cost to be transformed into a star of the first magnitude, 
especially for the pranksters of like blindness.”385 In this above quote it is automatic reason 
causing the confusing of language, and thereby taking away from the healthy use of both 
language and reason. Published in 1773, a year after the Last Will and Testament, the New 
Apology of the Letter h contained very explicate language condemning abstract reason and 
the attempts to submit tradition and experience to it. He even declares the assertions of 
“universal, sound, and practiced reason” to be, in fact, “lies”.386 This type of language, 
despite all the signs that would lead to abstract reason being singled out, received no such 
explicit language in his early works (e.g. Crusades of the Philologist), thereby demonstrating 
the persistent evolution of his notion of the idol of abstract reason. 
Language plays a more significant role in his critique as time progressed. In the 
Aesthetica, the original sensations are referred to as being words, with an emphasis on the 
role of transmission in conveying truths and ideas. In fact, it is the early works that warrant 
grouping Hamann in the Sturm und Drang movement as well as a type of proto-Romantic.387 
In the middle of his authorship, language takes on the primary role in both attacking 
abstract reason and in tying together the various faculties of human knowledge.  
                                                          
385 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 106. Last Will and Testament of the Night of the Rose Cross. 
386 Hamann, 161. New Apology of the Letter h. 
387 Helmut Gipper and Peter Schmitter, Sprachwissenschaft und Sprachphilosophie im Zeitalter der Romantik: 
E. Beitr. zur Historiographie d. Linguistik, Tübinger Beiträge Zur Linguistik; 123 (Tübingen: Narr, 1979), 60–
76.; Jørgensen, “Hamanns Streitkultur.” 
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The contingency of reason is also overtly addressed. “The stamina and menstrua of 
our reason are thus in the truest understanding revelations and traditions.”388 Another 
instance where reason is further specified and critiqued in this period is located in, Beylage 
zun Denkwürdigkeiten des seligen Sokrates, published 1774, fifteen years after Socratic 
Memorabilia. Hamann speaks of the “Vanity of dogmatic and polemical reason that will 
shrug its shoulders in its moral sentimental blissfulness (Emfindseligkeit).389 Enlightenment 
reason is being singled out, not as a means to reveal sin or as misapplied by an arrogant 
philosophy, but as something detrimental and leading to idolatry.    
Another text of from this middle period, written in 1775, the Hierophantische Briefe, 
the connection of reason to idolatry is evident. “Wherein does idolatry exist, this cardinal 
vice of paganism? – with children in the lust for every forbidden fruit- with man hunters 
(Menschenjäger) of a philosophical-poetic imagination, in their systematic construction of a 
tower without a visible tip.”390 It is abstract reason that creates these systems and hence, 
not only leads to idolatry, but the dependency on abstract reason becomes a superstition. 
Here it has been shown that in the middle of Hamann’s authorship – the early to middle 
1770’s – there is a marked turn toward both an even greater and focused role of language 
in his philosophy and the problematic and even superstitious elements of abstract reason 
employed by his century. 
                                                          
388 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 116. N III 39:13-15, Philological Ideas and Doubts. “Die 
stamina und menstrual unsrer Vernunft sind daher im eigentlichten Verstande Offenbarungen und 
Ueberlieferungen.” 
389 N IIII 118:3-4, Beylage zun Denkwürdigkeiten des seligen Sokrates. “Eitelkeit dogmatischer und polemischer 
Vernunft und ihrer moralischen Emfindseligkeit die Achseln zucken wird.“ 
390 N III 158:8-12, Hierophantish Letters. “Worinn besteht endlich die Abgötterey, dies Hauptlaster des 
Heidentums? – Bey Kindern in der Lüsternheit nach jeder verbotenen Gartenfrucht – Bey Menschenjägern 
von philosophisch-poetischer Einbildungskraft, in dem systematischen Bau eines Thurms von unabsehbarer 
Spitze.” 
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The Idol of Abstract Reason Fully Developed 
 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason provided Hamann with the opportunity to speak on 
reason itself as Kant’s book was already addressing it specifically. Hamann received early 
proofs of the Critique of Pure Reason from his publisher in 1781.391 From that point on it 
would become the most serious piece of philosophical thought reflected on by Hamann. He 
would go on to reference it throughout his correspondence with Herder and Jacobi among 
others. Outside of his letters and their multiple references, Hamann wrote both a review as 
well as the Metacritique addressing the content of the Critique of Pure Reason.392 It is in this 
later period of Hamann’s authorship that the full development of his critique of the idol of 
abstract reason culminated. 
Bear in mind that he held a high degree of respect for Kant. Despite the directness of 
his critique, in other places Hamann demonstrates more reserved judgment. For instance, 
“He [Kant], as I assume, speaks more modestly without hypocrisy of revelation and seems 
to take it as part of his interest.”393 This is still far from giving his stamp of approval, but 
does show that he regarded Kant to be honestly pursuing knowledge and respected his 
abilities. He once humorously noted, “My poor head is a broken pot against Kant’s – clay 
                                                          
391 To I. F. Hartknoch, April 8, 1781. 
392 Since the focus here is on the evolution of Hamann’s view of abstract reason as idolatrous, the reader 
might consult the following for a more specific explication of the Metacritique. Cf. Oswald Bayer, Vernunft ist 
Sprache: Hamanns Metakritik Kants, ed. Benjamin Gleede and Ulrich Moustakas, Spekulation und Erfahrung, 
Bd. 50 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2002). 
393 To Jacobi, April 9, 1786. “Er [Kant], wie ich vermuthe, ohne Heuchelei von der Offenbarung bescheidener 
redet und selbige mit in sein Interesse zu ziehen scheint.” 
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against iron”.394 Hamann also had gratitude for Kant, particularly his kind treatment of 
Hamann’s son.395  
Despite his respect for Kant, reason crafted into an idol would come under direct 
scrutiny in his Metacritique. This work can be interpreted as nothing less than a complete 
dismantling of the idea of pure reason as the entity whereby thought is generated. Hamann 
attempted to reveal its idolatrous nature by demonstrating that pure reason cannot exist in 
the way Kant asserted that it did. In the Metacritque many of the themes that have been 
addressed in the course of this study are taken up. 
Hamann was aware that Kant sought to chart a course between Wolffian rationalism 
and Humian empiricism However, Kant remained within the Cartesian focus on the cogito, 
holding to the superiority of the interior to that of the exterior according to Hamann.396 
Consequently Kant’s philosophy fell into a similar position as that of Hamann’s other 
interlocutors. Hamann deemed that Kant was engaging in a philosophy that was arrogant, 
serving an idol of its own creation: pure reason.  
Hamann is concerned with Kant’s “pure reason”, but also with abstract reason in a 
broader sense. At the time of the writing of the Metacritque, Kant’s other critiques had yet 
to be published.397 Hamann does not make the Kantian differentiation between pure reason, 
                                                          
394 ZH V, 108. This translation was taken from, Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent, 154. 
395 ZH V, 432. To Herder, May 8, 1785. “Kant hat mich auch durch Erkenntlichkeit für meinen Sohn gefeßelt, 
um eben wie Sie jedes Misverhältnis zu vermeiden.” Also, To Jacobi, April 9, 1786. “Alle meine 
Verbindlichkeiten, die ich ihm schuldig bin, und daß Michael alle seine Collegia die Erlaubniß hat zu hören, 
soll mich nicht abhalten, so zu schreiben, als ich denke.” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des 
Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):285. 
396 Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann Philosophy and Faith, 138. 
397 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, 11. print, The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, general ed.: Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood[...] 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009). See also, Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in 
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practical reason, and judgment. Although working at times closely with the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Hamann’s critique was to be applied broadly to the Enlightenment use of reason as 
a whole. 
The Reoccurrence of the Importance of Faith and Sense Experience 
 
Among the hidden mysteries the problem of which (let alone the solution) 
has apparently not yet entered into a philosopher’s heart is the possibility of 
the human knowledge of objects of experience and after this without and 
before any experience and after this the possibility of a sensible intuition 
before any sensation of an object. The matter and form of a Transcendental 
Doctrine of Elements and Method is grounded on this double im-
possibility.398 
Hamann’s reoccurring critique of abstract reason being independent from experience is as 
clear as ever, he still sees a bifurcation of reason and experience in Kant. Reason remains 
abstract, disconnected from life – at least in Hamann’s conception of it. He speaks of 
something higher and self-evident that needs no concept in order to speak of reason as an 
“object or source of knowledge or even as kind of knowledge”, which is language with its 
empirical and subjective elements.399 In the Metacritique, Hamann goes on to present his 
three purifications of philosophy. These provide probably the clearest moment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, 1. paperback ed., 9. print, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, general ed.: Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood[...] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 133–272. 
398 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 206. N III, 283:18-23, “Zu den verborgenen Geheimnissen, 
derer Aufgabe geschweige ihre Auflösung noch in keines Philosophen Herz gekommen seyn soll, gehöret die 
Möglichkeit menschlicher Erkenntnis von Gegenständen der Erfahrung ohne und vor aller Erfahrung und 
hiernächst die Möglichkeit einer sinnlichen Anschauung vor aller Empfindung eines Gegenstandes. Auf dieser 
doppelten Un=Möglichkeit und dem mächtigen Unterschiede.” 
399 Hamann, 206, 207. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
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addressing his epoch’s false use of reason – demonstrating how it had been turned into an 
idol. 
The First Purification of Philosophy 
 
In the most recent translation of Hamann into English there is an error due to a 
faulty translation. It translates the word “philosophy” into “reason” in the beginning of 
Hamann’s purifications of philosophy. Although not entirely skewing the argument, the 
translation is incorrect and misleading in regards to the overall focus of the argument. It is 
philosophy which has sought to create and use reason in this abstract way. This shifts the 
focus on how philosophy (and philosophers) has utilized reason and not that reason itself 
is necessarily superstitious itself. One sees that it is philosophy that has created an idol out 
of the application of abstract reason and not, as the translation would suggest, the other 
way around. Hence, the following quote is the author’s own translation. 
“The first purification of philosophy consisted, namely, in the partly misunderstood, 
partly failed attempt to make reason independent from all transmission, tradition and 
faith.”400 This is the most concise of Hamann’s purifications and is not entirely conclusive in 
refuting the use of reason by his contemporaries.401 Yet this claim gains greater persuasive 
power with the additional purifications and serves as the foundation of his critique. The 
implication in the first purification, that reason is dependent on faith and on historical 
                                                          
400 The incorrect translation referenced above reads, “The first purification of reason consisted in the partly 
misunderstood, partly failed attempt to make reason independent of all tradition and custom and belief in 
them.” Hamann, 207. N III 284:7-9, Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. “Die erste Reinigung der Philosophie 
bestand nehmlich in dem theils misverstandenen, theils mislungenen Versuch, die Vernunft von aller 
Ueberlieferung, Tradition und Glauben daran unabhängig zu machen.”  
401 This points back to the beginning of his Metacritique, where Hamann draws attention to the fact that Hume 
was dependent on Berkley, and Kant on Hume. Therefore, Kant is engaging in a historical endeavor. It is not 
that reason was now finally being analyzed on its own. 
164 
 
contingency, reveals the essential elements of Hamann’s critique of philosophical idolatry. 
The attempt to separate reason from transmission (i.e. tradition) and history is 
misunderstood. Hamann spends much time demonstrating the essential nature of history 
when doing philosophy. All knowledge is historically contingent and any attempt to 
disregard this is bound to fail. In conjunction with Hamann’s broad notion of faith (as 
analyzed in Chapter II), any attempt to extrapolate reason from contingency was something 
he saw as futile and unachievable. The following purifications further show how the 
utilization of abstract reason by reason was untenable. 
The Second Purification of Philosophy 
 
The second [purification] is even more transcendent and comes to nothing 
less than independence from experience and its every day induction. After a 
search of two thousand years for who knows what beyond experience, 
reason not only suddenly despairs of the progressive course of its 
predecessors but also defiantly promises impatient contemporaries delivery, 
and this in a short time, of that general and infallible philosopher’s stone, 
indispensable for Catholicism and despotism. Religion will submit its sanctity 
to it right away, and law-giving its majesty, especially at the final close of a 
critical century when empiricism on both sides, struck blind, makes its own 
nakedness daily more suspect and ridiculous.402  
                                                          
402 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 207–8. N III, 284:10-21, Metacritique of the Purism of 
Reason. “Die zweite ist noch transcendenter, und läuft auf nichts weniger als eine Unabhängigkeit von der 
Erfahrung und ihrer alltäglichen Induction hinaus - Denn, nachdem die Vernunft über 2000 Jahre, man weiß 
nicht was? jenseits der Erfahrung gesucht, verzagt sie nicht nur auf einmahl an der progressiven Laufbahn 
ihrer Vorfahren, sondern verspricht auch mit eben so viel Trotz dem ungedultigen Zeitverwandten, und zwar 
in kurzer Zeit, jenen allgemeinen und zum Katholicismo und Despotismo nothwendigen und unfehlbaren 
Stein der Weisen, dem die Religion ihre Heiligkeit und die Gesetzgebung ihre Majestät flugs unterwerfen 
wird, besonders in der letzten Neige eines kritischen Jahrhunders, wo beyderseitiger Empirismus, mit 
Blindheit geschlagen, seine eigene Blöße von Tag zu Tag verdächtiger u. lächerlicher macht.” 
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A few important points that further his concept and critique of reason are found in the 
second purification of philosophy. Here one finds support for Hamann being against 
abstract reason, but not reason per se - he is against the construct of reason created by his 
contemporaries. His contemporaries not only neglected the limitations of reason, but 
sought to dispense with the history of philosophy and thought in favor of their own version 
of the “philosopher’s stone” (i.e. in this case, abstract reason). Hamann connects this to an 
attempt at an absolute philosophy cut off from history. Although the reference to the 
philosopher’s stone is bit a cryptic, it is nevertheless essential for the purification of 
philosophy. It relates to the first purification in recognizing the historical break sometimes 
interpreted by Enlightenment philosophy. This reference also highlights the perceived 
dogmatism of his contemporaries. Philosophy had turned its use of abstract reason into a 
philosopher’s stone of sorts. This could then be used to suppress and justify disparate 
claims and set up a totalizing system, which in Hamann’s thought is despotic. Therefore he 
equates this with Catholicism, which was seen by Hamann as despotic due to its 
systematization.403 
 It follows logically that once the root of the transmission of history through 
language is cut, empiricism is blinded; for without something beyond it to give orientation 
(i.e. language which is dependent on history) empiricism has no other means of providing 
understanding of the perceived world. This position reinforces the opinion that Hamann 
                                                          
403 The reference to religion and law-giving is referencing directly a footnote in Kant’s Critique. Cf. “Our age is, 
in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, 
and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just 
suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to 
sustain these tests of free and open examination.” Kant, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, A xi. 
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rejects all modern developments; here he indicates that philosophy is always developing. It 
is the break with the past that is detrimental.404  
The Third Purification of Philosophy 
 
The third, highest, and, as it were, empirical purism is therefore concerned 
with language, the only, first, and last organon and criterion of reason, with 
no credentials but tradition (Überlieferung) and usage. But it is almost the 
same with this idol as it was with the ideal of reason for that ancient 
[Simonides]. The longer one deliberates, the more deeply and inwardly one is 
struck dumb and loses all desire to speak. ‘Woe to the tyrants when God 
troubles himself about them! Why then do they seek after Him? Mene, mene, 
tekel to the sophists! Their small change will be found wanting and their 
banks (Wechselbank) broken!’405 
As might be expected, the quintessential purification of philosophy comes down to 
language, which ties together the first and second purifications of philosophy. Language 
comes through the senses and is, therefore, inherently empirical. The meaning of the 
linguistic content comes through historical transmission; and faith underlies the reception 
of language.406 Language is not the terminus, as indicated in the quote above. It is not as 
though if one recognizes reason as being dependent upon language that it would 
                                                          
404 This is more evidence against Isaiah Berlin’s conjectures that Hamann was reacting in a way that pushed 
aside modern developments in favor of a superstitious past. Also, this pushes back against Radical Orthodoxy 
using Hamann as an ally in their crusade against secularity (Betz, Milbank). This is not to say that Hamann did 
not have his reservations of what would later be secularity, but his solution was not bound to a harkening 
back to a former “Christian” society.  
405 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 208. N III, 284:23-32, Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
“Der dritte höchste und gleichsam empirische Purismus betrifft also noch die Sprache, das einzige erste und 
letzte Organon und Kriterion der Vernunft, ohne ein ander Creditiv als Ueberlieferung und Usum. Es geht 
aber einem auch beinah mit diesem Idol, wie jenem Alten, mit dem Ideal der Vernunft. Je länger man noch 
denkt, desto tiefer und inniger man verstummt und alle Lust zu reden verliert. ‚Weh den Tyrannen, wenn sich 
Gott um sie bekommern wird! wozu fragen sie also nach Ihm? Mene, mene, tekel den Sophisten! ihre 
Scheidemünze wird zu leicht gefunden und ihre Wechselbank zu brochen werden!!‘” 
406 Hamann’s ideas regarding this subject matter are covered in Chapter II.  
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immediately lead to a pure philosophy void of epistemological challenges. Hence, Hamann 
states that language is “the same with this idol [reason]”; that is, language itself can become 
an idol. This does not detract from his argument but further informs it. One cannot 
substitute a general idea or concept and expect it to suffice for navigating the intricacies of 
human life. Hence Hamann’s suggest that even language might become only a fabrication of 
the schools.407 Elevating language to the level that philosophy had elevated abstract reason 
would only be to create another idol. The comments pertaining to the potential of language 
to be employed in a similar fashion to that of abstract reason indicate Hamann’s attempt to 
guard against any form of philosophical idolatry. He does not want to swap one system or 
idol for another. 
 The address to the tyrants contained in this third purification relates to the despotic 
nature of the idol of reason. The “Mene mene tekel” suggests that the philosophy employed 
by his contemporaries has been weighed – presumably by these purifications – and has 
been found wanting. The “banks being broken” – most likely a reference to Jesus’ 
overturning the money changers’ tables at the temple – indicates the duplicitous manner in 
which his contemporaries were employing abstract reason.  
The comments on the dissolution of meaning due to intense deliberation 
correspond with the dependent nature of the faculties of knowledge. Since all thought is 
interdependent, one specific faculty of knowledge is insufficient – be it experience, 
language, or reason. The more one seeks to define one of these faculties, the less clear they 
become. This relates to Hamann’s technique of looking to the foundational principles of a 
                                                          
407 Language is indeed concrete as it is received in the senses. It nevertheless remained allusive to Hamann: 
he was carefree in his criticism of concepts but was still searching for a key “to the abyss” of language. ZH V, 
177. 
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given system – which must be believed – before grappling with the specific elements of an 
individual system (in this case, Kant’s). Following the three purifications in the 
Metacritique, Hamann goes on to deal more specifically with Kant’s pure. Hamann’s text 
shifts to a more specific critique of the Critique of Pure Reason and the ambiguities found 
therein.  
Foundational Disagreements and the Idol of Reason 
 
Hamann casts doubt on the foundational principles of Kant’s system of philosophy, 
expounding upon that which was suggested in the three purifications of philosophy. The 
approach employed parallels his critique of Mendelssohn’s concept of a “state of nature” in 
Golgotha and Schiblimini!408 Whether utilizing quotes from secondary sources or direct 
language Hamann sows the seed of doubt by pointing out potential contradictions and 
foundational faith-based elements.  
Within the Metacritique, there is the recurrent use of religious terminology in the 
context of addressing philosophical concepts, thus continuing to allude to the faith-based 
nature of reason. An example of this is his attempt to make some of Kant’s postulates 
preposterous by referencing the “hypostatic union” of common language and the 
“transubstantiation of subjective conditions.”409 This language would certainly not belong to 
a discussion on pure reason in Kant’s eyes – and “transubstantiation” in particular would 
not, as it would fall into some superstitious Roman Catholic doctrine. These references are 
not pointed out in order to demonstrate that the Kantian Critique was in some way 
                                                          
408 Both texts were developed out of an initial idea of critiquing Kant but later were split into two: one 
addressing Mendelssohn, the other Kant. Cf. Betz, After Enlightenment, 221.  
409 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 213. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
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fruitless, but to emphasize the manner in which Hamann viewed the philosophy of his age 
as engaging in philosophical idolatry. One way to do this was to amalgamate religious 
doctrinism with Enlightenment philosophy. 
The nature of language – its empirical, conceptual, and historical aspects – plays a 
significant role in casting doubt on Kant’s a priori assertions such as something = x 
(covered in the previous section on superstition)410 and the a priori nature of space and 
time. For Hamann, words are the true a priori. In both history and usage words acquire a 
meaning that cannot be simply derived by the understanding; words have a basis in sense 
perception, hence they are also a posteriori.411 Consequently, in Hamann’s view, the very 
foundations of Kant’s assertions are inaccurate. It is not space and time but words that are 
a priori.412 
A full discussion of how and to what degree Hamann understood Kant and what 
such a critique might mean would require a much more intense look at the Kantian project. 
However, this would only serve to distract from the overall argument contained in the 
present study. To reiterate, this has already been done by other scholars and would detract 
from serving the overall purpose of reading Hamann’s philosophy as a critique of the 
idolatry of his age.413   
Since the object of Kant’s critique was pure reason, it is not surprising to find 
Hamann’s clearest statements regarding how abstract reason was a creation by 
                                                          
410 On page 98 and 99. 
411 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 211. N III, 286:14, Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
412 Hamann, 211. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
413 Axel Weishoff, Wider den Purismus der Vernunft: J. G. Hamanns sakral-rhetorischer Ansatz zu einer 
Metakritik des Kantischen Kritizismus, Kulturwissenschaftliche Studien zur deutschen Literatur (Opladen: 
Westdt. Verl, 1998), 89–146. See also, Bayer, Vernunft ist Sprache. 
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Enlightenment philosophy in his critique of Kant. It was not only the misapplication of 
reason which led to the creation of the idol of a “state of nature”, the public, or orthographic 
reform, but was itself an object of adulation which, according to Hamann, was only the 
fabrication of his contemporaries. The idol of reason manifests itself when reason is 
interpreted as the faculty of thought. That reason governs humankind’s relation to the 
world, and furthermore, that reason can be addressed unrelated to the subject is where the 
idolatry begins.414 Hamann conjectures that abstract reason resembles Gnosticism in its 
hatred of matter.415 He holds this to be detrimental, in that instead of focusing on the 
subject, reason possesses, “an old, cold prejudice for mathematics” due to its, “universal 
and necessary reliability”.416 The futility of this attempt is brought forth by Hamann in the 
quote below: 
If then a chief question indeed still remains – how is the faculty of thought 
possible? the faculty to think right and left, before and without, with and 
beyond experience? – then no deduction is needed to demonstrate the 
genealogical priority of language, and its heraldry, over the seven holy 
functions of logical propositions and inferences. Not only is the entire faculty 
of thought founded on language…but language is also the counterpoint of 
reason’s misunderstanding with itself.417  
Hamann proceeds in his discussion of the a priori nature of language and the conception of 
knowledge being founded on both the sensibility and understanding. Pure reason had 
essentially cut off the sensibility by ignoring language. The idolatry was manifest in the 
                                                          
414 Hamann explicitly states that, “the synthesis of the predicate with the subject” is “the proper object of pure 
reason”. Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 209. 
415 Hamann, 209. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
416 Hamann, 210–11. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
417 Hamann, 211. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
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quest for universality. Pure reason ignores essential elements of human knowledge, and 
attempts to attain universal knowledge on its own by whatever means deemed necessary. 
It is this “pure reason, christened per antiphrasin, and its metaphysics which serve the 
prevailing indifferentism.”418 Pure reason is christened by antiphrasis – that is, it is the 
opposite of what it purports to be – insofar as it ignores the foundations upon which it rests 
and serves the ambitions of the age. According to Hamann, pure reason is not so much 
interested in attaining true knowledge, but is utilized by Enlightenment philosophers in 
service of the presuppositions of the age. Reason was the idol of the philosophy of the age 
of Enlightenment.  
One of the final remarks in the Metacritique points to Hamann’s resolution to the 
idolatry of philosophy. He states, “And what the transcendental philosophy metagrabolizes 
I have, for the sake of the weak readers, transferred in a figure to the sacrament of 
language, the letter of its elements, the spirit of its institution, and I leave it to each one to 
unclench the closed fist into an open palm.”419 Language – and all its theological, historical, 
and empirical elements – was that which his contemporaries overlooked in favor of 
systems and faiths [read. idols] of their own creation. In the end it was a disposition that 
could only be changed in the individual to decide to open the closed fist to receive 
Hamann’s insights.  
 
                                                          
418 Hamann, 211–12. Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. 
419 Hamann, 218. N III, 289:20-24, Metacritique of the Purism of Reason. “Was die Transcendentalphilosophie 
metagrabolosirt, habe ich um der schwachen Leser willen, auf das Sacrament der Sprache, den Buchstaben 
ihrer Elemente, den Geist ihrer Einsetzung gedeutet, und überlasse es einem jeden, die geballte Faust in eine 
flache Hand zu entfalten.” 
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Summary 
 
The intention of this chapter has been to demonstrate the specific idols of thought 
that had been constructed by Hamann’s contemporaries in their application of abstract 
reason. Furthermore, how abstract reason was used as a tool for the construction of 
philosophical idols was elucidated, as well as how it was later considered an idol in and of 
itself. The commonalities of these varying systems can be tied together by the notion of 
idolatry. These philosophical systems all aspired to some form of abstraction, not giving 
enough precedence to experience. They sought a totality of knowledge with no regard to 
contingency. Their own faith-based foundations were overlooked, causing them to fall into 
philosophical superstition. Above all, they proceeded with an unprecedented arrogance in 
regards to the veracity of their own endeavors. Hamann’s authorship was driven by what 
he determined were abuses of his age. His authorship was corrective to what he saw as an 
underlying superstition and adherence to the philosophical idols constructed thereof. It is 
the contention of the present study that reading Hamann in this way allows for a more 
complete and unified understanding of his authorship and its philosophical motivation. For 
all of Hamann’s corrective intentions there are positive elements to his thought that can be 
discerned concerning reason, language, and philosophy. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 After the devastating critique of the thought of his time, there are a few questions 
that are in need of being answered: can anything be positively constructed out of Hamann’s 
authorship, and if so, to what degree might it be employed when approaching philosophical 
questions? Furthermore, why and how Hamann’s thought avoids falling into his own 
critique of the superstition that leads to philosophical idolatry will be addressed.420 This 
chapter posits a manner in which to read Hamann constructively. This is to say that 
Hamann, at least in his own understanding, was able to come to terms with the tension 
presented by his own approach. Additionally, how his Christianity affected his thought and 
also how it avoided the idolatry of system will be discussed. 
Anyone seeking to sum up Hamann’s thought is caught in a bit of a quandary, 
specifically, how to adequately summarize the thought of a figure resisting the idea of that 
very possibility. Due to the diversity of subject matter and, at times, esoteric statements, it 
can be tempting to pull various quotes from Hamann’s authorship in order to place him 
into a clear category of thinker. Normally this has amounted to turning him into a good 
Lutheran or Pietist, pre-deconstructionist or theological conservative, mystic or 
philosopher of language, to name just a few categorizations.421 In one way or another, 
Hamann is all of these and none of them. Therefore, going forward it is not the desire of this 
study to present a version of Hamann competing against these other prescriptive 
                                                          
420 It has been implied, and is indeed present in some of the various quotes, that Hamann does not personally 
ascribe to pessimism or nihilism. In fact, he conjectures that something similar to nihilism is the final outcome 
of his contemporaries approach. E.g. When Hamann speaks of two dead halves when convictions are severed 
from actions. See, Golgotha and Sheblimini!. Hamann, 179.  
421 Karl Pruter, The Teachings of the Great Mystics (San Bernardino, Calif.: Borgo Pr., 1985), 79–83.; Henry 
Corbin, Hamann, Philosophe du Luthéranisme (Paris: Berg International, 1985). 
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conceptions of his thought. Here, the intention is to exhibit how Hamann’s thought - 
specifically his approach to knowledge - corrected the idolatry of abstract reason. The 
philosophical repercussions of Hamann’s critique of superstition and idolatry will be 
analyzed through the notion of a hermeneutics of humility.422 This term, however limited, 
helps express a Hamannian approach which takes faith and its relation to the 
interdependency of the faculties of knowledge, convivial reasoning, and the contingency of 
history into account.423  
Hermeneutics of Humility 
 
This study considers Hamann’s thought or approach a disposition.424 This word fits 
Hamann well as he did not wish to establish a school or a philosophy that potential 
followers might attempt to further (e.g. Wolffian Rationalism, Kantian Transcendental 
                                                          
422 The connection to humility and hermeneutics in Hamann has received some comment in the past. 
Heinzpeter Hempelmann pointed out that humility (Demut) was the foundational principal for Hamann’s 
Hermeneutics. Heinzpeter Hempelmann, Gott, ein Schriftsteller! Johann Georg Hamann über die End-Äusserung 
Gottes ins Wort der Heiligen Schrift und ihre hermeneutischen Konsequenzen, Monographien und 
Studienbücher (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 1988), 24. However, Hempelmann is focused on explicating the 
idea of the condescension of God and its consequences for hermeneutics. He does not specifically address 
further a Hamannian approach or what the tenets of such an approach might be. Often humility is not 
connected directly to hermeneutics as it is influenced by Hamann’s idea of the condescension of God. E.g. H. A. 
Salmony, Johann Georg Hamanns metakritische Philosophie 1. Bd.: Einführung in die metakritische Philosophie J. 
G. Hamanns (Freiburg, 1958), 188. While the idea of God humbling himself is undoubtedly important for 
Hamann’s approach, it does not contain the entirety of Hamann’s philosophical ideas. In fact, due to the clarity 
of the Biblical Observations, it can be tempting to focus entirely on them. However, it will be argued here that 
specific elements of a Hamannian hermeneutics can be delineated. In the present study this insight fall under 
the hermeneutics of humility. 
423 Ulrich Moustakas works in hermeneutics and theology within Hamann in his, Urkunde und Experiment. 
However, the subject matter differs significantly from the present idea of the hermeneutics of humility in 
important respects. Firstly, Moustakas’ focus is reconciling Hamann within the field of theological 
hermeneutics, specifically the relationship between the natural sciences and theology. Secondly, the 
hermeneutics therein relate to Hamann’s theology of creation and connecting it to the natural sciences. Here 
the idea of the condescension of God in creation informs the hermeneutical approach set forth. 
Condescension having informed Hamann’s approach, the specific theological idea presented by Moustakas is 
not Hamann’s hermeneutical approach, but how Hamann’s thought applies to theology and the natural 
sciences. Cf. Ulrich Moustakas, Urkunde und Experiment: neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft im Horizont einer 
hermeneutischen Thelogie der Schöpfung bei Johann Georg Hamann, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Bd. 
114 (Berlin ; New York: W. de Gruyter, 2003), 285. 
424 The German equivalent would be “Gesinnung” or “Grundeinstellung”.  
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idealism). In fact, Hamann actively took steps to evade being pinned down by anyone for 
theological or philosophical purposes. Yet by writing to reprove his century, an implicit 
approach or counterpoint cannot be averted. Hamann utilized a myriad of methods 
entrenched in pseudonyms and intertextuality while retaining his unique voice. He had a 
particular disposition for approaching matters of philosophy. By observing the key 
elements of this disposition one might extrapolate an approach inherent therein.  
It is important to note that for Hamann human knowledge, philosophical or 
otherwise, begins with the subject: all experience must be interpreted. As such, knowledge 
about the world is always a way of reading the world. This helps justify speaking of a 
hermeneutical element to philosophical knowledge and reasoning.   
By focusing on the faith-based foundations of the principles of his contemporaries, 
he drew attention to the subjective nature of knowledge. This furthered the interpretive 
aspect of the subjects' understanding of the world. Faith is inherently subjective. The object 
of faith can be mutual, yet faith itself comes down to the subject. Therefore, if his 
contemporaries were dependent upon faith in their principles and systems, there was no 
purely objective philosophical knowledge that could be derived solely by abstract reason.  
On some occasions Hamann reveals the dilemma presented by his own insights and 
his focus on language. For example, "Reason is language, λόγος; on this marrowbone I gnaw 
and will gnaw myself to death. For me there still remains a darkness over this depth: I am 
still waiting on an apocalyptic angel with a key to this abyss.”425 Elsewhere, “Here [in 
                                                          
425 ZH V, 177, To Herder, August 6, 1784, “Vernunft ist Sprache λόγος; an diesem Markknochen nag’ ich und 
werde mich zu Tod drüber nagen. Noch bleibt es immer finster über diese Tiefe für mich: Ich warte noch 
immer auf einen apokalypitschen Engel mit einem Schlüßel zu diesem Abgrund.” 
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language] lies pure reason and at the same time its critique – and the eternal disputes over 
its boundaries will remain until language stops with prophecies and the recognition of 
truth.”426 Again, nothing is finalized in regards to the boundary of reason and language. 
Presumably this dispute will continue until there would be no more language or reason as 
Hamann held that language implies a prophetic, eschatological element.427  
 Also present in his critique was that merely recognizing the faith-based elements of 
all of thought does not solve the problem of the subject's knowledge of the world: it only 
puts one on the right track. Ordering experience is done by the understanding, by 
reasoning, however, this is not the concept of abstract reason advanced by his 
contemporaries. In contrast to his contemporaries, Hamann embraced the idea that reason 
is something done by individuals in relation to other entities (internal and external). 
Hamann speaks of his own reason and that of other individuals. For instance, in his Biblical 
Observations during a discussion regarding the condescension of God he stated, “Each had 
understood his own language (Sprache) and no one that of the other. Descartes had his 
reason, Leibniz his, Newton his...“428 Hamann closely connected language to reason and the 
individual’s subjective role in utilizing language. This indicates that he held that reasoning 
is an activity of the individual. Despite the emphasis on interpretation and subjectivity, this 
did not lead Hamann to purport a radical relativity, which he circumvents through 
                                                          
426 ZH V, 360. To Scheffner, February 11, 1785. “Hier liegt reine Vernunft und zugleich ihre Kritik – und die 
ewigen Grenzstreitigkeiten werden so lange währen, bis die Sprache aufhört mit Weissagungen und 
Erkenntniß.” 
427 This is another reason why atheistic claims to truth or morality are religious in Hamann’s view. As all 
language touches upon that which is beyond the spirit of observation or abstract reason there is no getting 
outside the mythical in terms of explaining human existence.    
428 Hamann, Londoner Schriften, 89. “Jeder hat seine Sprache verstanden und keiner des andern, Cartes hat 
seine Vernunft, Leibniz seine, Newton seine, eigene verstanden, verstehen sie sich daher besser 
untereinander selbst.” 
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language. Individuals reason with language, and it transcends the mere subjective elements 
of the individual. Additionally, sense experience was revelation that – although needing 
interpretation – was real. It was not the self creating the world or the self ordering the 
world, but rather it was the self working to read the language given in the senses.  
These insights lead to the question: how does one go about acquiring knowledge 
and communicating with others? The fact that Hamann wrote and engaged with his 
contemporaries reveals that he ascribed to a form of reasoning and communication capable 
of developing and coming to conclusions. The human capacity of reasoning and knowing 
bases itself on contingency and the interdependency of the faculties of knowledge. 
However, this does not leave the subject to grapple with the world without the aid of 
rationality. The point is that one's reason is neither independent nor a priori, according to 
Hamann.  
In a letter to Wizenmann Hamann wrote, “By the tree of knowledge we are robbed 
of the fruit of life.”429 Hamann advocated life over knowledge. This did not mean that he 
wanted philosophy to cease in its attempts to better understand and clarify the world. Yet 
Hamann insisted that the why and how one went about understanding the world were of 
equal importance. Additionally, the limits of the endeavors of philosophy should 
continually be kept in mind according to Hamann. In the last statement of the Metacritique 
he leaves it up to the reader to unclench the fist to the open palm. This image relates 
directly to how he thought philosophy should be done. One must come to reality with a 
disposition of humility, not seeking to control but seeking to understand that which is 
                                                          
429 ZH VI, 492. To Thomas Wizenmann, July 22, 1786. “Durch den Baum der Erkenntnis, werden wir der 
Frucht des Lebens beraubt.” 
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received in sense experience. This is exemplified in his statement, “Not cogito, ergo sum 
instead the reverse or yet more Hebraic, est, ergo cogito, and with the inversion of such a 
simple principle the entire system takes on another language and direction.”430 Knowledge 
does not start with the “Me” of the cogito but with the “You” of revelation.  
Coupled with the hermeneutical element is the aspect humility. The germ of 
arrogance was present in the superstition and idolatry of the philosophy of his time, and 
hence permeated the systems constructed by abstract reason. In the same letter to 
Wizenmann quoted above, Hamann juxtaposes the tree of knowledge with the arrogance of 
philosophy, providing a vivid example of Hamann’s prioritization of humility. In reference 
to John 3:27, he writes, “A man can receive nothing, except it be given him” (KJV), then 
adding, “and to whom He gives it has it at no cost (umsonst)” and that which is given cannot 
be “procured” by “Papismus philosophicus” (philosophical Popery).431 It is important to 
observe that philosophy seeks to procure that which is given. Since this procurement was 
directly connected to philosophical Popery, Hamann viewed the attempt to control and 
posses as arrogance, which he saw the doctrines of Catholicism doing. Moreover, later in 
the letter he states that, “The arts of school [a reference to philosophical schools] and the 
world intoxicate and puff up more than they are in a position to quench our thirst and 
satisfy our hunger.”432 A plethora of other examples could be given to support the notion 
that humility was a quintessential element to Hamann’s approach. Hamann deemed it vital 
                                                          
430 To Jacobi, June 2, 1785. “Nicht Cogito, ergo sum, sondern umgekehrt oder noch Hebräischer Est, ergo 
cogito, und mit der Inversion eines so einfachen Principii bekommt vielleicht das ganze System eine andere 
Sprache und Richtung.”Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und 
Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):81. 
431 Z VI, 492. “Ein Mensch kann nichts nehmen, es werde ihm den gegeben – und wem Ers giebt, der hats 
umsonst Es mag niemand ererben...noch erwerben/Papismus philosophicus.” 
432 Z VI, 492. “Die Künste der Schule und der Welt berauschen u. blähen mehr, als daß sie im Stande sind 
unsern Durst zu löschen und Hunger zu stillen.” 
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that one's fundamental attitude, when reading the world, be one of humility. Therefore the 
term hermeneutics of humility expresses well what a Hamannian approach to philosophy 
would look like. The elements making up this approach will be addressed in what follows. 
Hermeneutics of Humility: Interdependency 
 
Interdependency is a term that was not specifically employed by Hamann, but he 
does make statements that support the use of this term (e.g. “Reason and language are 
therefore the inner and outer band of all social life” and, “Faith is in need of reason as much 
as the latter of the former.”).433 The idea of the interdependency of the faculties of 
knowledge helps tie together how he addressed multiple philosophical concepts and 
language. For instance, despite Hamann’s harsh criticism of abstract reason, his authorship 
is interspersed with positive and constructive references to reason. Concurrently, although 
language is employed as the crux of his critique, it is at times disparaged as being 
susceptible to becoming simply another idol upon which to build one’s philosophy. Before 
long, language might become nothing more than another abstract construct whereupon 
philosophy could find a basis for another idol. The term interdependency explains how the 
faculties of knowledge are mutually dependent upon one another for any sort of meaning 
to be constructed.434 Hamann refrains from giving a definitive list of the faculties of 
knowledge, but he does give some clear statements regarding what one might regard as a 
faculty of knowledge. Predominately, interdependency of the faculties of knowledge 
appears in his correspondence with Jacobi. However, aspects of interdependency are 
present throughout his criticism – particularly when he speaks of dividing sense 
                                                          
433 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 175. Golgotha and Sheblimini!.  
434 ZH VII, 174. To Jacobi, April 30, 1787. 
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perception, or when he refers to reason as severing that which naturally grows together. 
The analogy suggests that they can be differentiated, that they are interdependent, 
organically growing together. To isolate one faculty is to take life out of the living organism 
or reasoning. 
When speaking of the role of reason in human cognition he speaks of the “powers of 
cognition”.435 Faith, sense-perception, and reason all appear prominently. The following 
quote has been utilized earlier but effectively proves the point here being made. “Sensation 
can be as easily separated from human nature as reason, or reason separated from the 
senses [Sinnlichkeit]…Knowledge from faith is essentially identical with the nil in 
intellectu.”436 By working together - acknowledging and applying the powers of cognition – 
one can come to a better understanding of the world. Hence, experience and faith might be 
the eyes of reason, yet reason is still essential for one’s ability to make sense of the world. 
“Faith necessarily needs reason as much as it needs the faith…” he continues by noting that 
unity should be at the basis of all our concepts.437 This is where the term interdependency 
becomes constructive for understanding Hamann’s thought: faith and reason working 
together. However chaotic Hamann’s texts might be, he sought a unity nevertheless. This 
study has elucidated an aspect of this unity, namely, his critique of idolatry and 
                                                          
435 N III, 191. 
436 ZH VII, 165-166, To Jacobi April 27, 1787. “Empfindung kann in der menschl. Natur eben so wenig von 
Vernunft, als diese von der Sinnlichkeit geschieden werden...Erkenntnis aus dem Glauben ist im Grunde 
identisch mit dem: Nil in intellectu.” 
437 ZH VII, 165. To Jacobi, April 27, 1784. “Glaube hat Vernunft eben so nöthig: als diese jenen hat.” 
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superstition. This involved pointing out the disunity in the systems of his 
contemporaries.438   
 Hamann’s critique was informed by the interdependency of reason and faith. “Being, 
faith, reason are, accordingly, relationships that do not let themselves be treated 
absolutely, are not things but pure concepts of the schools, symbols to understand not 
admire, to aid in awakening our attention, not to fetter it.”439 The faculties or powers of 
cognition cannot be absolutely defined in a philosophical sense. They are not things but 
faculties of the mind, that is, the mind of an individual subject – not an abstract, theoretical 
“mind”. The faculties of knowledge are made unquantifiable and indefinable by their 
subjectivity, e.g. Hamann’s reason, Mendelssohn’s reason, or Kant’s reason; it is not a 
universal, abstract reason. This position adds greater clarity to Hamann's manner of 
critique. He does not believe that one can come with objective, outside, universal 
arguments. Because of this he attacks the lack of unity in the respective author's 
philosophy; his is an internal rather than external critique. He critiqued the foundational 
principles and verisimilitude of the respective system. This method would, theoretically, 
spur his respective interlocutor on to correcting the imbalances in thought. 
Hermeneutics of Humility: Conviviality of Reason (Geselligkeit der Vernunft) 
 
 Although the powers of cognition have a certain harmony in the conception above 
(i.e. interdependency), they remain inherently subject to contingencies which inform their 
                                                          
438 Hamann saw his own thought, as chaotic as it might first appear, having a unity all it own. He asserts that 
his “mimic style” is ruled by “a stricter logic and are more closely glued together (geleimtere Verbindung) than 
in the concepts of livelier heads.” ZH I, 378. To Kant, July 27, 1759. 
439 ZH VII, 173. To Jacobi, April 29, 1787. “Seyn, Glaube Vernunft sind lauter Verhältniße, die sich nicht 
absoluten behadeln laße, sind keine Dinge sondern reine Schulbegriffe, Zeichen zum Verstehen, nicht 
Bewundern, Hülfsmittel unsere Aufmerksamkeit zu erwecken, nicht to feßeln.” 
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interdependency. New perceptions and experiences (i.e. revelations) are continually being 
received, and therefore there can be nothing which remains static in thought and in life. 
Faith and reason are relationships; as such, they cannot be simply defined or properly 
balanced to arrive at an absolute approach. Every person works within their own 
subjectivity - this is to say that there is no reason outside of the subject reasoning. 
However, one does not live isolated from history or other individuals, who are themselves 
also employing their own reason to better understand the world, not to mention the fast 
history informing the language one utilizes to reason. Hamann resolved the organic 
interdependency and contingent element of thought through conviviality. In the following 
quote many things come together which are present throughout his authorship with a 
clarity rarely found:  
Sense perception and knowledge from reason (Vernufterkenntniß) are both 
based on the relations of things, their qualities with the instruments of 
receptivity as the relations of our conceptions (Vorstellungen). It is pure 
idealism to segregate belief and sensation (Empfinden) from thinking. 
Conviviality (Geselligkeit) is the true principle of reason and language, 
through which our sensations and conceptions are modified. This and that 
philosophy segregate things that can in no way be separated. Things without 
relationships, relationships without things...Since each works on the analysis 
of the concepts of others and the synthesis of his own concepts, no constancy 
is possible from either side, but rather an eternal turning and an unavoidable 
change.440 
                                                          
440 ZH VII, 174. To Jacobi, 30th of April, 1787. "Das wirkliche Dasein ist nichts (p.575) als ein ens rationis. 
Empfindung und Vernunfterkenntniß beruhen beiderseits auf Verhältnissen der Dinge, ihrer Eigenschaften 
mit den Werkzeugen unserer Empfänglichkeit, wie auf den Verhältnissen unserer Vorstellungen. Es ist reiner 
Idealismus, Glauben und Empfinden vom Denken abzusondern. Geselligkeit ist das wahre Princip der 
Vernunft und Sprache, durch welche unsere Empfindungen und Vorstellungen modificiert werden. Diese und 
jene Philosophie sondert immer Dinge ab, die gar nicht geschieden werden können. Dinge ohne Verhältnisse, 
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Although reason is derived from language, it does not automatically order sense 
perceptions accurately, as indicated earlier, it can mislead. Here Geselligkeit is the solution 
to understanding how the powers of cognition relate to one another, and how interactions 
take place on the societal level. Geselligkeit is a rather peculiar word to use when speaking 
about the use of reason and language. This word was once misleadingly translated by 
Ronald Gregor Smith as “community”.441 More accurately it should be rendered conviviality, 
which is much closer to the German original. Conviviality as a principle relates more to the 
disposition of the subject than a scheme of how to relate language and reason to each other. 
Hamann's use of the term conviviality points to a number of important aspects in his 
thought: the social element of knowledge, the contingent (and therefore non-absolute state 
of philosophical ideas), and the focus on life over knowledge. 
Conviviality brings together elements of primary importance to Hamann. It is 
important to note that he does not advocate mere consensus building as means of 
validating opinions that might then be deemed to be derived from “reason”. Rather this 
must be understood as building upon the already established subjective element of 
reason.442 The later section of the quote above supports this idea. One must be convivial 
when reasoning. The subject is always working, “on the analysis of the concepts of others 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Verhältnisse ohne Dinge.... Da jeder an der Analysis des andern und an der Synthesis seiner eigenen Begriffe 
arbeitet, so ist keine Stetigkeit möglich von beiden Seiten, sondern ein ewiges Drehen und ein 
unvermeidlicher Wechsel." 
441 Smith, J. G. Hamann 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Existence, 257. 
442 Cf. It has been well established that Hamann did not find the conception of reason outside of lived 
experience possible. One can reason (i.e. use the intellect to order sense perceptions), but this does not 
correspond to an absolute or abstract reason. 
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and the synthesis of his own”. This is done through being social, from engaging and 
working with others to modify one’s conceptions but not to build consensus.443   
Conviviality of Reason in Golgotha and Sheblimini! 
 
Language has a fundamentally relational and social element as one's reasoning is 
continually working with the ideas of others. This insight is addressed broadly in Golgotha 
and Sheblimini! His critique of Mendelssohn's philosophical approach, in part, was its lack 
of accommodating dependency. Mendelssohn neglected to address dependency, not only 
on history and language, but one's dependency on others according to Hamann. “Should 
everyone intend to set up his unphilosophical Me as the royal umpire in cases of collision, 
neither a state of nature nor a state of society is possible.”444 In order to fruitfully interact 
with one another there needs to be conviviality. Society is built upon the ability of language 
to express the inner convictions of the person. “The moral capacity to say Yes! or No! is 
based on the natural use of human reason and speech.”445 In the same section Hamann 
speaks of language and reason as the inner and outer band of all social life and that this 
should bring about an attitude of conviviality. In doing so, it negates the philosophical spirit 
purported by Mendelssohn’s state of nature that amounted to each having the right of a 
"Nimrod, to call out in the state of nature with the force of a horned brow, 'To Me, and to 
Me alone, appertains the right to decide whether, for whose benefit, when, and under what 
conditions I am obliged to exercise beneficence'."446 This is in stark contrast to Hamann's 
                                                          
443 The idea of convivial reason aids in differentiating Hamann’s thought from Jacobi, namely, how he avoided 
the fideism of Jacobi. 
444 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 175. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
445 Hamann, 175. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
446 Hamann, 174. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
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counter proposal, "let us rejoice over the We of God's Grace".447 Although the individual 
subjectively utilizes reason, there is always a relational element. Mendelssohn’s use of 
reason was the opposite of Hamann’s relational understanding of reason. Mendelssohn's 
conception of reason led to the individual becoming a Nimrod in the state of nature.448 
Hamann goes on to juxtapose this with a more humble position.  
Golgotha and Sheblimini! is a superb text to display the convivial (gesellig) approach 
of Hamann. The text is confrontational and borderline defamatory, but written to a friend 
for the purpose of confronting philosophical issues in which they greatly differ. Hamann 
frequently emphasizes interpersonal interaction and the continuous unfolding of 
experience. Although he speaks of conviviality as a principle modifying our sense-
experience and conceptions, he does not suggest finding the proper balance of the powers 
of cognition but rather healthy interaction, resulting in a continuum. Everyone brings more 
to the table; hence, his interaction with, and appreciation for, those with an entirely 
different opinion. All of these revelations and interactions lead to an ever developing 
opinions and ideas - there is no definitive philosophical system. This leads to the next 
point: the contingent and therefore non-absolute nature of knowledge. 
 
                                                          
447 Hamann, 175. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. 
448 Hamann attached the idea of the tower of Babel to Nimrod. This also points towards idolatry as it 
represented the arrogant desire of man to reach God. In fact, the use of Nimrod is not arbitrary in the least. 
Later in the text Hamann connects Mendelssohn's idea of Jerusalem to a modern Babel. “Meanwhile the ephah 
of theory in the land of Shinar is lifted up between heaven and earth, and Jerusalem shall no more be 
inhabited in her own place, even in Jerusalem, but shall come to be under the meridian of Babel. –” Hamann, 
178, 179. Golgotha and Sheblimini!. This point continues to support the idea of abstract reason being a tool 
used by the Enlightenment to uphold its own type of despotism and absolute hold on knowledge. Anytime an 
absolute position such as this was postulated, Hamann viewed it as idolatrous. 
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Hermeneutics of Humility: Contingency 
 
The notion of contingency plays an important role in Hamann’s thought and 
underlies his conjectures of the non-absolute nature of human knowledge and the concrete 
nature of existence. Knowledge - most importantly that derived through philosophical 
reason - is contingently conditioned by history, experience, and above all, language. 
Language is first apprehended in the senses and transmitted in history. Philosophical 
knowledge is constructed on the contingent and therefore on the concrete - the tangible - 
insofar as it is founded upon language. The contingent element of all thought and 
philosophy are not absolute - recall the idolization of abstract systems being referred to as 
creations and fabrications of human art. Accordingly, the knowledge of philosophy is 
impermanent due to the perpetual influx of experiences and interactions. Consider again 
his statement, "There are no absolute creations, and just as little absolute certainty… Since 
each works on the analysis of the concepts of others and the synthesis of his own concepts, 
no constancy is possible from either side, but rather an eternal turning and an unavoidable 
change."449 One might speak of the verisimilitude within a philosophical system; however, it 
will always remain a tentative relation to the outside world due to its contingency. 
Therefore, greater verisimilitude should be attempted, with the caveat that it is not 
absolute. Not to attempt this would be to disregard the philosophical enterprise. It must be 
understood that one does not achieve philosophical access to truth with a capital "T", so to 
speak. The idea of the concrete allows him to retain elements of the Christian faith of which 
he can be certain of, at least on the subjective level.  
                                                          
449 ZH VII, 174. To Jacobi, 30th of April, 1787. “Es giebt keine absoluten Geschöpfe, und eben so wenig 
absolute Gewißheit.” 
187 
 
In Hamann's critique of Mendelssohn he does not quarrel with their differing 
philosophical principles when addressing the difference between Judaism and Christianity. 
For Hamann it comes down to historical revelation passed down and recorded in history; 
the knowledge thereof being historically and linguistically contingent, yet real. He 
considers, in agreement with Hume, that it is something of a continuous miracle which 
must take place for contingent truths to be accepted. Indeed, it is due to his ideas of the 
contingency of all knowledge that he is able to hold as tightly as he does to this claim.  
Hermeneutics of Humility Summarized 
 
Interdependency of the faculties of knowledge, a convivial understanding of reason, 
and the contingency of knowledge are the building blocks of the hermeneutics of humility. 
Each of these building blocks resists the compulsion to create a philosophical system that 
might abstract or claim absolute metaphysical certainty. As such, Hamann avoids the 
superstition and idolatry that he so avidly assailed.  
His contemporaries were idolatrous due to their faulty faith in arbitrary principles 
that were supposed to lead to knowledge that was universal. The result of this faulty (i.e. 
superstitious) faith was a philosophical idol; which could manifest itself as a system or an 
underlying prejudice of what might be considered legitimate knowledge. Hamann's notion 
and application of faith is located in the subject seeking to interpret his or her world and is 
always unfolding: he provides no coinciding system. In fact, there is no possible system that 
one might derive from a hermeneutics of humility, at least in a universal sense. It leaves 
room for new revelations as reading and reasoning in the world is done by individuals 
interacting with other individuals in history. This might at first seem to decentralize 
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institutions and society by promoting the dissolution of the social into the purely 
individual. Yet this is not the case. This approach emphasizes the individual's dependence 
upon language, history, and one's neighbor. For the above reasons Hamann was able to 
avoid the philosophical idolatry of which he condemned his century.  
Hamann's Christianity in Relation to the Critique of Superstition 
 
To what degree do Christian truth claims differ from the idolatry and superstition of 
his contemporaries? Answering this question is critical to perceiving Hamann’s 
understanding of the Christian faith and how it avoids the pitfalls of superstitious faith. 
Christian truth claims are historically contingent. Christianity (as well as other 
concrete faiths for that matter) is precluded from the same critique he launched against his 
age due to its concrete nature. To illustrate this point, one can look to the resurrection. 
Because of the nature of how the resurrection is communicated there can be no 
philosophical proof, either positively or negatively, of its veracity for Hamann. Another 
example can be found in Hamann's defense of Rabbinical thought. He defended Rabbinical 
thought against Mendelssohn’s abstractions. Hamann argued that Mendelssohn sought to 
take Judaism out of history by seeking to show that it was merely a religious precursor to 
moral truths that would later be confirmed through philosophical reason. This would 
essentially do away with Judaism itself, according to Hamann. For Hamann, these 
revelations cannot be equated with the theological theorizing of the subject. Theology and 
philosophy were guilty of superstition when believing in the truth of their own abstract 
systems created by reason. The systems of abstract reason usurped the fluidity of thought 
and contingency of experience. Christianity was an experience based on revelation coming 
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in language through history, not an abstract system of beliefs. The faith in contingently 
revealed truth avoided the abstract claims, and therefore idolatry, of Enlightenment 
philosophy. 
The contingency of thought justified his personal Christian experience. Contingent 
revelation avoided the definitive and purely abstract systemization that leads to idolatry. 
Hamann justified his Christian faith for himself and sought to demonstrate its veracity to 
others. But he does not lay claim to an absolute way of thinking available to the subject 
apart from faith in special revelation that can neither be conveyed nor proven outside of 
experience. In this sense, Hamann’s Christian faith has a personal claim to truth, indeed, as 
it informs his life and thought but does not claim universality outside of subjective 
experience. Contingent faith lays no totalitarian claim to knowledge. Hamann’s views were 
formed by elements of his faith and written in the Christian idiom. With the nature of his 
highly inter-textual criticism, language holds philosophical content only insofar as it 
reveals deficiencies or juxtaposes the belief of philosophy in abstract reason. One might say 
that Hamann had come to terms with (resolved) Christianity in his life and sought to share 
it with - but not impose it upon - others. 
In short, to answer the question as to why Hamann’s Christian faith avoided 
superstition - it is because of its concrete nature. It is something which is transmitted in the 
Scriptures and is experienced by the individual. This type of faith is uninterested in 
absolute claims concerning the world outside of its personal meaning for the individual. 
They are individually absolute, yet leave each to judge the veracity of a claim. It is 
individually absolute and metaphysically non-absolute simultaneously.  
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Hamann’s Final Attempt at a Philosophical Approach 
 
Hamann’s occasional writing bespeaks his ideas of the continual changing of 
conceptions through the “analysis of other people’s ideas” and our own, as well as the 
concrete nature of existence. The term occasional is used here to point out that Hamann 
wrote to address specific people, situations, and philosophical writings. 450  The 
interpersonal, concrete, and non-abstract were earmarks of his authorship. He is not 
interested in constructing his own system; to the contrary, he is interested in interaction 
with the ideas of others. To advocate something of his own, in the sense of system, would 
be to fall into the trap of philosophical idolatry. In his Disrobing and Transfiguration, 
Hamann revealed his desire to be understood. He did not want only to be shrouded in 
idiosyncrasy. In this work he attempted to clarify, to a degree, his authorship.  
His contemporaries sought to come to absolute ideas about reality – most often by 
the use of abstract reason – in so doing they created their own totalizing systems which 
were nothing more than an idol. In contrast, Hamann sketched an approach relying much 
more on both history and eschatology in what he calls the spirit of observation and the 
spirit of prophecy.  
His text, Disrobing and Transfiguration, carries the subtitle: A Flying Letter to 
Nobody the Well Known. This reflects a direct relation to the work commencing his 
authorship, the Socratic Memorabilia, which carried a double dedication: to Nobody and to 
Two. Disrobing and Transfiguration was the last text he was working on before his death. 
                                                          
450 ZH V, 358. Letter to Scheffner 11 Feb. 1785 “Es ist für mich wirklich eine herkulische Arbeit gewesen, was 
ich von 59 bis 83 [1759-1783] geschrieben, durchzugehen, weil sich Alles auf die wirklichen Lagen meines 
Lebens bezieht. 
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The title indicates that he considered it and the Socratic Memorabilia as bookends of his 
authorship as they are both dedicated to "nobody", i.e. the ambiguous public.451 When 
speaking of his own authorship Hamann notes the difficulty of his language, that is, the 
clothing of his thought. He announces his desire to disrobe, indicating that he wants to 
express his thoughts with greater clarity than heretofore. Additionally, he wanted to sum 
up the main tenets of his authorship, but he thinks it doubtful that this will make his 
thought endearing to the public, yet attempts it nonetheless.  
Disrobing and Transfiguration discusses a rather wide array of issues, much of it in 
relation to the then departed Mendelssohn. Hamann’s attempt to describe an approach 
most applicable to this study can be found at the end of the text. The discourse is about 
Jerusalem, namely, Mendelssohn's attempt to make an analogy that the city of Jerusalem 
(representing the Jewish religion in ancient times) should now conform to modern 
Enlightenment philosophy and religion within the confines of the secular state. 
Furthermore, he conjectured that these insights should be applied to the modern Prussian 
State. This analogy is the springboard for Hamann’s comments on everything from 
philosophical bias to his attempt at overcoming the trap of idolatry.452 The primary passage 
to be explicated is the following: 
The spirit of observation and the spirit of prophecy are the wings of human 
genius. All that is present belongs to the domain of the former; all that is 
                                                          
451 It was never published during his lifetime, and in Nadler there are two versions of the text placed side by 
side. 
452 It must be kept in mind that the text was never published and existed in multiple versions. This particular 
passage does not exist in all versions and therefore it remains unclear to what degree Hamann was content 
with it. However, there is reason to work with this passage as it accords with much of his others works. The 
other the version published by Nadler does nothing to correct or re-phrase; it focuses more directly on 
Mendelssohn and the idea of revealed religion. 
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absent, the past and the future, belongs to the domain of the latter. 
Philosophical genius expresses its power through striving, by means of 
abstraction, to make what is present absent; it disrobes actual objects into 
naked concepts and merely conceivable attributes, into pure appearances 
and phenomena. Poetic genius express its power through transfiguring, by 
means of fiction, visions of the absent past and future into present 
representations. Criticism and politics resist the usurpations of both powers 
and ensure that they are balanced, through these positive forces and means 
of observation and prophecy.453 
The spirit of observation clearly resembles other statements regarding the intellect and the 
positive use of reason. The tendency towards abstracting is clearly present. A certain 
amount of abstraction is acceptable, even necessary; it is how abstractions are understood 
and their limitations that are important.454 The spirit of observation cannot provide the past 
with meaning because it is beyond its capacity to do. Therefore, those who believe that they 
can derive meaning and knowledge of the future are engaging in a form of conjecture and 
interpretation which belongs to the spirit of prophecy.455 This scheme allows for Hamann's 
defense of revealed religion coming through history and language: emphasizing that it did 
not belong to the sphere of abstract reason employed by philosophy. Even more fascinating 
                                                          
453  Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 221. N III 382:30:34; 384:1-8, Disrobing and 
Transfiguration: A Flying Letter to Nobody, the Well Known. “Geist der Beobachtung und Geist der Weissagung 
sind die Fittige des menschlichen Genius. Zum Gebiete der ersteren gehört alles Gegenwärtige; zum Gebiete 
des letzeren alles Abwesende, der Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Das philosophische Genie äussert seine Macht 
dadurch, daß es, vermittelst der Abstraction, das Gegenwärtige abwesend zu machen sich bemüht; wirkliche 
Gegenstrände zu nackten Begriffen und bloß denkbaren Merkmalen, zu reinen Erscheinungen und 
Phänomenen entkleidet. Das poetische Genie äussert seine Macht dadurch, daß es, vermittelst der Fiction, die 
Visionen abwesender Verganenheit und Zukunft zu gegenwärtigen Darstellungen verklärt. Kritik und Politik 
widerstehen den Usurpationen beyder Mächte, und sorgen für das Gleichgewicht derselben, durch die 
nemlichen positiven Kräfte und Mittel der Beobachtung und Weissagung.” 
454 This closely resembles Francis Bacon and his limitations placed on the use of the scientific method, 
particularly its inability to provide orientation regarding religious matters. Cf. Sven-Aage Jørgensen, 
“Hamann, Bacon, and Tradition,” Orbis Litterarum 16, no. 1–2 (1961): 48.-73. Also, Sven-Aage Jørgensen, 
Querdenker der Aufklärung: Studien zu Johann Georg Hamann (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), 37. 
455 For Hamann, to act is to act in accordance with an eschatological view of the future. As such, the domain of 
human moral action is not grounded in the spirit of observation.  
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are the eschatological aspects of the spirit of prophecy.456 Poetic genius is to the spirit of 
prophecy what philosophy is to the spirit of observation. It is that which provides 
explanatory power to our lives, through fiction. There is an interesting convergence 
between Hamann's critique of his contemporaries’ systems as fabrication of human art and 
the poetic element present when interpreting and giving meaning to reality. The critical 
difference appears to be the independence from contingency and further claim of access to 
"reality". Enlightenment thinkers rejected the spirit of prophecy all the while possessing 
their own form of eschatology. In the passages that follow the quote above, a concrete 
example is given of the spirit of prophecy. The idea of Jerusalem is taken into consideration. 
Mendelssohn used the analogy of Jerusalem to proffer the idea that the Jewish religion was 
merely a vehicle for revealing the eternal truths of reason. For Hamann, Jerusalem can only 
be understood through prophecy; this meant the revelation of a new heaven and new earth 
– the New Jerusalem. In light of the prospect of the New Jerusalem is the Old Jerusalem 
given meaning.  
The regulatory apparatuses of criticism and of politics are important to 
understanding how this scheme does not give human imagination free rein. Hamann does 
not precisely define how politics and criticism work in resisting both powers, but one can 
draw on earlier ideas expressed in his thought that aid in understanding how this might 
function. Without some sort of control, the idea of the spirit of prophecy would seem to 
give free rein to any and all pseudo-poetic explanations of life. In fact, it might be for this 
reason that Hamann focused on the idea of Jerusalem as having a prophetic function and 
                                                          
456 This is only found in the second version of Disrobing and Transfiguration that currently has no English 
translation. 
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interpretation due to the alterations he made in his second draft.457 Either way, the manner 
in which Hamann processed knowledge is revealed in this sketch: reason being limited in 
its ability to provide meaning for the existence of life. Additionally, the spirit of prophecy 
indicates the importance he placed upon history and eschatology, which are behind the 
meaning given to our world, which informs one's reading of the world (i.e. hermeneutics).  
Hamann gives reasons for why he interprets the prophetic element of Jerusalem as 
he does. However, this approach gives little if any room for definitiveness, as it would lead 
to a system that had the potential to become a superstitious idol of thought. Fundamentally 
it involves the continual interpretation of the world that includes factors inaccessible to the 
spirit of observation (i.e. the field of reason), namely, history and eschatology. By adding 
criticism and politics he acknowledges the need to regulate interpretations that are 
constantly changing in light of the present situation.458  
Life over Knowledge 
 
The hermeneutics of humility, his understanding of Christianity, and his attempts to 
explicate his thought in Disrobing and Transfiguration, all help to further understand 
Hamann’s response to the philosophical idolatry of his age. Specifically in regards to how 
he understood philosophical knowledge, and how he was able to avoid, to a degree, the 
idolatry which he critiqued. However much the interdependency of the powers of cognition 
were important to the approach of philosophy in understanding the world, for Hamann 
that remained only a part of life. “Which [the powers of cognition/faculties of knowledge] 
                                                          
457 Both versions follow the same general argumentative blueprint, they differ in the harshness of his critique 
of Mendelssohn. That found in Haynes’ English translations of Hamann is the first and less harsh version.  
458 Albeit one’s imagining has the potential to run amuck, consequently requiring regulation on a larger, 
societal scale. 
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taken all together, account for the most accidental and abstract modum of our existence.”459 
This leads to the final point of Hamann’s authorship: existence over knowledge. He 
regularly points toward lived existence over abstract analysis. Lived experience was a 
priority both in his life and in his thought. It was far removed from the abstract notion of 
the cogito, which dominated the philosophy of his time. A humorous yet apt example of this 
is exemplified in his comment to Jacobi, “Also in the kitchen are the gods, and what 
Descartes said of his cogito is carried over to me (überführt mich) by the activity of my 
stomach.”460 Here he is pointing to the sum of the formula cogito ergo sum. On numerous 
occasions he references the importance of the sum (i.e. one's existence) over the cognitive 
element.461 In these statements he indicates that abstract thought and the acquisition of 
knowledge are not the ultimate purpose or objective for the individual. Despite his 
erudition and extensive reading in philosophy, Hamann prioritized living above thinking. In 
a discussion on reason during his correspondence with Jacobi he stated, “Over clear 
concepts meals will grow cold and lose their taste.”462 Hamann says this to support his focus 
on language, "I have completely given up this investigation [to define reason] due to its 
difficulty, and hold myself closely to the certain, on the Organo or Criterio) – I mean 
language. Without word, no reason, - no world. Here is the source of creation and 
                                                          
459 N III, 191, Zweifel und Einfälle. “welche alle zusammengenommen, den zufälligsten und abstractesten 
modum unserer Existenz ausmachen.” 
460 To Jacobi, April 9, 1787. “Auch in der Küche sind die Götter und was Cartes von seinem Cogito sagt, 
überführt mich die Thätigkeit meines Mages. ” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im 
Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):476–77. 
461 Cf. To Jacobi, January 15, 1786, “Nur nicht über das cogito das edle Sum vergessen." Hamann and Jacobi, 5 
(Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):195. Also, to Jacobi, 28 Dec. 1785, "und muß man aus 
Cogito allein folgern das Sum. Dieser Cartesianismus ist von Sp. und Wolf übergegangen und da liegt der 
Haase im Pfeffer.” Hamann and Jacobi, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):173. 
462 To Jacobi, November 2, 1783. “Ueber die deutlichen Begriffe werden die Gerichte kalt und verlieren den 
Geschmack.” Hamann and Jacobi, Johann Georg Hamann’s, des Magus im Norden, Leben und Schriften, 5 
(Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):7. 
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government."463 Even Hamann's emphasis on language and its critical function in forming 
reason was a turn toward lived experience. That is why he perpetually utilized the analogy 
of a living organism to represent a vibrant philosophy.464 
 Hamann was concerned that philosophy had taken a place of detracting from life. 
For all of the philosophical idolatry in abstract systems and the superstitious belief in them 
that he critiqued, what was at stake was life itself: concrete, lived experience. Sometimes 
this revolved around the idea of what it meant to work and having a different value system 
and idea of what constituted work, e.g. caring for family above commercial success. 
Friendship was also a priority to him.465 As much as Hamann was immersed in the world of 
literature and philosophy he valued friendship above acclaim. For all his emphasis on 
experience and convivial reason he goes yet further, emphasizing the way the entire 
Enlightenment philosophical enterprise detracted from the basic enjoyment and 
appreciation of a life well lived. Not in an Epicurean sense of seeking pleasure, but finding 
the pleasure in friends and family, food and drink.466 Hamann does not regard the products 
of abstract reason as a way of truth or life. For Hamann truth is something to be known (i.e. 
in the Logos) not uncovered, to be experienced not grasped.  
                                                          
463 To Jacobi, November 2, 1783. "Ich habe aber diese Untersuchung ganz aufgegeben, wegen ihrer 
Schwierigkeit, und halte mich jetzo an das sichtbare Element, an dem Organo oder Criterio) – ich meine 
Sprache. Ohne Wort, keine Vernunft, - keine Welt. Hier ist die Quelle der Schöpfung und Regirung!” Hamann 
and Jacobi, 5 (Hamann’s Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi):7. 
464 E.g. “Would not a single stem with two roots be an apter image of our knowledge, one root above in the air 
and one below in the earth?” Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 212. Metacritique of the Purism 
of Reason. 
465 Prior to her translation of Hegel’s review of Hamann, Lisa Marie Anderson gives a great analysis of 
Hamann and how Friendship played a significant role in his life and thought. See, Lisa Marie Anderson, “The 
Notion of Friendship in Hegel and Hamann,” in Hegel on Hamann, Topics in Historical Philosophy (Evanston, 
Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2008). 
466 In Aesthetica in Nuce, Hamann makes clear that both Epicureanism and Stoicism mislead philosophy. 
Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 80. 
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In summation, Hamann did not claim to have solved the riddle of language or of life. 
He did, however, offer a way of thinking; a disposition with which to approach knowledge 
of the world. Despite not coming to a definitive solution to the riddle of language, he does 
come to terms with his Christian faith in his notion of knowledge. His authorship 
confronted the philosophical superstition and idolatry of his time, pointing to how it 
detracted from life.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This study has presented Hamann's authorship as a critique of the superstition and 
corresponding idolatry of the philosophy of his age, connecting the disparate topics and 
various styles of his authorship. Furthermore, the insights brought about by this 
interpretation reveal constructive elements in Hamann's thought that can be understood as 
a loose philosophical approach. In this respect, this interpretation falls within the group of 
Hamann scholarship that asserts that his thought can and does have an internal 
consistency. Moreover, it provides positive, constructive insight, aiding and furthering 
Hamann research. Assuredly, his thought was informed by his Christian faith, but often this 
has been too much the focus. What is unique about the present study is that is provides 
explication of the philosophical motivations of his critique.  
Remarkably, this reading of Hamann avoids many common pitfalls when attempting 
to interpret his work. That is, being able to hold together the primary emphases of his 
thought: for instance, the inter-textuality and irony pointing to the non-absolute and 
subjective element in philosophical writings; or how his broad idea of faith allowed him to 
be both highly skeptical while being devoutly Christian.   
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This reading of Hamann opens up a few new avenues that could be further pursued. 
One of them would be how his broad notion of faith would compare to current ideas of faith 
in the different Christian traditions: does it err too far on the broadly philosophical or 
might it aid in bridging the contention between revealed religion and philosophical as well 
as scientific approaches to knowledge. Another avenue opened up by this interpretation is 
in the field of interreligious dialogue. Namely, how might a Hamannian focus on the 
inability of philosophy to prove or disprove religious truths revealed in the concrete, 
historical religions be a means whereby dialogue could focus on understanding could be 
investigated? That is, being solutions oriented rather than truth oriented. Hamann's 
defense of historical Judaism in Golgotha and Sheblimini! is a specific example of how he 
treated two differing concrete religions in his authorship.  
 Significantly, the interpretation of Hamann's critique being motivated by his notion 
of supersition and its corresponding idolatry of philosophy presented in the present study 
holds up from the beginning of his authorship through the end. Albeit there are slight 
changes and developments, yet these only add to a greater focus of his critique, christened 
by the Socratic Memorabilia.467 Finally, the interpretation of Hamann as argued for here 
presents a Hamannian approach to philosophy, namely, the hermeneutics of humility. The 
latter provides those who have the patience and learning requisite to reading Hamann, a 
lens by which he can be better understood and applied to contemporary theological and 
philosophical questions.   
 
                                                          
467 For instance, his later use of Metacritique did not offer a new approach, but only a better description of 
what Hamann had been doing up until that point. 
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